Debates over conceptions of autonomy and accounts of its value have a long history in liberal political theory. Defenders of autonomy have appealed to its benefits for both society and individuals. Many argue that, at the societal level, autonomy supports the cultivation of public reason and the stability of the liberal state. At the individual level, the debate has centered on the role of autonomy in the pursuit of a life that the individual deems valuable. The diverse individuals and groups within liberal democratic society hold competing conceptions of what kind of life is valuable. Within this context of diversity, justice demands that the liberal state treat each member of this diverse citizenry fairly, which includes protecting the rights of each citizen to have a fair chance to live the life that she deems valuable. If justice demands education for autonomy, then understanding what autonomy is and how it might be developed is a vital concern. These questions have profound implications for our responsibility to provide common education to children who are born into diverse families and communities, including illiberal groups existing within liberal society.

Consider the example of Tabitha, a girl raised in a fundamentalist, religious group. Members of this group observe strict restrictions on dress and social practices in line with “outward holiness” as do the Amish. These practices include strict differentiation between men and women, in dress and other aspects of outward appearance, as well as in the roles they can fill within the religious group. Tabitha is taught to accept this way of life by her parents at home and by religious leaders in her group. At the same time, she and her family and other families in their group live in integrated communities alongside members of other religious groups, and their children attend public schools where they encounter alternative ways of life. As an adult, she may continue living this life or she may instead end up living by an alternative set of values, perhaps those of mainstream society. In this essay, I am interested in the value of autonomy for individuals like this young woman and in particular in the kind of education for autonomy that is necessary to guarantee all individuals a fair chance to live the kinds of lives that they value.

Although much philosophical work on autonomy has focused on the conditions required to respect the exercise of autonomy ignoring the requirements of education for autonomy, scholars with interests in education, including Eamonn Callan, Rob Reich, and Harry Brighouse, have debated the demands of education for autonomy. They have defended either autonomy-facilitating education or autonomy-promoting education. Each of these forms of education understands autonomy and its value in distinct ways. I will begin in the first two sections by considering these two forms, the conceptions of autonomy they assume, and the value they place on autonomy. I argue in favor of autonomy-promoting education. Then, in the third section, I will consider the relationship between autonomy and open-mindedness, understood as an intellectual virtue. I will argue that autonomy-promoting education must also support...
open-mindedness. In my discussion of open-mindedness, I draw on recent work in virtue epistemology, the philosophical study of the intellectual virtues. Although liberal theory and virtue epistemology are distinct areas of inquiry, it is my view that investigating the relationship between the two provides valuable insights when considering the educational aims of liberal democracies like the United States. My analysis of the relationship between autonomy and open-mindedness aims to contribute to the literature in two ways: first, by identifying a conception of autonomy that explicitly acknowledges its connections to intellectual virtue thus clarifying one aspect of its value and identifying an important component of education that supports autonomy, and second, by establishing open-mindedness as not only a virtue in the pursuit of intellectual goods but a virtue in the pursuit of the good life as well.

**AUTONOMY-FACILITATING EDUCATION**

Let us begin by considering autonomy-facilitating education. This view understands autonomy as a capacity to reflect critically on one’s ends or conception of the good. Agents exercise this capacity and make their ends their own by reflecting on and endorsing them. This may involve adhering to commitments that they have received from others, such as those that were instilled in them from an early age by their parents or community, or it may involve revising their commitments in favor of alternative options. Autonomous reflection requires access to alternatives, and educating for this autonomous capacity involves teaching skills of reflection but notably does not require motivating students to exercise these skills, which amounts to promoting autonomy rather than facilitating it. In this view, the capacity for autonomy is a motivationally inert tool, like the ability to perform multiplication tables. Such a capacity can be taught through autonomy-facilitating education, which emphasizes the development of knowledge and skills as opposed to character and virtue. The capacity for autonomy is then at the disposal of agents should they choose to use it. Returning to Tabitha’s case, recall that she attends public school where she is exposed to other ways of life. If she is also taught basic critical reasoning skills at school, then the basic requirements of autonomy-facilitating education have been fulfilled.

Defenders of this form of education appeal to the instrumental value of autonomy. The instrumental argument proposes that individuals have an instrumental interest in exercising autonomy in their pursuit of the good life. It can be summarized as follows:

1. Each individual has an interest in living a good life (in pursuing good ends).
2. Each individual has a privileged epistemic standpoint in determining what comprises a good life for her or him.
3. Each individual will better fulfill her or his interest in living a good life by employing this privileged epistemic standpoint to reflect on which ends to endorse.
4. That is, the exercise of personal autonomy has instrumental value for each individual in the pursuit of a good life.

This argument assumes that everyone is interested in living a life of value and that each person is in the best position to judge what kind of life is valuable for him or her, whether it be a religious life, a scholarly life, a life devoted to family, some combination thereof, and so on. From these premises, the conclusion is drawn that exercising personal autonomy will help individuals adopt or adhere to ends that are
best for them. So while autonomy may not be necessary to lead a good life, it does help lives go better and so should be protected. Accordingly, the state has obligations not only to protect the mature exercise of autonomy in those who already possess the capacity, but also to facilitate the development of the capacity in those who do not yet possess it (for example, children). This argument aims to explain the value of autonomy while remaining neutral among competing conceptions of the good life and avoiding any claims of that certain ways of life (that is, those conducive to the exercise of autonomy) have more intrinsic value than others. Our young woman, Tabitha, may choose to use her autonomous capacity or not, and she may use it to endorse the way of life she grew up in or some other way of life. Autonomy-facilitating education aims to remain entirely neutral among the options available to her.

**Autonomy-Promoting Education**

Let us now consider an alternative to autonomy-facilitating education, education that promotes autonomy. Defenders of both of these forms of education agree that autonomy requires the availability of options and the capacity to reflect critically on one’s ends. However, whereas proponents of autonomy-facilitating education understand autonomy as requiring only a capacity for reflection on one’s ends and understand education for autonomy as providing access to the skills of reflection, autonomy-promoting education also seeks to motivate students to exercise this capacity. Autonomy-promoting education can be supported on a variety of grounds, including the individual and societal value of autonomy. Here, I will leave aside other possible justifications for autonomy and use the instrumental argument for autonomy as a starting point. In this section, I follow Callan in arguing that the instrumental value of autonomy cannot be secured without the motivation to exercise autonomy. I then consider the form of intrinsic value that is assumed by the instrumental argument.

Recall the first premise of the instrumental argument, that every individual has an interest in pursuing good ends. The state, in turn, has an interest in providing education for autonomy because of its instrumental value to individuals in their pursuit of good lives and because the state is obligated by justice to give all citizens a fair chance to live a good life. The instrumental argument claims that autonomous reflection aids the individual in pursuing good ends. Callan argues that these instrumental benefits of autonomy will not be reliably produced unless the agent not only possesses the capacity for autonomy but also is motivated to exercise it. His argument appeals to the social contexts in which autonomy is exercised. Agents exercise their autonomy by critically reflecting on their ends and either adhering to or revising them in the midst of a wide variety of countervailing forces that push against autonomous endorsement. Callan describes these forces as follows:

I have in mind a popular culture that projects an image of well-being as ceaseless and thoughtless consumption; peer groups in which belonging depends on an unreasoned contempt for those who do not belong; the pressures of particular religious or ethnic traditions in which seriously to question what one is taught during childhood or adolescence immediately raises the spectre of love’s withdrawal or at least provokes the disappointment and anxiety of those whose love one craves, and so on.

For example, say Tabitha is taught the skills of critical reflection and is exposed to alternative ways of life at school. If she exercises this capacity and considers
wearing pants or going to college and pursuing a career, she is questioning a core tenet of the religion in which she was raised about the differentiation of men and women. Exercising her autonomous capacity in these circumstances, even if she ultimately endorses the values of the group in which she was raised, raises the risk of losing the acceptance of her family. To get this kind of reflection off the ground requires pushing back against these opposing influences. Thus, if Tabitha is not also motivated to exercise her autonomous capacity, she will not gain the instrumental benefits of autonomy that come with endorsing the way of life she thinks is best (whether it is the one in which she was raised or some alternative). Rather, she must also be persistently motivated to exercise the capacity even in difficult conditions. This amounts to possessing an autonomous character, a persistent trait or virtue. This resulting conception of autonomy is more robust than initially proposed in the instrumental argument. Consequently, the autonomy liberal who wants to defend the value of personal autonomy by appealing to its instrumental value must support autonomy-promoting education that not only teaches children to reflect critically on their ends but also motivates them to do so.

With this conception of autonomy as a virtue or trait that involves being characteristically motivated to reflect on and endorse one’s ends, we can ask what kind of value is placed on autonomy. As described by Callan, autonomy-promoting education that supports autonomous character implies some form of intrinsic value. This value may be assigned to autonomy itself or to the kinds of lives that autonomous people are disposed to endorse. This second option maintains the theoretical possibility that autonomous people may choose good lives that are not compatible with autonomy. As I have reconstructed the instrumental argument, we see evidence for placing the intrinsic value not on autonomy itself but on the kinds of lives autonomous agents are disposed to choose. Premise two claims that each individual has a privileged epistemic standpoint in determining what comprises a good life for her. This premise rests on an assumption that there is some truth or epistemic good that is available to each individual about what ends are good for her. Autonomous agents are disposed to choose lives that are truly good. Tabitha has access to some truth or understanding about whether the way of life she was raised in is good for her, and so exercising her autonomy will help her live a good life. The instrumental argument, thus, makes an epistemic claim that warrants further consideration.

I have proposed that autonomy is best understood as a character trait that involves both a capacity for critical reflection and a persistent motivation to exercise that capacity. This robust conception of autonomy is valuable in the pursuit of the good life because it leads individuals to endorse lives that are truly good for them. These lives may theoretically be more or less conducive to the exercise of autonomy, but nevertheless, the agent learns about the ends that are best for her through the exercise of autonomy. This instrumental value of autonomy assumes a connection between autonomy and the epistemic good or truth. It is to this relationship that I will now turn. I will examine the relationship between autonomy and one particular virtue in the pursuit of epistemic goods, open-mindedness. I will argue that autonomy depends upon open-mindedness, and therefore, that education for autonomy, in addition to motivating students to exercise autonomy, must also support open-mindedness.
**Autonomy and Open-Mindedness**

The two elements of autonomy discussed previously, a capacity and a motivation, resemble the structure of virtues, which also involve characteristic motivations and the capacity to succeed in following through on them. If autonomy is accepted as a virtue or character trait that is beneficial in the pursuit of the good life, and if we are concerned with providing education that promotes it, then it is important to consider whether it depends on any other characteristics. Here, I will consider whether the exercise of autonomy is possible without intellectual virtue. Intellectual virtues are characteristics that aid individuals in the pursuit of the epistemic goods of truth and understanding. As described above, the instrumental argument assumes a relationship between autonomy and the epistemic good. If a connection between autonomy and intellectual virtue can be established, then the demands of autonomy-promoting education are more far-reaching than many autonomy liberals have explicitly granted, requiring not just the motivation to endorse one’s ends but also to pursue truth and understanding. I will examine the relationship between autonomy and the intellectual virtue of open-mindedness. In my analysis, I will consider the capacities required by each, as well as their motivations, including the objects toward which they are directed.

Just as autonomy has received considerable attention among liberal theorists, open-mindedness is popular among virtue epistemologists as well as philosophers of education. Interestingly, the capacities or dispositions required for autonomy and open-mindedness have been described in these various literatures in similar terms. Consider the following descriptions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Open-Mindedness</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dworkin</strong></td>
<td>“a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and values.”¹⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reich</strong></td>
<td>“a person’s ability to reflect independently and critically upon basic commitments, values, desires, and beliefs, be they chosen or unchosen.”¹⁶</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Kymlicka</strong></td>
<td>“being able to assess and potentially revise [our] conception [of the good]” and to “make informed judgements about what is truly valuable.”¹⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hare</strong></td>
<td>a disposition “to revise or reject the position he holds if sound objections are brought against it, or, in the situation in which the person presently has no opinion on some issue,… to make up his mind in the light of available evidence and argument as objectively and impartially as possible.”¹⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Callan and Arena</strong></td>
<td>“To believe Proposition P close-mindedly is to be unable or unwilling to give due regard to reasons that are available for some belief or beliefs contrary to P because of excessive emotional attachment to the truth of P.”¹⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baehr</strong></td>
<td>“characteristically (a) willing and (within limits) able (b) to transcend a default cognitive standpoint (c) in order to take up or take seriously the merits of (d) a distinct cognitive standpoint.”²⁰</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Each of the descriptions of the autonomous capacity presented above requires critical reflection or rational revisability. Similarly, the accounts of open-mindedness appeal to revision based on evidence and argument, giving due regard to reasons, and taking seriously the merits of other views. Indeed, the connection between the critical reflection required by autonomy and paying attention to available information (evidence, argument, reasons) is apparent in the quote from Kymlicka, in which he appeals to making “informed judgements about what is truly valuable.” By referring to information and truth, he indicates the intellectual nature of personal autonomy, which recall is represented in the instrumental argument for autonomy. Notice also that both of these capacities require the agent to engage in reflection on the basis of interactions with others. Autonomous agents choose to adhere to or revise their conceptions of the good in light of competing options presented to them by other individuals or groups. Whereas open-minded agents give serious attention to the evidence and argument encountered through their interactions with others. Finally, I want to mention that the kind of reason or reflection required by autonomy and open-mindedness need not be limited to strictly rational deliberation on reasons that are available to everyone. Rather, following Callan, these forms of reflection may also incorporate “particularities of experience and feeling that do not belong within the ambit of impersonal reason.”

Although both autonomy and open-mindedness play a role in critical reflection, they do involve distinct capacities. Whereas autonomy involves the capacity to reflect on and endorse one’s ends, open-mindedness requires the capacity to consider available evidence and argument in support of alternative beliefs or ends. Open-mindedness is focused on how the agent reflects on alternatives. Autonomy shares this concern but additionally is concerned with how the agent endorses the ends that he follows in life. It appears that open-minded reflection is a necessary component of autonomous reflection insofar as autonomy requires the consideration of alternatives and open-mindedness enables agents to consider views other than those they currently hold.

The connection between autonomy and open-mindedness can be further elaborated by considering the motivations associated with each, the object at which each is directed. Autonomy is described as involving the capacity and motivation to reflect on one’s ends or conception of the good life, making it a moral virtue. Thus, its object may include one’s other motivations, beliefs, desires, and so on about the good life. Open-mindedness, on the other hand, is a distinctly intellectual virtue. All intellectual virtues share a common motivation, pursuit of the epistemic good. In order to compare the object of autonomy with that of open-mindedness, it is worth saying a bit about what the epistemic good comprises. It may come in a number of forms, including knowledge and understanding. Knowledge requires true belief, in addition to something more that gives the agent credit for the true belief. Whereas knowledge is concerned with the truth and justification of discrete beliefs, understanding involves entire subject matters. To understand a subject, the agent must grasp its structure and the relationships between the discrete beliefs that it contains. I define open-minded agents as motivated to improve both their knowledge and their understanding and
seeking to do so by giving due regard to available evidence and argument when forming or maintaining their beliefs and understandings about the world.

Thus, we have autonomy requiring reflection on our conceptions of the good, which includes our beliefs about the good life, and open-mindedness requiring reflection on our beliefs and understandings about what is true, the epistemic good. Although our moral ends and epistemic ends are not identical, they arguably do overlap. In forming our conceptions of the good life, we make judgments about what we believe to be true about the world. Although these judgments may not amount to knowledge (which requires justified true belief), they do form part of our understanding of the world and our place in it. Autonomous development of a conception of the good life, reflecting on our various ends, necessarily involves the intellectual task of forming an understanding of how our ends hang together, how they are related to one another. As a result, autonomous reflection is not possible in the absence of open-mindedness because the closed-minded agent would not be willing to engage in reflection about his ends, seeking to improve his understanding of his basic commitments. Consequently, education that promotes autonomy must also support open-mindedness.

This connection between autonomy and open-mindedness is clarified by considering their relationship to identity. An agent’s identity has been described as a web of commitments, in which more central and pervasive commitments are more important to the individual good. According to Robert Noggle, autonomous reflection on a particular end involves considering how it coheres with one’s other central commitments and potentially revising it from the standpoint of one’s other central commitments. This process requires being motivated to understand how the end in question is related to one’s other ends; it requires open-mindedness. Let us consider Tabitha again. Fundamentalist parents who follow “outward holiness” are raising her and teaching her that wearing pants or jewelry is morally wrong. Having respect for her parents as moral authorities, she develops a strong heteronomous commitment to outward holiness as she grows up. In order for this commitment to become autonomous, she must critically reflect on it and choose to endorse it in light of the other options available to her. However, if she is not open-minded, she will not be motivated to consider the available evidence or arguments in support of these other options, she will not be motivated to improve her understanding of the relationship between outward holiness and her other commitments. In order for her to autonomously adhere to or revise her commitments to these religious values, she must be motivated to use her reflective capacity to endorse the way of life that she deems most valuable. This additionally requires being open to examining the value of her group’s way of life against the available alternatives; it requires open-mindedness. Thus, open-mindedness is necessary for the exercise of autonomy and should be supported as a component of autonomy-promoting education, alongside the development of critical reflection skills and awareness of available alternatives.

**Conclusion**

I have proposed that the instrumental value of autonomy proposed by defenders of autonomy-facilitating education cannot be secured without teaching students not
only how to critically reflect on their ends but also motivating them to do so. This motivational element of autonomy-promoting education implies some intrinsic value. After discussing how the instrumental argument, in fact, assumes the intrinsic value of autonomously endorsed lives, I investigated the relationship between autonomy, intrinsic value, and truth more carefully by looking at the relationship with open-mindedness. I argued that autonomy is not possible without open-mindedness, which requires both the capacity to reflect on the merit of alternative beliefs or other commitments and the motivation to do so. Thus, the instrumental goods associated with autonomy cannot be secured in the absence of the intellectual virtue of open-mindedness, and if autonomy liberals are to take seriously the importance of education for autonomy in securing educational justice, they must attend to education for open-mindedness as well.

This commitment to open-mindedness may create an obligation to educate for intellectual virtues more broadly. Elsewhere I have discussed the close relationship between open-mindedness and a cluster of other intellectual virtues, including intellectual humility, intellectual courage, and intellectual diligence. If we accept the interdependence of this set of intellectual virtues, then it may be impossible to educate for open-mindedness without also promoting these other virtues. Thus, those concerned with educating for autonomy should also educate for these intellectual virtues, which share a common motivation — the pursuit of epistemic goods. Providing education for autonomy and for open-mindedness is a matter of justice in liberal democratic societies, which are obligated to protect the rights of all citizens to have a fair chance to live the life that they deem valuable.


2. Here I am interested in the role of autonomy in securing justice. The robust conception of education for autonomy that I propose in this essay may pose a challenge to liberal neutrality, which I leave aside for the purposes of this essay.


5. See, for example, the work of James A. Montmarquet, “Epistemic Virtue,” Mind 96, no. 384 (1987): 482–97; Linda Trinkaaz Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the
6. Virtues, whether intellectual or moral, are characteristics of agents that aid them in pursuing the good. On strong virtue theories, goodness is a feature of persons rather than acts, and the virtues define the good. Thus, strong virtue theory stands apart from liberalism. Nevertheless, one need not accept strong virtue theory in order to provide a role for virtue in ethical theory. The concept of virtue, identifying traits of individuals that aid in the pursuit of the good, has been applied to autonomy, which is central to many forms of liberalism.

7. Autonomy-facilitating education of this kind is endorsed by Brighouse, “Civic Education and Liberal Legitimacy.”


9. See, for example, Callan, “Autonomy, Child-Rearing, and Good Lives”; Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy; and Reich, Bridging Liberalism and Multiculturalism in American Education.


12. Ibid., 122.

13. Ibid., 123.

14. Callan refers to an “opening of mind” that accompanies autonomy in Ibid., 134. It is this relationship I want to explore in greater depth.


17. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 92.


22. The open-minded agent may also reflect on his epistemic commitments and seek out evidence independently of other agents (for example, the arm chair philosopher), but an important sense of open-mindedness concerns our interactions with others.


25. The relationship between the moral virtues and the intellectual virtues is discussed in Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind; Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues; and Baehr, The Inquiring Mind.

26. In their chapter on intellectual autonomy, Roberts and Wood argue that seeking understanding fosters autonomy (see Intellectual Virtues, 257–85).


29. For discussion of the unity of the intellectual virtues, see Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Annas, Intelligent Virtue.