“There is no freedom in Japanese society,” a student from Burma remarked provocatively in a course I teach at a university in Tokyo. Her experience in Japan as an outsider has made her feel that “freedom” in Japan is only a borrowed concept, not one that people practice or authentically think for themselves in their daily lives. Her sharp words of criticism apparently stirred up uneasy feelings among other, Japanese students — students who are not used to raising their voices. Many of them later came to express their feeling that they had lost something precious in their educational experience. “Where do we find ourselves?…Sleep lingers all our lifetime about our eyes, as night hovers all day in the boughs of the fir-tree” — the question Ralph Waldo Emerson once raised concerning the loss of the self is still relevant for those young college students. School for them is not necessarily a place for experiencing the joy of learning, for reconfirming their sense of existence, or for that matter for finding their own voices. Education today, which is so often driven by assumptions of gaining and raising (whether this comes as an appeal to raise standards, or to achieve excellence, or to teach right and wrong, or to increase the understanding of other cultures), often produces, ironically, a ubiquitous sense of loss or irrelevance. As if to combat this, however, or to cover over the pervasive sense of loss into something else, the quest for absolute goals gains momentum in recent educational reforms. As Richard Rorty cynically puts this: “unless the youth is raised to believe in moral absolutes, and in objective truth, civilization is doomed.”

The invisible but undeniable sense of loss behind gain I believe to be one of the most tragic conditions of contemporary education. And in a second sense, it is tragic that educational reform today has lost its sensitivity to this duplicitous condition. This is the theme I would like to pursue in this essay. An urgent task of education, I shall propose, is to find a way to let young people encounter courageously such critical but awakening voices as that of the Burmese student, to let them remember what they have lost, while still maintaining their hope. To respond to this challenge, this essay attempts to re-examine the potential of John Dewey’s pragmatism in the light of Emersonian moral perfectionism (EMP) — an interpretation of Emerson presented by Stanley Cavell.

Deweyan pragmatism is notorious for its lack of the sense of the tragic. His ateleological notion of growth and its concomitant concept of intelligence, has been continuously attacked from his days until today on the grounds that it has led education nowhere, if not into chaos. Rorty’s relativist reinterpretation of Dewey aggravates the concern. Critics of Dewey tend to advocate a reactionary turn to moral absolutism and the quest of certainty in education. Going beyond debates between relativism and absolutism, Deweyan pragmatism, if reconsidered and
reconstructed, can help us overcome the peculiar sense of the tragic as contemporary education manifests it. In service of this aim, I shall try to recover Dewey’s “muted voice,” not in the direction of Rorty’s antifoundationalism, but in that of Emerson’s, whose perfectionist spirit is revived today by Cavell. By so doing, I wish to point to the possibility of hope for education along the lines of Emersonian perfectionist education: a hope that is geared towards finding one’s own voice and releasing the intensity of living.

“The Tragic Sense of Education”: The Debate between Burbules and Arcilla

The debate between Nicholas Burbules and René Arcilla over the tragic sense of education suggests a possible continuity (and allegedly discontinuity) between education, tragedy, and pragmatism. “[E]very success is a failure,” Burbules declares, presenting a thought-provoking argument to the effect that the endeavor of education needs to be reconsidered from the perspective of the “tragic sense.” Following an Aristotelian model of tragedy, he claims that the tragic sense of education originates in “uncertainty, confusion, and failure,” and the “limits to our effort.” This is not, however, pessimism. Appealing to Rorty’s neo-pragmatist idea of “unjustifiable hope,” Burbules claims that pragmatism encourages us to persevere “without falling into either cynicism or utopianism.” He criticizes, however, Sidney Hook’s appeal to science as the way of “going all the way through tragedy.” In recent writings, Burbules has reinforced this position, declaring that “pragmatism, in my view, lacks a recognition of tragedy.”

Although Arcilla shares the concerns of Burbules, he raises doubts over Burbules’s apparent affirmation of Rorty’s antifoundationalist position. In Arcilla’s view, the acknowledgment of the tragic, which he defines in terms of irrecoverable loss, leads us to act “beyond the reach of pragmatist forms of justification” — a hope that is justified by outcomes and some kind of “observable success.” As an alternative, Arcilla proposes tragic absolutism — the acceptance of “absolute loss and vulnerability, absolute mortality,” and an appeal to “an absolute faith in our personal sense of integrity” as the means of “absolute redemption.”

Megan Boler, in reviewing this debate, connects Arcilla’s position with the postmodern sense of tragedy, particularly with Jacques Derrida’s embrace of disappointment. There again, pragmatism is challenged. Boler characterizes the tragic sensibility of postmodern times in terms of “tragedies of dissensus”: there is no shared value, no common ground or objective norm that the subject can rely on. She argues that pragmatism cannot do justice to the postmodern tragic sense of dissonance and disequilibrium.

Pragmatists, however, cannot and should not completely give in at this point as the criticisms also harbor their own potential problems. I believe it is in the light of these very problems that pragmatism must be newly appreciated and that its reconstruction is urgently needed. The first problem is what might be called the romanticization of tragedy. The “sceptical attitude” that Burbules encourages may end up by cultivating among teachers and students a sentimentalized — or worse, a daunting — feeling of imperfection, incompleteness, and inadequacy. In Arcilla’s case, such a tendency is heightened by a certain mystification of the tragic sense. The
Boler also evokes the image of the guilt-stricken self in a “confession of ignorance.” There is something in postmodern culture that reinforces this mood of mourning, that deprives us of energy for commitment, indeed, hope itself. As Boler claims: “if a ‘fundamental groundlessness’ must be accepted, perhaps giving up hope is a fruitful directive.”

The second problem is the generalization of tragedy and the lack of specificity. As Linda Williams points out, from a feminist position “tragedy has always been assumed to be universal; speaking for and to a supposedly universal ‘mankind.’” Within this way of thinking, the particular and simple joy of learning the novice often exhibits is trivialized. The accounts of tragedy given by Burbules, Arcilla, and Boler follow Greek tragedy. Their views seem to be predominantly anchored in the psychological basis of fear (“the fear of death,” as Arcilla puts it). To those young people who have lost their voice, and who cannot even remember their sense of loss, neither Burbules, nor Arcilla, nor Boler gives any concrete guidance as to how the moment of redemptive transformation is to be realized.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF DEWEYAN PRAGMATISM IN THE LIGHT OF EMERSONIAN MORAL PERFECTIONISM

It is the tragedy of the absolutism of tragedy and its concomitant abrogation of hope that pragmatism resists. From this standpoint, I shall propose another approach to the tragic scene of contemporary education. This is to be done by reconstructing Deweyan pragmatism in the light of EMP. While fully accepting the fate of irrecoverable loss, Emersonian perfectionism does not resort to the absolute ground or to any mystical force of redemption.

EMERSONIAN MORAL PERFECTIONISM: “EMERSON: THE PHILOSOPHER OF DEMOCRACY”

Cavell interprets Emerson’s perfectionism as an ateological concept: perfection as perfecting with no fixed ends. The essence of EMP, as Cavell presents it, is the endless journey of self-overcoming whose central focus is on the here and now in the process of attaining a further, next self, not the highest self: “each state of the self is, so to speak, final” (CHU, 3). The direction of Emersonian perfection is “not up but on... in which the goal is decided not by anything picturable as the sun, by nothing beyond the way of the journey itself” (CHU, 10). It is characterized by “goallessness” (CHU, xxxiv); it refuses final perfectibility. It might then be asked what self-realization consists in. Cavell’s suggested response is secular and down to earth; perfection is firmly rooted in our natural sense of shame as a driving force and the quest for happiness. This contrasts, for example, with Thomas Hurka’s omission of natural desire in his Aristotelian concept of perfectionism. Cavell’s EMP is more Freudian than Aristotelian. The sense of shame is specifically directed against the state of conformity. The Emersonian self is involved in the continuous illumination of the state of “my” compromise with “my” society; my self-realization consists in my response to my society in my own voice of criticism. This Cavell calls “the democratic aspiration” (CHU, 1).

It is Dewey who acknowledges these perfectionist and democratic strains in Emerson — whom he called “The Philosopher of Democracy.” Although it is...
controversial whether Emerson is a pragmatist and whether Dewey is an Emersonian perfectionist, a rereading of Dewey through Cavell’s Emerson helps in the recovery of Dewey’s muted Emersonian voice. Dewey’s conception of democracy and growth has the double condition inherent in Emerson’s perfectionism: his sense of democracy as both attained and unattained, not as some fixed telos, but rather as something forever to be worked towards, never finally to be achieved.

**The Flying Perfect: The Emersonian and Deweyan Senses of the Tragic**

Can perfectionism, however, accommodate the tragic sense of life? Raymond Boisvert expresses the doubt that the notion of perfection is compatible with what he calls the tragic metaphysics of Necessity. In sharp contrast to Greek tragedy, perfectionism, Boisvert claims, is a one-sided meliorism that lacks the concept of sin and degeneration, and that simply negates the past for future regeneration. Contrary to Boisvert’s view, EMP is rooted in the double condition of existence. Its worldview is best captured by Emerson’s idea of the “flying Perfect”:

> Our life is an apprenticeship to the truth, that around every circle another can be drawn; that there is no end in nature, but every end is a beginning; that there is always another dawn risen on mid-noon, and under every deep a lower deep opens. This fact, as afar as is symbolizes the moral fact of the Unattainable, the flying Perfect.

Emerson’s sense of perfection is permeated by a poignant sense of imperfection. Cavell elaborates this imagery in terms of “ever-widening circles” and “endless, discontinuous encirclings” (CHU, xxxiv). Dewey holds a similar view, especially in his later aesthetic writings, speaking of “ever-recurring cycles of growth” and of “an expanded whole.” Unlike Boisvert’s criticism, the flying Perfect does not affirm a total break from the past or a singular process of ascent; neither doubt nor hope alone is in its origin. Dewey presents an Emersonian transitory view of the world — the world composed of an admixture of instability and stability. His Emersonian sense of the attained and unattained perfection accommodates loss, limitation, or failure — as much as gain, possibility, and success — as integral parts of the human condition. As Dewey says: “progress is not necessarily advance” (AE, 216).

Dewey, with Emerson and Cavell, suggests a peculiar sense of the tragic: in our obliviousness to the double condition of human existence, we cannot even remember its loss, its unattainability; we subside into apathy and indifference. He expresses this tragic sense as follows: “We do not know what we really want and we make no great effort to find out.” Dewey criticizes a state in which human beings, without the aching sense of unattainability, live in the illusion that democracy has attained its perfection. This state of oblivion is the crisis of nihilism — the numbing of our humble sense of the human condition. It is this urgent sense of crisis and shame that incessantly drives Dewey towards a further state of democracy: “Perfection means perfecting, fulfilment, fulfilling, and the good is now or never.” This is tantamount to what Cavell calls “Perfectionisms’s moral urgency” (CHU, 55).

**The Emersonian Way of Going through Tragedy: Finding as Founding**

In this double condition, what is the Emersonian perfectionist way of “going all through tragedy”? It is more than retrospective mourning over loss; it is not constrained by an absolute sense of mortality. The keen recognition of a reality in
which distance and proximity are forever “knotted” is internal to EMP (CHU, 12).

Suppose we see our age as impoverished in the first sense of the tragic, the sense of irrecoverable loss, our response is one of grief. Grief, however, was not Emerson’s response to his own tragic experience — the loss of his young son, Waldo. A day after Waldo’s death at the age of five, Emerson wrote a letter to his close friend, Margaret Fuller: “Shall I ever dare to love any thing again. Farewell and Farewell, O my Boy!” An entry in his journal written some two months later demonstrates Emerson’s continuing grief:

A new day, a new harvest, new duties, new men, new fields of thought, new powers call you, and an eye fastened on the past unsuns nature, bereaves me of hope, and ruins me with a squalid indigence which nothing but death can adequately symbolize.

Two years later, however, his tone changes:

In the death of my son, now more than two years ago, I seem to have lost a beautiful estate — no more....So is it with this calamity; it does not touch me: some thing which I fancied was a part of me, which could not be torn away without tearing me, nor enlarged without enriching me, falls off from me, and leaves no scar. It was caducous. I grieve that grief can teach me nothing, nor carry me one step into real nature.

His sense of the tragic has been metamorphosed, toward a quiet resolve.

Cavell interprets Emerson’s tragic sense in connection with his idea of “finding as founding.” Emerson’s response to the tragic sense of groundlessness when we lose our way is not grief, but the awareness of the futility of grieving. Cavell elaborates on this as follows. To make sense of the life of his lost son, Emerson has to declare himself as a philosopher, to be a founder. Philosophy begins in loss, with the experience of “the world falling away.” Emerson’s philosophical task, however, is not the building of the unified foundation of philosophy as a kind of the ground we reach once and for all. “Foundation reaches no farther than each issue of finding.” Paradoxically, it is the process of the establishing of founding without a founder. Cavell claims that Emerson’s effort of finding himself again in this world symbolizes “finding a new America in the West while being lost.” This is a process of finding one’s location as a newcomer, to be the “first philosopher of this new region.” Philosophical writing then involves the task of “founding a nation.” In contrast to Derrida, whose task is to deconstruct the “finished edifice of philosophy,” Cavell claims that Emerson’s is “to avert foundation, in advance” in “founding, or deconfounding, American thinking.” This might be called Emerson’s antifoundationalism, his middle way of living beyond the restrictive, fixed choice between no ground and absolute ground.

In response to “cynicism and disillusion” as politically devastating passions in a democracy and the imminent sense of groundlessness in our times, Emerson and Cavell encourage us to follow the path of finding as founding. Certainly, Dewey would endorse Emersonian antifoundationalism. The flying Perfect always leaves the possibility of its own transcendence through imperfection: it consistently drives us to depart again. Its focus is on an endless searching for the common with the sense of defeat and pain as much as the hope for advancement; and with the acknowledgment that unity is always beyond our full grasp. This brings Deweyan pragmatism in a direction different from Rorty’s relativist antifoundationalism. The life of
Emersonian perfection is tested, and indeed, starts in the very moment when we are mired in loss and face limitations — whether it involves the impossibility of the full understanding of different values, or the imperfectability of democratic ideals. A hope for unity is regenerated from within the conditions of dissonance, disequilibrium, and imperfection. As Cavell says: “[Emerson’s] perception of the moment is taken in hope, as something to be proven only on the way, by the way.”

An urgently practical question here is how one can convert a negative force that erodes one’s life into affirmative energy for further perfection. In EMP, a key for this conversion lies in the prophetic power of impulse, the Emersonian “gleam of light” — an admixture of the aesthetic, spiritual, and natural. In his idea of habit reconstruction, Dewey says that impulse plays a significant role as an impetus to passionate “hope” to produce a “prophetic vision” (*HNC*, 161). In Cavell’s words, power is derived from “crossing, or rather leaping.” This urge is the limitless source for perfection, the “foundation” for hope. The possibility that we can always depart again from within loss, by “bearing pain,” is Emerson’s hope, Dewey’s hope, and America’s hope. While an Emersonian way of living with tragedy is projective and prospective, this is not simply the negation of the past; rather it is “recurrence with difference” (*AE*, 173). This is the essence of Emersonian self-transcendence and Deweyan “detachment” (*AE*, 262).

**Conclusion: Education’s Hope: Towards Emersonian Perfectionist Education**

I am at first apprised of my vicinity to a new and excellent region of life. By persisting to read or to think, this region gives further sign of itself, as it were in flashes of light, in sudden discoveries of its profound beauty and repose.

Thus does Emerson declare his sense of joy in his own response to his initial skeptical question, “Where do we find ourselves?” How can one in lingering sleep experience such a moment of awakening? How can Dewey’s pragmatism, reconstructed in the light of Emersonian moral perfectionism, contribute to this educational task?

Let us revisit the tragic condition of education that was discussed at the beginning — the paradoxical conditions of gain and loss, and the forgetting of the very sense of loss. The voices of Emerson, Cavell, and Dewey have awakened us to the fact that oblivion to this double condition is at the heart of nihilism in education — the crisis of an ethical thinning, of a deprivation of one’s own voice, and indeed of a flattening of life as a whole in the state of conformity. The clamour of urgency about the raising of standards and the increasing of school effectiveness, on the one hand, and the drive towards the clear identification of goals in curriculum and the fixation of values in moral education, on the other, do not save us; rather they aggravate this state of oblivion. Concomitant to this trend is the metaphor of freedom in the globalized economy that permeates the language of educational reforms. The commercialized, therapeutic culture enfeebles the resilience of youthful impulse.

What we have lost under these circumstances is, Emerson and Dewey remind us, a *hope* that each of us can become the creator of our own culture, and the bearer of history by producing “critical junctures” in time. The foremost task of their perfectionist education is to convert the state of obliviousness to the remembrance
and releasing of the intensity of one’s gleam of light — the precious reservoir of the regeneration of culture from within. This Dewey calls the “re-education” of aesthetic impulse (AE, 328). The fundamental mode of Emersonian perfectionist education is neither fear, nor doubt, nor the asceticism that is so much a part of absolutist forms of education; rather it is geared towards trust — trust in prophetic impulse and the creative energy of life, trust in what is yet to come. This is trust not only in personal relationships, but in what experience and nature can bequeath us beyond ourselves. This implies the courage to open oneself to the potential in the evolving universe, the courage to receive the otherness of the world that endlessly transcends one’s existing knowledge. Emerson’s and Dewey’s voices remind us that it is the courage to trust that is missing today — from the minds of policy makers, teachers, parents, and students.

Unlike Rorty’s unjustifiable hope, the hope for education as expressed by Emerson, Cavell, and Dewey is justifiable not by any fixed, absolute ground, but by the way — on the way — of living. Justification is made through the creation of words, the work of poiesis, and the finding of one’s own voice as the “foundation” of hope. The poets, they suggest, are the “moral prophets” of democracy (AE, 350), and with their inner light, they serve as critics of culture (AE, 349). The poets emancipate us from the “prison” of our thoughts, produce the moment of “metamorphosis,” which breaks new ground. Emerson’s and Dewey’s perfectionist education transcends any conventional dichotomy between traditional and progressive forms of education, and revitalizes the idea of liberal learning: learning as a life-long process of perfection, a process of liberating our innovative impulses and voices through our engagement with culture, tradition, and texts.

In the re-education of intensity, the classroom must become the forum for the finding of voices mutually, through awakening and remembrance. The classroom is a place, to borrow Cavell’s phrase, for an “autobiographical exercise.” But finding one’s voice here is something more than a merely verbal formula, or than the assertion of one’s position in the name of social justice. Unlike the typical mode of narrative education that tends to mourn and look back upon one’s past miseries in the mode of ressentiment, the focus of Emerson’s and Dewey’s perfectionist education is on the drawing out of creative energy by transcending the tragic. Using Thoreau’s metaphor in Walden, Cavell says that our capacity and indeed freedom to leave our existing poverty is “the transfiguration of mourning as grief into morning as dawn.”

Emersonian perfectionist education can be incorporated into such diverse classes as history, social sciences, ethics, art, and literature. Emersonian moral education can permeate the whole range of human interaction and the process of learning and teaching. In resisting both the kind of moral absolutism that inculcates the revengeful attitude of combating evil in the name of good, and a relativistic attitude towards the different, Deweyan pragmatism reconstructed in the light of EMP gives education hope — hope for our common ground — while keenly acknowledging the ever-lasting gap that separates us, one from another. In circumstances of globalization and with a bearing on questions of multiculturalism, Dewey’s and Emerson’s transcendental perspective of mutual perfection fore-
grounds the educative possibilities of interpretation and translation that the encounter with otherness enables.

3. Stanley Cavell, *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1990). For all subsequent references this text will be cited as CHU.
5. I thank Vincent Colapietro for suggesting this phrase.
9. Ibid., 478, 480.
23. John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, in *LW* 10, 152, 171. For all subsequent references this text will be cited as *AE*.


32. Cavell, *This New Yet Unapproachable America*, 113.


37. Cavell, *Contesting Tears*, 211.

38. Emerson, “Experience,” 228.


42. Cavell, *Contesting Tears*, 212.