Tradition, Authority, and Education: Insights from Gadamer and Giussani

Brett Bertucio
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Introduction

Not more than a year ago, a speech given by John Agresto, a former deputy chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities, reignited longstanding debates regarding the future of the humane disciplines. A subsequent flurry of essays, both in favor and in rebuttal, rehashed Allan Bloom’s decades-old claim that postmodern and critical theories have contributed to the decline of traditional humanities. While this “decline” may be empirically suspect, the “critical” thrust of higher education and its inherent antagonism toward the past – whether to the historical wisdom accumulated in an academic discipline or to some sweeping notion of “the Western tradition” – is undeniable. University bookstores are lined with works subtitled “A Critical History,” “A Critical Approach,” or “A Critical Reader.” Undergraduates often seem to equate scholarly understanding with the deconstruction of past ideas. Appeals to tradition are frequently dismissed as irrational or at least unsophisticated. My intention here is not to deny the value or even necessity of many insights generated through critical theory. Rather, I am skeptical as to whether the critical project, with its inherently antagonistic relationship to the past, can provide the grounds for a substantive education.

In our current “critical” climate, it is essential for educators to recover a positive relationship to the past. In this article, I propose the thought of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Luigi Giussani as models for the rehabilitation of our conceptions of authority, tradition, and criticism. Gadamer’s insight is helpful, in part because philosophical hermeneutics arose out of the need to interpret the past during a historical moment in which a substantive tradition (the biblical interpretation of the Roman Catholic Church) was being jettisoned. Philosophers of education have previously made fruitful appeals to his work in other areas. Charles Bingham has examined teacher authority through a Gadamerian lens, while Deborah Kerdeman has shown how his thought might provide an alternative to a modernist, Cartesian education focused on mastery and control. In light of this year’s conference theme, I hope to extend Gadamer’s project contra the
“Enlightenment prejudice against prejudice”\textsuperscript{10} to the role of tradition and authority in education. Further, the article aims to contribute to the philosophy of education literature by introducing the thought of the late Italian theologian and educator Luigi Giussani. Giussani’s \textit{The Risk of Education} offers a pedagogical model that is remarkably consistent with Gadamerian principles. His work provides a concrete application of Gadamer’s thought, a further rehabilitation of “criticism,” and a more convincing account of how embeddedness in tradition serves to overcome subjectivism. After delineating predominant conceptions of tradition and authority through the work of Jürgen Habermas and outlining Gadamer’s alternative understanding, I argue that Giussani’s model offers students a more reasonable relationship to the past.

\textbf{Habermas and the Critical Project}

Habermas provides an appropriate representation of the critical project, not only because his “debate” with Gadamer has been enshrined in collective memory,\textsuperscript{11} but because his work has been foundational to critical theory.\textsuperscript{12} Although at the time of the debate, Habermas was responding to Gadamer, both identify their opponent as representative of the antithesis of their original projects. According to Gadamer, Habermas adopts the Enlightenment position that “takes tradition as an object of critique, just as the natural sciences do with the evidence of the senses.”\textsuperscript{13} For Habermas, reflection tends, by definition, toward radical autonomy. In his words, reason “obeys an emancipatory cognitive interest.”\textsuperscript{14} Following the ethic of the Reformation, the Enlightenment conception of reason is inimical to authority. To accept a claim on the basis of authority or tradition is inherently irrational. Only when the subject accepts a proposal on the basis of unencumbered reason can this acceptance be rational. In Habermas’ view, reflection illuminates and repudiates the false consciousness produced by dogmatic institutions. It is therefore always geared toward the dissolution of tradition.\textsuperscript{15}

In his review of \textit{Truth and Method}, Habermas accuses Gadamer of confining the subject within the same dogmatic limitations that necessitate emancipatory critical reflection. Interestingly, Habermas sees Gadamer’s view as explicitly educational:

Gadamer has in mind the type of educational process through which tradition is transferred into individual learning processes and appropriated as tradition. Here the person of the educator legitimates prejudices that are inculcated in the learner with authority – and this means, however we turn it around, under the potential threat of sanctions and with the prospect of gratifications.\textsuperscript{16}
He accuses Gadamer of blindness to the alleged fact that authority is necessarily coercive. In recognizing authority as legitimate, the student remains bound by that authority and thus reflection (which for Habermas is always critical and dissolving) is stunted. The student will remain at the level of knowledge, and will not be capable of reflection (which is beyond, after, and above tradition). Habermas admits that authority can be stripped of domination and accepted as an “insight and rational decision,” but maintains that this insight will appear as the personal possession of the individual unbounded by the weight of tradition. If whatever is presented as the wisdom of the past is helpful or insightful, this occurs by an arbitrary chance. For Habermas, and for dominant academic currents, tradition and authority cannot be categorically positive.

Gadamer’s Recovery of Authority and Tradition

In contrast, Gadamer asserts that reason and authority “stand in a basically ambivalent relation.” Ingrid Scheibler’s defense of Gadamer is helpful here. While Gadamer may have failed to sufficiently emphasize his caution against uncritical assent to authority, Habermas (and often the contemporary academy) ignores those cases in which one can reflectively accept the judgment of authority. While Gadamer believes that authority can serve to supplant judgment, this is not part of its authentic essence. In his view:

the authority of persons is ultimately based not on the subjection and abdication of reason but on an act of acknowledgment and knowledge – the knowledge, namely, that the other is superior to oneself in judgement and insight and that for this reason his judgment take precedence – i.e., it takes priority over one’s own.

The acknowledgement of this possibility forms the basis for hermeneutic experience. In dialogue, I encounter the horizon (for Gadamer, the range of vision conditioned by historical, cultural, and experiential insight) of another. I am able to recognize a true authority not because the person adopts a dominant stance toward me, but because I recognize that her horizon captures reality better than my own. Under this conception of authority, assent is a supremely free and rational act. In fact, contrary to the assumptions of the critical project, it is precisely through the acknowledgement of authority that my own horizon becomes wider. Rather than being trapped, as Habermas would argue, this relationship to authority allows me to move beyond my own limited sphere.
Gadamer also offers a more helpful formulation of tradition. The Cartesian and later Enlightenment penchant for methodology can be read as an attempt to escape from prejudices – those notions we bring to a question that are the seemingly arbitrary products of our particular historical position. We might call these inherited concepts “tradition.” Rather than seeking to transcend the historicity of experience, Gadamer suggests that tradition is a normative condition for reflection. In our daily experience, “we are always situated within traditions, and ... we do not conceive of them as something other, something alien.”21 In interpretation, inherited concepts – what Heidegger terms “fore-conceptions” and Gadamer calls “fore-meanings” – are the basis with which we approach a historical text. The interpreter is constantly projecting possible meanings onto her object and verifying them against its alterality. Certainly, particular dispositions must be developed. The interpreter must direct her gaze toward the object and derive her fore-meanings from this encounter as far as possible. However, this does not mean that the task can be attempted without initial, provisional patterns of thought. Insofar as tradition provides an expansive horizon with which to approach a text or an object, it is not only helpful, but essential.22

Georgia Warnke raises the question that identifies criticisms of Gadamer’s theory as essentially conservative: “Why... is the hermeneutic circle not a vicious one?”23 What prevents the interpreter from simply confirming her assumptions about a text or object? This concern ultimately gives rise to the accusation that Gadamer’s insistence on tradition solidifies an arbitrary subjectivism. As Gadamer puts it: “[H]ow is one supposed to find his way out of the boundaries of his own fore-meanings?”24 Gadamer places the answer in hermeneutic experience itself. The hermeneutical task is in some sense a process of testing, of verifying the “fore-meanings dwelling within.”25 In order to separate false prejudices from valid ones, they must be made visible through provocation. Traditional understandings must be put “at risk” – not in Habermas’ sense of antagonistic interrogation, but through a process of testing potentially valid explanations.26

Gadamer advances the “anticipation of completeness” and criterion of “unity” as benchmarks for this verification. When approaching a text, the reader must assume an internal coherence or completeness. Situations where fore-meanings prove inadequate to explain the whole of the text serve as correctives for prejudices. As Deborah Kerdelman has shown, realizing the inadequacy of a fore-meaning – the experience of being “pulled up short” – is powerfully educative.27 Not only does this verification of traditional prejudice protect against Heidegger’s “arbitrary fancies,”28 but by grounding hermeneutic understanding in a substantive tradition, it insulates the interpreter from the more radical, a-historical subjectivism of Enlightenment
In turning to Giussani, we shall see how the verification process is enacted in a pedagogical method and how the criterion of unity can be extended to the whole of experience.

**Luigi Giussani and The Risk of Education**

To be sure, Giussani’s writing cannot be considered apart from his work as a Catholic priest, theologian, and founder of the lay movement *Communione e Liberazione*. In places, his thought employs decidedly metaphysical anthropologies that will not hold universal appeal. However, his educational thought coheres remarkably with Gadamer’s hermeneutic principles and provides an inimitable model for the rehabilitation of our relationship to the past. In his *The Risk of Education*, a work inspired by his teaching at high school and university levels, Giussani outlines three criteria for education. First: “In order to educate, we must present the past in a suitable form.” Like Gadamer, Giussani sees reason as beginning from “working hypotheses” of meaning. Without a substantive working hypothesis, young people will “either invent skewed ones or embrace skepticism.” It is important to note here that while Gadamer is speaking primarily of a fore-meaning that will explain all the factors of a text, Giussani’s “hypothesis” anticipates a unity of all the factors of experience.

To elect tradition as the privileged working hypothesis is not an arbitrary or coercive choice, as Gadamer’s critics might claim. Rather, for Giussani, tradition is inseparable from the person. It is “that complex endowment with which nature arms us” in order to “confront our surroundings.” The general thrust of the critical project, the assumption that tradition and reason are inimical, is itself irrational in Giussani’s view:

Let us say that a man is launched on life’s path with a tradition in his hands. Suppose he throws it away before putting it to use with a loyalty coming right from the very core of his being, before having really verified it. His refusal of something so inherent to his nature would betray a fundamental disloyalty in other aspects of his life as well, particularly with respect to himself and his own destiny.

Loyalty to tradition is necessary not simply because it constitutes part of the historically conditioned subject, but also because it is necessary to avoid the very subjectivism and false consciousness of which Habermas warns. Without a substantive hypothesis, the student will construct her own hypothesis in response to the inexorable desire for meaning. This will inevitably
consist of either the codification of provisional reactions or the acceptance of whatever dominant cultural mentalities surround her. Most likely, “young people will be victims of the strongest wind and its ever-changing shape, a public opinion shaped by the elites who hold real power.” While Habermas and others might object that tradition itself is shaped by elite power, this view overlooks the possibility of accumulated historical verification, which will be made clear in examining Giussani’s third criterion.

Giussani’s second criterion concerns the proper mediation of tradition. The past must be presented “within the context of a life experience.” Gadamer concurs on this point, noting that historical inquiry is always motivated by present concerns. For Giussani, this means that tradition must be embodied and presented in the person of the teacher, in a living authority. Like Gadamer, Giussani argues that authentic authority is not opposed to reason, but rather is generated by reason.

We experience authority when we meet someone who possesses a full awareness of reality, who imposes on us a recognition and arouses surprise, novelty, and respect. There is an inevitable attraction within authority and an inexorable suggestion within us, since the experience of authority reminds one more or less clearly of one’s poverty and limitations.

It is interesting that the Enlightenment project, in contrast, is predicated on the denial of limitations. To admit the relative paucity of the single human intellect prepares the way for a much-needed rehabilitation of authority. Authentic authority does not constrain or coerce, but is in fact necessary for extending the subject’s own limited vision.

Giussani’s final criterion helps to further extend Gadamer’s hermeneutical principle of verification to the broader work of education. Whereas for Gadamer, a fore-meaning is tested against the unity of a text, for Giussani, the hypothesis presented by tradition must be critically compared to all the factors of a student’s experience. He argues that we can locate “a primordial ‘original experience’ that constitutes [our] identity in the way [we] face everything.” Even in the most mundane events, we evaluate life on the basis of our deepest desires – for goodness, for happiness, for truth, for beauty, for justice, for love. Giussani terms this experience of unavoidable comparison the “elementary experience.” We should note that his particular use of “experience” does not refer to a specific type of occurrence in daily life, but instead designates a fact of existence that is noticed through reflection on experience. If I am honest with myself, I must admit that the criteria with which I instinctively evaluate my life (even if this evaluation is usually haphazard or
superficial), can be described as the desire for truth, beauty, goodness, justice, etc. Giussani refers to these needs as “evidences,” because they help illuminate the structure of the person. The Italian term *esigenze*, here rendered as “needs” and more closely related to the English “exigency,” is instructive. These needs are so immediate, so pressing, so inexorable, that they help constitute the person.

The “elementary experience,” or constitutive needs, form a criterion with which to critically evaluate the claims of tradition. In each moment of contact with, or exposure to, tradition, a student may inquire, “Does this proposal meet my deepest needs? Does it account for what I experience as the central concerns of life?” In this way, tradition is taken seriously. It is allowed to address the student on its own terms – as a potential explanatory hypothesis for life. The young person is helped to compare the hypothesis of tradition to the demands of her elementary experience. Only a tradition that corresponds with the elementary experience will be rationally accepted or affirmed. In this way, Giussani’s method avoids the fear underlying the critical project – that tradition acts as a coercive force upon the person. By using the person’s own constitutive nature as a criterion for verification, a potentially alienating or coercive tradition will be made transparent and can be rationally rejected.

Two notes are necessary here. First, this criterion may appear egocentric and thus given to subjectivism. Its focus on perceived individual desires suggests that such an education will revolve around the mere personal preferences of students. However, for Giussani, insofar as the “elementary experience” is unavoidable and universal, it is experienced phenomenologically as *given* and is therefore not generated by the subject. For this reason, he concludes that “the fundamental criterion for facing things is an objective one.” To be sure, Giussani’s confidence that the *experience of givenness* indicates an external source of human nature implies at least a minimal theism that may be contentious.

Similarly, it is true that Giussani’s model implies a teleological relationship between human desires, reality, and the potential truth of a hypothesis. It would be impossible to deny the influence of Giussani’s seminary training, steeped in a then-recently recovered Thomism, on his thought. Like any philosophical system grounded in Aristotelian metaphysics, Giussani’s vision appeals to an ordered universe and a human intellect that is *connatural*, or structurally correspondent, to reality because it shares the same source of being. It is understandable that some may object to this on philosophical grounds, and in that sense Giussani’s proposal may not carry immediate purchase as an educational model within secular institutions or among all educational theorists. Of course, some scholars have argued that Gadamer’s thought, especially as regards the necessity of an
assumed external “world-in-itself” shared by interlocutors, is itself unavoidably theological. While these implications may be contentious and a cause for suspicion among some scholars, the genius of Giussani’s proposal is that he calls students to verify even his framework existentially. The veracity of the “elementary experience” is drawn simply from reflection on daily life, and testing this claim is itself part of his educational process. Finally, for all the theological overtones that might accompany Giussani’s work, we must admit that to reject anything akin to the correspondence between the subject and the known at operation here inevitably raises broader questions about the possibility of truth and, by extension, the entire educational enterprise.

By outlining the process of verification, Giusanni also helps to rehabilitate our notion of criticism. The Greek roots of “criticism” – κρίνειν and κρίσις – indicate a neutral process of distinguishing rather than a negative process of denigration. Giussani uses the analogy of a child’s knapsack to describe a properly “critical” education. Early in a child’s life, “those who love the child instinctively offer him, and fill his knapsack with, the best of their experiences, the best choices they made in their own lives.” At a certain age, the child must open the knapsack and begin to examine its contents. If he does not criticize the items – in the sense of taking hold of them and distinguishing the good from the bad – the contents of the knapsack (in this case, tradition) will either be irrationally rejected or irrationally accepted, and the child will not mature. Under this conception of criticism, the Habermasian assumption of dissolution is not at play, and the student avoids irrationally jettisoning a tradition that may prove the most adequate explanation of all the factors of experience.

The Risk of Education provides a final insight that may motivate a more positive relation to tradition. The critical project tends to see authority and tradition as unconsciously erected, impersonal structures of power. Their cementation, it is alleged, serves to advance the material benefits of the few, who are often oblivious to their privilege. This view discounts the possibility that what we call tradition is simply a coherent hypothesis personally verified over generations of experience. As Giussani would tell his students in reference to the Christian tradition, “I’m not here so that you can take my ideas as your own; I’m here to teach you a true method that you can use to judge the things I will tell you. And what I have to tell you is the result of a long experience, of a past that is two thousand years old.”

Conclusion: Alienation and the Future of the Humanities

Roger Scruton has recently remarked that the critical trajectory of the modern academy seems to be a cannibalizing project. In the humanities in particular, higher education revolves
around the interrogation and deconstruction of the very cultural and intellectual traditions that have formed the various disciplines. While such “death of the humanities” pieces can be read as merely rote ideological performances, I think they raise a concern that philosophers of education should take seriously. Habermasian criticism can indeed be thrilling for young people. Setting oneself in opposition to a great tradition can grant a semblance of power and autonomy. The question is, can it form the basis of a substantive education? I’m convinced that in order to provide a substantial intellectual experience, and in order for humane study to endure, we must allow the past to speak to us. Gadamer says this is unavoidable, that the human sciences are always undertaken within a context of tradition. However, we must listen intently in order for this “speaking” to be fruitful. If we do not treat tradition as a propitious tool given by nature for our confrontation with experience, we must inevitably face the consequences. In the case of education, this means that young people will be thrown into life equipped with a truncated hypothesis of meaning, one based on either provisional reactions or the vagaries of public opinion.

Such incomplete hypotheses will be unable to account for all the factors of life. They will inevitably be at odds with the “elementary experience,” those innermost desires of the person. Giussani indicates that such an education will ultimately be alienating. He cites the political radicalism of mid-century Italian students as evidence of a desperate grasp for an all-embracing hypothesis. For my own part, I see a more despairing sort of alienation in the move away from humanities to more pragmatic fields. Popular reasoning seems to say, “If education cannot provide a vision that is correspondent with my heart’s needs, at least it can make me well-off.” Without a recovery of a more reasonable relationship to the past, I am convinced this trend will continue. Philosophers of education will do well to consider how this relationship may be rehabilitated or even transformed, and the ideas of Gadamer and Giussani are excellent places to start.

---

2 John Argesto, “Do the Liberal Arts Today Serve Any Useful Public Function?,“ paper presented at the conference celebrating the 50th anniversary of St. John’s College’s Santa Fe campus, Santa Fe, NM, October 17, 2014.
6 Paul Jay notes that enrolments in humanities disciplines have been stable since the 1980s. See Paul Jay, *The Humanities “Crisis” and the Future of Literacy Studies* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 11.


16 Habermas, "Review of Gadamer’s *Truth and Method,*" 357.

17 Ibid., 357-358.


21 Ibid., 283.

22 Ibid., 267-271.


25 Ibid., 270.

26 Ibid., 298-290.


29 Ibid., 278.


32 Ibid., 8.


34 Ibid., 38.


36 Ibid., 8.

37 TM, 282.


40 Ibid., 10.

41 Patrick Neil Rogers Horn, “The Unity of Language and Religious Belief: Gadamer and Wittgenstein” (Ph.D., The Claremont Graduate University, 1999), 125-133. On Gadamer’s debt to patristic theology, see Philippe


43 Ibid., 9.

44 Ibid., 11.


47 We should briefly note here the difference between Giussani’s sense of “alienation” and Gadamer’s. For Gadamer, alienation is a necessary part of the expansion of one’s horizon. The student must come across something outside her “natural” life-world in order to rise above her native prejudices. However, this is simply an intermediary step in returning to oneself (see Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 13-15). For Giussani, alienation means the irrational acceptance of a hypothesis of meaning that leads the young person away from her constituent needs and thus divorces the person from herself.