Exceeding Thought: Standing on Tiptoe Between the Private and the Public

Naoko Saito

Kyoto University

Language is not, as such, either public or private. Not public because you never see to the end of it. Not private because there is always a particular route in which it has become private.

– Stanley Cavell

INTRODUCTION: HOW SHOULD WE “BRIDGE” THE PRIVATE AND THE PUBLIC?

In 1969, in collaboration with John Rawls, Stanley Cavell played a crucial role in the establishment of the Department of Afro-American Studies at Harvard. Cornel West has acknowledged Cavell’s indispensable contribution in this historical event (SC, 163) — a key moment of which was the so-called “Cavell Resolution,” a draft motion, part of which Cavell read out in front of the Dean of the Faculty. In his memoir, Little Did I Know, Cavell reflects upon other, earlier times when he was faced with, and indeed involved in, the political disturbance in America in the 1960s, at the time of the Vietnam War, and in the concomitant upsurge of the Civil Rights movement. In 1964, he committed himself to a summer school at a black college in Mississippi (LD, 430). Looking back on this event Cavell writes: “Speaking for myself, I went on to testify that my life too has been transfigured by the experience [in Mississippi] in unpredictable ways, both in psychological ways, as well as, in some extended sense, in political” (LD, 430–431). Cavell’s writing is sometimes called “impolitic” and “linguisticist.” In reality, the political situation in America (and around the world) has had a sustained presence in Cavell’s ordinary language philosophy, and especially in his struggling over the identity of philosophy and over his own identity as a philosopher. The pressing question for him is how to connect these two horizons in philosophy — which we might think of as the private (psychological) and the public (political).

In Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, the theme of the interconnecting of two paths in philosophy is brought up in terms of our relation to language.

From the root of speech, in each utterance of revelation and confrontation, two paths spring: that of the responsibilities of implication; and that of the rights of desire. It will seem to some that the former is the path of philosophy, the latter that of something or other else, perhaps psychoanalysis. In an imperfect world the paths will not reliably coincide, but to show them both open is something I want of philosophy.

If the path of the “responsibilities of implication” is a matter of responsibilities outward, toward others, that of “the rights of desire” is inward, toward oneself. The opening of the two paths cannot be achieved within a horizon of the politics of recognition — that is, simply as an issue of adjusting, conflicting interests and of resolving disagreement; rather, it calls for an “extended sense” of the political. This, in Cavell’s view, is the task of philosophy (LD, 478), and this is a project to be distinguished from the polemical discourse of politics-as-usual. Hence, “philosophical problems are not solved polemically.” For many, however, the very idea of connecting the private and public, from the innermost to the outermost, is one that
strains credulity. We can imagine reactions from the politics of recognition: Can you so smoothly bridge the private and the public? How would you reconcile conflicts of private interests in the public arena?

In response to these imagined voices of criticism and doubt, and in order to explicate the "extended sense" of the political, this essay intends to disturb the idea of the bridging of the private and the public when this is conceived in terms of adjustment of interests, resolution of disagreement, or recognition of difference. Cavell encourages us to convert the manner in which one does philosophy — its style and discourse — into what might be called a transcendental medium for linking the two horizons, a detouring in order to connect, while maintaining the disjunction, the private and the public. In order to illustrate its political and educational implications, this essay begins by examining Ralph Waldo Emerson’s provocative idea of “friendship” (one that is apparently exclusive, elitist, and self-serving). I shall then, through Cavell’s redefinition of transcendentalism, try to convert Emerson’s and Henry David Thoreau’s apparently disturbing thought to the kind of thought that provokes the reader to new possibilities. This mode of thinking, which I shall call “exceeding thought,” is geared toward a higher sense of the public, characterized by both humility toward the other, conditioned by Emersonian friendship, and an awareness that our lives are never above reproach. The alternative sense of the public calls upon us to replace the subject, via transcendence. The excess of thought disturbs political debate over liberalism (autonomy) and communitarianism (sympathy and care for the other), and guides us toward the cultivation of an alternative way of thinking about political education.

DISTURBING THOUGHT: EMERSON’S FRIENDSHIP

In Cavell’s recollections of the Civil Rights movement and the Vietnam War, the transcendental perspectives of Emerson and Thoreau are never far away. Thoreau was a “steadying companion” (LD, 514). Cavell’s own sense of guilt at the time of America’s involvement in the war resounds with Emerson’s sense of shame and injustice at the institution of slavery (LD, 539–540).

Indeed the task of connecting two horizons in philosophy is taken up directly by Emerson and Thoreau. Emerson says: “The deeper he dives into this privatest, secretest presentiment, to his wonder he finds this is the most acceptable, most public, and universally true.” Similarly, in Walden, but in a more radical tone and through actually living in the woods, Thoreau encourages us “to explore the private sea, the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean of one’s being alone,” before we commit ourselves to an allegedly public act. Emerson’s and Thoreau’s call for starting from the private, which achieves on the way a genuine sense of the public, its strong sense of the singularity of the self, is a primordial form of American philosophy. In contrast to the more communitarian orientation of John Dewey, Emerson’s and Thoreau’s emphasis on the private is more radical: it can sound individualistic and even amoral. It would invite an immediate reaction from the politics of recognition. Can we risk living a solitary life in, as Emerson says, “poverty and solitude,” in the state of “virtual hostility in which [we] seem to stand to society” (EM, 52)? Is not Thoreau’s life at Walden Pond simply a manifestation of his withdrawal from public life?
At first glance, Emerson’s essay, “Friendship,” not only does not respond to the question, but also aggravates the doubt. If a reader approaches this text with an expectation of obtaining some understanding of how a self-reliant individual connects her private self with others and participates in the public, she will be disappointed, even feel betrayed. The essay starts, in a puzzling and mystical tone, with an episode about a friend who, “unsought,” visits someone’s home as a stranger, which becomes the occasion of “a just and firm encounter” (EM, 202). Emerson describes this as an ideal state, in hopeful expectation of which one would be glad to be “alone for a thousand years” (EM, 202–203). The friend not only constitutes a source of “joy and peace” (EM, 206), but also causes disturbance, as a presence who “hinders me from sleep” (EM, 203). The essay is also permeated by a strong sense of privacy and secrecy, signalled especially by the surprising phrase “the absolute insulation of man” (EM, 212). This quasi-mystical, unworldly territory of friendship seems to be cut off from the public, realizing as it were some purely private realm. The “social,” if it is there, seems limited to a “select and sacred relation” (EM, 206). This sounds anti-democratic, even aristocratic. We are also struck by apparent contradictions in the idea of friendship. There are, in friendship, the dual aspects of “deep identity” and “disparities,” or likeness and unlikeness (EM, 210 and 217).8

Aside from the balancing of “tension” and “affection” and of the idealistic and the bodily, there is something more deeply disturbing in Emerson’s remark that a friend is a “beautiful enemy untamable” (EM, 211) — to such an extent that any conventional framework of thinking is radically unsettled. First and foremost, and remembering Emerson’s influence on Friedrich Nietzsche, this challenges our common-sensical vocabulary of love and care. For the sake of “sincere” friendship, Emerson asks us to give up “household joy” and “warm sympathies” (EM, 207 and 213). Second, Emerson does not talk about the immediate, face-to-face relation with the friend, but about the evanescent moment when friendship exists between two people. This requires us not to stand between the worldly and the unworldly, or the idealistic and the real, but to pay attention to the evanescent moment of a perfect encounter — to what he calls in another essay, “Circles,” “the flying Perfect” (EM, 252). Third, when Emerson talks about the “paradox” of “the not mine is mine” (EM, 210), he enters into the alternative mode of possessing what cannot be possessed. And when he says “we part only to meet again on a higher platform” (EM, 213), he suggests that such possession requires parting, relaxing one’s grasp. Fourth, a strong affirmation of the self-reliant self — who declares, “thou art enlarged by thy own shining” (EM, 213) — exists against the background of the humble sense of “High thanks I owe you” (EM, 203). Emerson speaks on the verge of the affirmation of the self and negativity derived from “the Other [who] comes to me as having depths that I cannot know,” indicating some common ground with poststructuralism.9 It is noteworthy here that Hilary Putnam finds some common ground between Emmanuel Levinas and Cavell’s Emersonian moral perfectionism.10

It is this sense of an unbridgeable gap that the presence of a friend confronts us in a relationship of correspondence, and yet “without due correspondence” (EM,
213) — a “just encounter” without balance, the relationship of the “equal” (*EM*, 207), and yet without equivalency. As Emerson says in another essay, “Gifts”: “there is no commensurability between a man and any gift”; he expresses the perception of excess in relation to the other with a sense of “shame and humiliation” (*EM*, 362). It is this sense of *incommensurable correspondence* that disturbs and unsettles the mind of the reader. As Cavell says, “the drift of *Walden* is not that we should go off and be alone; the drift is that we are alone, and that we are never alone.”

**UNDERWRITING ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY:**

**TRANSCENDENCE, TRANSLATION, AND TRANSUBSTANTIATION**

An Alternative Route from the Private to the Public via Language

Cavell says Emerson’s idea of circles resolves and recasts the antinomy of subjectivity and objectivity, or of the inner and the outer (*SW*, 128, and 137–138). It is this standing on the verge of aloneness (the singularity of the self) and of opening to an otherness that allows us to go beyond equilibrium between two opposites, to transcend the antinomy of the private and the public. In order to understand how the transcendentalism of Emerson and Thoreau might support Cavell’s quest for the public, we must be destabilized by their thought and immersed in its sense of excess. Cavell identifies this excess as a matter not of unworldly, spiritual, mystical communion, but of (re)engagement with language in conversation with a friend. This is at the heart of Cavell’s reconfiguration of American transcendentalism as *transcendence in the ordinary*, and his resuscitation of a transcendental dimension in the political.

Cavell says that the transcendentalism of Emerson and Thoreau underwrites ordinary language philosophy (and by implication, that language plays a crucial role in transcendence). We need to awake ourselves to the state of blindness and voicelessness that is produced in the name of public (and political) language. We must stand on precarious ground, “on tiptoe,” as Thoreau says (*WD*, 71), alert to the sense of our being on a border between past and future, inner and outer, private and public, and death and rebirth. This mode of “standing between,” however, is no suggestion of any kind of middle way. For Emerson’s thinking, Cavell says, “[t]here is no middle way between, say, self-reliance and self- (other-) conformity.” This implies Cavell’s frustration with Dewey’s declaration that language is public and is shared; and more generally, his remark manifests a difference from the approach of the politics of recognition.

Ironically, there is a potential alliance for Cavell that is not at home but across the Atlantic, in Derrida’s poststructuralism. Derrida’s re-examination of “learning by heart” helps us here, as Paul Standish has shown. Reading Derrida’s account, in *The Gift of Death*, of Abraham’s dilemma in sacrificing his son, Standish draws out the paradox in “the singularity and secrecy of the absolute demands of a particular moment and the publicity of culture and language.” The word “heart” proves to be a rich field of “thesaurization,” where, in our struggling reengagement with language, the private and the public intersect, “making possible the invisible answering of your inner life.” This manifests the paradox of the secret and the necessity of sharing it with the other. To live with this paradox, one has to stand on
a precarious border between the inner and outer, and attest to the very moment when the secret bursts into the outer. There is a strong sense of interiority, and yet this is not an isolated individualism but a singularity of the self, different from solipsism. Secrecy and privacy are already a part of linguistic practice and, hence, already public. The interiority of the self is not a priori, but is something to be achieved, paradoxically, in participation to the language community. Simultaneously the public is far richer than we conventionally assume, as in the political use of a phrase such as “public opinion.” Finding connections between American philosophy and poststructuralism, Standish shows us how we can stand on a precarious border between the private and the public via language. Emerson’s “friendship” can be reread and reinforced in the light of the paradox that Standish elucidates via Derrida. Unwittingly Cavell shares this sense with Derrida, but he highlights Emerson’s and Thoreau’s distinctively American transcendentalism.17

CAVELL’S REDEFINITION OF TRANSCENDENTALISM

Cavell’s transcendental medium of philosophy does not aspire to the high, to the abstract; rather, it calls for the returning of language to the low. Transcendence is made possible by our reengagement with language. What we mean by “transcendence” and how it takes place in the “ordinary” is then the central issue to be addressed. Though such an enquiry may not show immediate impact on the political, it connects, via a detour, the private and the public. Cavell here gives his unique reinterpretation to Emerson’s and Thoreau’s transcendentalism. In his ordinary language philosophy, participation in the language community is an ingredient of our political life, where “the polis is the field within which I work out my personal identity and it is the creation of (political) freedom.”18 In his rereading of Walden, Thoreau’s apparently secluded life in the woods is reinterpreted as a primordial form of participation in the polis — his experiment in living, in testing his life and words under the trial of his language community, the people of Concord, Massachusetts, and America (SW, 7–11). Returning language to the ordinary does not mean praising the mundane. Rather it inspires us to rediscover the foreign and the strange, which is to say, the uncommon, in the common. In this sense it is a “transcendence down.”19

Cavell’s redefinition of transcendentalism has multiple implications. First, it releases American transcendentalism from the dichotomous frameworks of the social and the individual, the public and the private, and more broadly, historicism and spiritualism. Second, as its movement is downward, it reverses the conventional association of transcendence as a movement upward, toward an ideal oneness. Cavell’s characterization of Emersonian perfectionism evokes a movement onward, not the upward movement symbolized by Plato’s sun (SW, 136).20 By highlighting the adverbial phrase, “in due time,” in Emerson’s remark, “the inmost in due time become the outmost” (EM, 132), with its implications of provisionality, uncertainty, and unpredictability, Cavell reminds us that a path from the private to the public is always still to be achieved. Furthermore, transcendence down has a further implication: of shame. Cavell perceives Emerson’s idea of self-reliance as a “study of shame” (CH, 47). (This contrasts with Richard Rorty’s reclaiming of the voices of Walt Whitman and Dewey in his task of achieving America, which is a matter not
of shame but pride.21) In his memoir, Cavell refers to Thoreau’s and Emerson’s sense of guilt over slavery (LD, 540) and, hence, their sense of responsibility to “publish [their] guilt” (LD, 447). A good society depends on “me,” involving “my” confrontation with the “sins of society” (SC, 162) and my self-reproach (CW, 187, quoted in SC, 173). This is a mode of risk-taking beyond the secure discourse of the politics of recognition (SC, 163; 173–174). It is this unappeased sense of sin that permeates Cavell’s writing. Unlike Rawlsian conceptions of justice, you are never “above reproach,” and, hence, democracy is still to come (SC, 162).

Third, language transcends itself. Language is attached to the low and the common, and yet a certain spirituality is inherent in language, beyond human grasp. This is symbolized by Thoreau’s remark, “The volatile truth of our words should continually betray the inadequacy of the residual statement. Their truth is instantly translated; its literal monument alone remains” (WD, 217). Translation reveals an impulse to transcendence inherent in language. Cavell considers Thoreau’s Walden as a book on philosophy as translation, where translation is understood as a matter of “transfiguration from one form of life to another.” It is the moment of language’s producing “a new revelation within an old familiarity.”22 It necessarily involves the experience of the ungraspable and untranslatable, which is an encounter with otherness. It is the experience of “the extraordinariness of what we accept as the ordinary” (PD, 1); and the process of converting what he calls the “actual” into the “eventual ordinary” (SC, 165–166). We find ourselves on “some boundary or threshold, as between the impossible and the possible.”23 This implies further that what is transcended is our natural condition. By comparison with the molting of the loon and the fowls at Walden, the molting season for humans, Cavell writes, is “not a natural crisis” (SW, 43). Translation itself hinges on this sense of a radical turning point.

Finally, through transcendence, we are released from narrow self-possession and raise ourselves to that “higher self” that Emerson calls the state of the “Over-Soul,” “a higher self-possession” (EM, 241; SC, 161). This higher state is again burdened by the sense of sin, with the suggestion of the Christian notion of transubstantiation: the word of God made flesh. By the same token, Thoreau’s “philosophy of morning” is a book of crisis, Cavell claims, and his Walden is “writing about departure” (PD, 225). “Morning” has the further connotation of “mourning” (PD, 217). That is to say, it is from within the state of mourning that morning arrives, as the moment of “transformation in our relation to words and to the world” (PD, 230). The focal point in American transcendentalism lies in the very moment of conversion from negativity to affirmation, as if realizing a “philosophy the day after tomorrow” — a phrase designed to evoke the multiple significances of Nietzsche’s “Übermorgen” — the day after tomorrow, the next morning, overcoming mourning and making possible a super-awakening. The prefix “Über-” more than its English equivalent, itself suggests an exceeding of thought, which in turn reminds us of the inheritance of Emerson’s Over-Soul in Nietzsche’s Übermensch. Such an alternative medium of philosophy requires us to stand on tiptoe in the moment of conversion.24
Exceeding Thought: Toward a Higher Public

Emerson’s and Thoreau’s American transcendentalism sheds light on an alternative, transcendental route from the private to the public. Recasting the antinomy of the inner and the outer, it destabilizes conventional expectations of “bridging” the two — styled perhaps as the conflict-resolution of recognizing and narrowing difference, through open (allegedly public) discussion. Cavell, with Emerson and Thoreau, reminds us that the private and the public are not to be “bridged” but to be connected through disjunction by the transcendental medium of language. This requires that we change our stance. Thoreau will say that we must stand on tiptoe, poised between public and private, as if at the moment of rebirth. Rorty ends up dividing the private and the public by de-transcendentalizing them, depriving the public of the spiritual. Cavell, by contrast, holds on to the notion of transcendence, yet in a way that frees it from mystification. In transcendence down, we are opened to the possibility of creating a richer, even, say, a spiritual public, where our private desire is converted for political participation. Following this alternative route, the extended sense of the political does not trivialize concerns in one’s personal life simply as “minor” in relation to ostensibly “big” political issues. Emerson and Thoreau raise provocative voices against the dullness of public discourse routinized by rights-talk and recognition — where, to adapt a phrase of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s, political language has gone “on holiday.” Translation dispels routines at the same time as it demystifies transcendence: it is the linguistic condition for our becoming “Man Thinking” (*EM*, 52). Then we can live under its sign, with the breaching of our experience.

Here Emersonian friendship can be redeemed as the condition for achieving a higher public by a detour. Emerson speaks of an incommensurable correspondence, an idea that resonates with Thoreau’s “perpetual nextness” — that is, the state of the self never fully identified with the other (*WD*, 108). Then in his texts the images of excess abound: of our implication in sin, which calls for neither sacrifice nor sympathy; of the gift, where Emerson writes, “He is a good man who can receive a gift well” (*EM*, 362); and of the “the residuum unknown, unanalyzable” (*EM*, 241), which exceeds our capacity for confident articulation but does not release us from the obligation toward expression. These multiple images of exceeding thought point toward the possibility of a public that can never be assimilated into the discourse of accountability and exchange.

For the self to learn to speak the language of what Thoreau calls “extra vagance” (*WD*, 216), for a person to “regain his tongue” in conversation (*EM*, 210), he needs a friend who attests to the moment, standing on tiptoe, where the secret is translated into the public, where negativity turns to affirmation. The friend can teach us only indirectly, not by “caring” or “love,” but through “a shock of recognition” (*SW*, 32). Friends give me, Emerson says, “that which properly they cannot give, but which emanates from them” (*EM*, 213). In incommensurable correspondence, the friend awakens us, making us “ashamed of our shame,” of the state of our conformity, and represents “our beyond,” through “recognition and negation” (*CH*, 58–59). This is
the implication of Emersonian moral perfectionism: that “we are educations for one another” (CH, 36).

It is only in this paradoxical relationship of friendship that we can understand Thoreau’s puzzling remark: “We are alone, and never alone.” This releases us from any dichotomous choice between self-reliance and communal relationship, between autonomy and care, and more broadly between liberalism and communitarianism. A higher public calls for the subject to be replaced by what might be called a resilient self, where strength and independence are permeated by a humble sense of sin and shame, and by an attitude of receptivity. One can express one’s thankfulness only indirectly — after the friend is gone, by one’s “own shining,” as Emerson puts it, by finding and demonstrating who one is. Hence, we walk alone in the world: the friend can teach only by leaving. It is only this “I” who can redeem what is “unrequited” (EM, 214). The subject thus replaced is marked not simply by the negativity of self-abrogation and abandonment, but, more importantly (for American philosophy), by the hope of self-affirmation. The language of “extra vagance” professes our “right to desire,” resuscitating political emotion from within. This is an alternative — say, transcendental — route of political education from the private to the public.

2. Stanley Cavell, Little Did I Know: Excerpts from Memory (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 511. This work will be cited in the text as LD for all subsequent references.
4. Stanley Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 185. This work will be cited in the text as PD for all subsequent references.
5. Stanley Cavell, Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 185. This work will be cited in the text as CW for all subsequent references.
6. Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Brooks Atkinson (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 53. This work will be cited in the text as EM for all subsequent references.
11. Stanley Cavell, The Senses of Walden (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 80) This work will be cited in the text as SW for all subsequent references.
15. Ibid., 149
16. Ibid., 150
20. See also, Stanley Cavell, *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: Emersonian Perfectionism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 10. This work will be cited in the text as CH for all subsequent references.
23. Ibid.
24. I thank Paul Standish for helping me to clarify these subtle implications of the relationship between translation, transcendence, and transubstantiation in Cavell’s thought.