Knowledge and the Space of Reasons: The Ideas of John McDowell and Paul Hirst
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In this essay I develop an epistemological perspective that argues for the central role that knowledge plays in education. I do this first of all by elaborating John McDowell’s ideas on the “space of reasons.” I then use this concept to reinterpret and develop the concept of the “forms of knowledge” associated with Paul Hirst. I argue that the forms of knowledge can be seen as inhabiting the space of reasons. I then show how one of the key features of the space of reasons — the making of judgments — is also a key feature of education and learning.

Second Nature and the Space of Reasons

I will begin by giving a brief account of McDowell’s epistemological position. His exposition is wide-ranging but the force of his argument is lost unless its different strands are held together. His starting point is Immanuel Kant’s well-known remark that “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind,” which McDowell thinks underpins what he sees as a pernicious, oscillating dualism. On the one side is, borrowing from Wilfred Sellars, the “Myth of the Given,” and on the other side is a coherentism that McDowell attributes to Donald Davidson. The problem with relying on the “given” is that it is not clear how the relation between sense experience and concept can be considered as one of genuine justification since unalloyed, bare sense data is simply “other” to conceptual thought. Hence we are obliged to veer toward Davidson’s view that the only thing that can count for holding a belief is another belief. Yet this approach, McDowell thinks, condemns us to a “frictionless spinning in a void,” and we are recoiled back to the myth of the given in order to find some kind of constraint or underpinning to our beliefs. Davidson’s solution to this (that the relation of belief to the world must be causal) is certainly an explanation of our beliefs (or conceptual scheme), but it is not a justification of them: for, according to McDowell, I cannot justify those beliefs in terms that make sense from the standpoint of those beliefs.

McDowell’s proposed solution is in two stages. First, he insists that receptivity at its most basic, passive level is always conceptual: there must indeed be constraint on beliefs but this constraint need not be outside what is thinkable. Moreover, this “thinkable content” is linked to a wider repertoire of content without which individual bits of receptivity could not be experienced as anything intelligible. It is because of this that “experience” never comes without conceptual content: for example, in color discrimination I understand the concept of “red” as not blue or green and this understanding characterizes color experience as well so that there is not a two stage process of, first, the onset of raw sense data followed by, second, some internal processing of this data. Yet, McDowell is also insistent that this conceptualized experience does act as a constraint upon belief that potentially can answer to...
worlds being “thus and so” (MW, 26). But it is the second stage of the solution that moves the whole argument up a gear. McDowell proposes that humankind has a “second nature” in which sensory processes and other experiences that we share with the natural world become saturated with conceptual meaning. This formation and acculturation is analogous to the development of ethical dispositions and practical reasoning so that what McDowell is proposing is an Aristotelian form of habituation that extends beyond the ethical into the domain of the epistemological. That is to say, experience is formed through a receptivity that is itself conceptualized. This habituation into the world, not only through the formation of dispositions, but through the development of our very cognitive faculties, suggests, McDowell thinks, that experience is never directly of the “given” (for example, in the form of raw sense data) but is impregnated with what he terms “conceptual content.” This implies that an experience has a cognitive admixture, so that, for example, a certain level of meaning is also conveyed even if this is inchoate and indistinct.

I have mentioned in passing the analogy with an Aristotelian account of the development of virtues, but interestingly, McDowell draws on two further historical accounts of this habituation to the world. One suggestion is that it is possible to interpret the account of praxis in Karl Marx’s early writings in terms of a second nature that arises out of human activity itself (MW, 117–19). Indeed, when Marx criticizes traditional materialism for supposing that the world is experienced passively, “in the form of an object or perception,” as opposed to being the product of “sensuous, human activity,” then there is indeed a close parallel to the criticism McDowell makes of traditional empiricism, which stands accused of falling victim to the myth of the given. The conceptualizing of receptivity plays the same role for McDowell as conceiving human activity in terms of praxis did for Marx: it is not just that the world is transformed through human activity, but the way in which that world is experienced is also transformed. If this is the case, then the theory of alienation itself could be recast and reinterpreted as nothing less than the alienation from the flourishing of this second nature. This could arise through the brutalization of social and working conditions that reduce a person to the point of enjoying only the animal functions of eating, drinking, and procreating (MW, 118).

Further, McDowell appeals to the concept of Bildung: second nature is also a function of upbringing and self-formation (MW, 87–8). What this suggests is that the development of second nature is not only the inevitable by-product of linguistic practices but is also something that can be purposefully shaped and nurtured. And this development may not only occur at the level of belief but also through what might be termed the aestheticization of experience. The sculpting of the antennae of experiencing — that is, the cognitive and emotional process through which content is drawn in and interpreted — is something that can be purposefully crafted. It is not that experiences — in terms of their content — are somehow neutrally drawn in and then subject to an internal processing that varies depending on what kind of dispositions and character a person has developed. Rather the very mode of experiencing itself — that is, the character of the experience — is subject to cultural and educative formation. Second nature is not a black box, internal to each of us, marked
“personal development”; rather, it is manifest in all the different ways in which the process of experiencing itself takes place.

Thus the idea of the space of reasons emerges as the realm in which justifications for beliefs are sought, from the standpoint of agents who have developed a second nature. It is conceptualized experience, in the form of beliefs, which enable there to be a space of reasons since it becomes possible to challenge experience at the level of justification. On the one hand, the space of reasons constitutes the structure within which meanings and intelligibility emerge; on the other hand, it is not merely self-generating without any constraint. The space of reasons does not dissolve the dualism of mind and world: rather, it provides a way of thinking through that relationship.

In a later essay, McDowell links experience to judgment so that it is proposed that “what we need and can have is the idea of a case of receptivity in operation that, even while being that, is an actualization, together, of conceptual capacities whose active exercise, with the same togetherness, would be the making of a judgment.” If we construe judgment as making up one’s mind about how things are — as coming to have a view of the world — then we can see that the process of judging is emblematic of what the space of reasons is about because, of course, my judgment may come to be questioned by others and, indeed, by myself. In judging I am proposing a view of the world that is quite different from merely asserting that things are thus and so. The space of reasons must be able to permit more than mere assertion and counter assertion if the process of justification is to be given room. Moreover, the process of judgment (as opposed to assertion) would not be possible without the possibility of constraints on what seems reasonable. And these constraints do not merely arise from the counterjudgments of others but also from their having a world in view that is the same world for each. For without this there would merely be so many conceptual schemes each with their own, separate world in view: the very essence, that is, of an epistemological frictionless spinning in a void.

It may be thought that a different view of McDowell’s perspective is feasible. This could take the form of treating the justificatory character of the space of reasons as essentially naïve, a realm that in time will be replaced by a naturalist discourse that will be satisfied with descriptions of states of affairs (be they mental or nonmental) and causal explanations of them. Nature is best considered, on this view, as the “disenchanted” realm of law that is impervious to human design and intentionality. According to McDowell, such a standpoint sets up two contrasting (and ultimately futile) paths: first, that of “bald naturalism” (which insists that our space of reasons be recast so that it coincides with the realm of law; and, second, rampant platonism, in which the space of reasons is cut off from nature entirely and permitted to pursue its own introverted and unfettered purposes (MW, 76–7; 77–8). The problem with bald naturalism is that its reductivist program in effect writes spontaneity out of the relation between mind and world; the problem with rampant platonism is that spontaneity — the operations of the understanding, suitably structured — is treated as sui generis and nature treated as a mere side effect of its deliverances. McDowell’s position can be seen as an attempt to think through the tensions between mind and
world and, at the same time, resist temptations to dissolve one of these two terms
into the other.

What starts as an epistemological problem of the relation between mind and
world is addressed not only through an alternate epistemology but also through a
historicization of knowing and belief in the account of second nature. The clear
implication of McDowell’s argument is that education and learning take place in the
space of reasons. Does the development of second nature take place simply through
participation in a language community, or can it (indeed, must it) be subject to further
guidance, development, art, and purpose? Presumably, the nurturing of the space
of reasons must surely be a purposeful endeavor: paradoxically, the development
of the realm within which spontaneity flourishes cannot be left to chance. Yet the
development of second nature should not be supposed to take on the character of
extrinsic, instrumental purpose, as if learning to live within the space of reasons is
merely a goal that can be achieved through extra hard work and forward planning.
This is not only because the process of learning and acquiring second nature is one of
living a life but also because the constraints on the space of reasons — encountering
a world that is “thus and so” — ensures that the best laid plans and goals may be
frustrated. The development of second nature is not a process that can be brought
about by means of a comprehensive pedagogic strategy. The role of pedagogy must
be conceived along more modest lines.

Would the extrusion of the realm of law from second nature imply that scientific
approaches to learning are inherently misguided as an attempt, knowingly or not, to
fashion human sensibility in ways of non-spontaneity? What McDowell calls “bald
naturalism” is a form of reductivism — whereby the space of reasons gets overwritten
by natural law. We can see, once we reject bald naturalism, why the space of reasons
must be sui generis (without lapsing into rampant platonism). The implication is
that approaches to teaching and learning that are dictated by science (for example,
by forms of behaviorism) amount to bald naturalism. This implies that teaching and
learning must employ the methods appropriate to the space of reasons — justification
and judgment. Learning to live within the space of reasons cannot be brought about
through causal means.

“Forms of Knowledge” and the Space of Reasons

If the purpose of education is to develop the capacity to act and judge within the
space of reasons then what role does the acquisition of knowledge play? The seminal
essay on the relation between knowledge and education by Paul Hirst, “Liberal
Education and the Nature of Knowledge” is still, in my view, very instructive. The
essay is in four parts. The first part focuses on the role of knowledge drawn from
a reading of ancient philosophy that envisages the development of mind through
knowledge, which both furnishes a knowing of reality in terms of truth and, through
this process, also plays a central role in the development of the good life. Knowl-
edge therefore plays, on this reading, both an epistemological and an ethical role.
In the second part, Hirst considers certain modern (in fact, mid-twentieth century)
proponents of the idea that the purpose of education is to cultivate certain attributes
of mind (such as, effective thinking, communication, and ethical judgment). He
makes quick work of showing that such attributes cannot be developed without
disciplinary (subject) engagement in which is embedded what counts as effective
thinking, good communication, and the like (LE, 90–5). In the fourth section, Hirst
elaborates in more detail what he envisages to be a knowledge-led curriculum, of
which the details need not concern us since over the passage of time new disciplines
and subdisciplines have emerged while others have receded.7 It is the third part of
the essay that is of most interest here.

Hirst begins by disavowing the suggestion in the first part of the essay — namely,
that the relation between knowledge, mind, and reality has a “metaphysical” basis —
and initially goes on to suggest that the relation between mind and knowledge is rather
“logical,” such that the achievement of knowledge “necessitates” the development
of mind. This thought, however, is not developed and Hirst then goes on to suggest
that the focus of knowledge is rather “experience, structured under some conceptual
scheme” (LE, 97). “Experience” is explained in terms of “sense perceptions, emotions
or different elements of the understanding” which it is suggested “are intelligible only
by virtue of the conceptual apparatus by which they are articulated” (LE, 97). This
sounds as though Hirst, in separating out experiences as such from the conceptual
apparatus through which they become known, is sailing perilously close to the muddy
waters of the myth of the given. What emerges, however, is that forms of knowledge
become coextensive with forms of experience. For, first, experiences can only be
articulated through conceptual forms — they can only be recognized as experiences
of such and such character because they are presented and articulated through a
conceptual apparatus. Second, the system of concepts takes the form of publicly
known and shared criteria for their application — it is this that allows experiences
to be recognized, evaluated, and compared. Third, this structuring of experience
is not confined to traditional academic divisions of knowledge since “the forms of
knowledge are the basic articulations whereby the whole of experience has become
intelligible to man” (LE, 98, emphasis added). The generation of knowledge — that
conceptual apparatus through which experience becomes intelligible — pervades
the whole of experiences of humankind. The clear implication is that experience is
constituted through the forms of knowledge: “it is by its terms that the life of man in
every particular is structured and ordered … without its structure all other forms of
consciousness, including for example, emotional experiences, or mental attitudes and
beliefs would seem to be unintelligible” (LE, 98). This thought is developed further
under the fourth characteristic of Hirst’s conception, namely that the experiences
we undergo must not be thought as primary or foundational but are themselves in
part the product of meditation, evaluation, and validation of those publicly specified
criteria that identify and articulate experiences themselves (LE, 97–8).

Although Hirst postulated the concept “forms of knowledge,” I show that this
could just as well have been recast as “forms of experience.” It is often supposed
that Hirst proposed the forms of knowledge in terms of so-called “propositional
knowledge” — inert statements bundled into disciplinary domains that generations of
children and students are obliged to learn, repeat, and forget.8 It is assumed, in other
words, that the forms of knowledge are disconnected from experience, whereas in
fact they arise from a certain understanding of the structuring of experience. I want to suggest, then, that to the extent that the “forms of knowledge” characterize the articulation and intelligibility of experience, they inhabit the space of reasons and are pervaded by this space. Forms of knowledge can be seen as clusters within that space and as exemplifying the character of that space, namely giving and justifying reasons. One of the problems, however, with Hirst’s theory of knowledge is that he never quite differentiated between what McDowell terms the “realm of law” (that is, the realm of causal explanation, fetishization of which leads to bald naturalism), and the space of reasons, namely that justificatory realm in which experience of the world is made intelligible. If, then, the forms of knowledge are identified solely with the realm of law, it is not difficult to see — indeed, it is perfectly understandable — why so many have had problems with it. Nevertheless, Hirst does make it clear that the forms do include (for example) moral knowledge, literary and aesthetic appreciation, as well as the traditional disciplines in the sciences and mathematics.

However, apart from the space of reasons/realm of law distinction, there is another feature that plays an increasingly major role as McDowell’s analysis has developed and that is also a crucial feature of the forms of knowledge, once viewed through the perspective of the space of reasons. This is the role played by judgment, namely the ability to constitute a state of affairs as having certain features and to evaluate their relative importance. Judgment is usually contextual so that the discrimination of a state of affairs (which, it should be noted, can be mental or nonmental or a combination of these) is situated within a wider understanding. When we refer to the forms of knowledge as underpinning educational purposes, then the ability to make judgments occupies a central place. Learning does not merely consist of the mastery of concepts and information: what we are looking for is the ability to make judgments. Understood in this way, learning becomes an active process that engages and challenges the learner in two distinct ways.

The first links judgment and responsibility, and it is described by McDowell in these terms:

judging can be singled out as the paradigmatic mode of actualization of conceptual capacities, the one in terms of which we should understand the very idea of conceptual capacities in the relevant sense. And judging, making up our minds what to think, is something for which we are in principle responsible — something we freely do, as opposed to something that merely happens in our lives … and this freedom, exemplified in responsible acts of judging, is essentially a matter of being answerable to criticism in the light of rationally relevant considerations. So the realm of freedom, at least the freedom of judging, can be identified with the space of reasons.9

Roughly speaking, there will be at least some of our beliefs for which we are less likely to be held to account in the sense that they are formed through the world’s being “thus and so.” But supervening on such beliefs are a complex of beliefs — judgments — for which we are accountable. Engagement with forms of knowledge is therefore a risky endeavor since we are responsible for our judgments and being able to account for them is also what one has to do if one lives within a space of reasons. The kinds of judgments one makes, as far as learning is concerned, will range from the theoretical and the interpretive down to the severely practical. For example, the deliverance of a judgment may be a decision on which form of
clinical treatment is most appropriate, on the one hand to a judgment that assesses the weight of responsibility accruing to Germany in terms of the causes of the World War I, on the other. The learner, in acting and making judgments thereby becomes accountable. Viewing the forms of knowledge through the perspective of the space of reasons brings this out.

The second feature is the way in which subjective or agent-centered considerations must be laid aside. When Hirst speaks of knowledge that is subject to publicly specified criteria, we can see that coming to be acquainted with such criteria helps us extrude personal considerations in reaching a judgment. That one is held personally accountable for making judgments in accordance with impersonal criteria takes some time — many years — in learning, and if the beginnings of this are started in primary schooling, it certainly takes the whole experience of education at all levels before the appropriate habituation is in place. The paradox of judgment is that while subjective perspectives are to be eschewed in reaching a conclusion, one is nevertheless held responsible for a judgment in which there is a certain personal investment. The process of education helps learners to practice the art of judgment in which the consequences are by and large confined to the classroom — a necessary preparation for the time when one’s judgments really start to count.

In a brief article published in 1998, Hirst disavows the central thesis that he developed in the 1960s. He suggests, “social practices and practical reason are the fundamental concerns of education, not propositional knowledge and theoretical reason.” In some ways, this new approach can be interpreted as having a perspective on knowledge that goes beyond the realm of law (“propositional knowledge and theoretical reason”) toward a more expansive view of the reach of the space of reasons, which does indeed reach into the realm of the practical. In part, this is what the idea of “second nature” is all about. It follows, therefore, that the “forms of knowledge” can indeed include what has traditionally been termed vocational knowledge. Moreover, it also implies that even traditional disciplines (history, biochemistry) may be taught in practical ways in such a manner as to encourage learners in the making of judgments. However, when Hirst now maintains that reason is to be placed at the service of needs and interests, then here, I think, he takes a step too far. For needs and interests themselves must be evaluated within the space of reasons in order to see what counts as a need or interest, in accordance with (as the Hirst of old would say) publicly specified criteria. Needs and interests must be identified and justified within the space of reasons. Moreover, through the activities that generate knowledge within the space of reasons, new needs and interests may arise (or old ones modified); knowledge activities cannot be placed in service of needs and interests that they themselves may help to generate.

**Conclusion**

It should be noted that the capacity for judgment is internally related to an understanding of context. While one may, through experience, acquire the disposition
of a judging temperament (for example, through the habit of discounting personal preferences), this in itself is no substitute for an engagement with some context. Hence, there is no skill of “judging” that can be transferable. If learning is to involve as one of its central features the making and contesting of judgments, then there is no escaping the difficult process of building up and understanding appropriate knowledge-contexts. In this respect, the early Hirst’s central thesis that education comprises the pursuit of forms of knowledge still stands. Through the perspective of the space of reasons, knowledge can be viewed not so much as a set of inert propositions but as a domain that is contested and subject to revision — a domain in which judgments are backed by reasons and invested with personal commitment. This makes for a knowledge-based curriculum which goes well beyond the naive informational sets associated with the kind of curriculum advocated by E.D. Hirsch. Moreover, the emphasis on reason and judgments suggests rich pedagogical implications, for example in the direction of inquiry-based learning. But these must be left for another essay.

1. See John McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). This work will be cited as *MW* in the text for all subsequent references.


7. Originally, Hirst identified seven forms of knowledge: mathematics, the physical sciences, the human sciences, history, religion, literature and the fine arts, and philosophy and moral knowledge. In addition there were interdisciplinary “fields” of knowledge (*LE*, 104–105).


11. Ibid., 18.