The Politics of Unknowing and the Virtues of Ignorance:
Toward a Pedagogy of Epistemic Vulnerability

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INTRODUCTION

In Plato’s allegory of the cave, prisoners are chained to the walls of a cave, unable to move their heads to see the light and the life of freedom going on behind them; all they see are shadows on the wall; the shadows are their reality. One of them breaks free, only to find that each movement thereafter is wrought with pain and discomfort. To finally see the light is painful, after a lifetime of darkness. Adjusting one’s vision, altering one’s perception of reality proves challenging, for there is comfort in the dark. More difficult still is the attempt to free the other prisoners, for the prisoners have found comfort in their closed community and illusory reality. As enduring as this image has been, it leaves open key issues this essay will address: How do we know if we are in the cave or not? How do we attend to relationships that create and sustain patterns of ignorance?

Philosophers have for centuries been concerned with the importance of knowledge, with what can be known, who can know, and how, as well as with that which we do not know, cannot know, and do not want to know. While epistemology explores the nature, methodology, and limits of the production of knowledge, “antiepistemology” wonders about its shadow: “the nature of non-knowledge, and the political and social practices embedded in the effort to suppress or to kindle endless new forms of ambiguity and ignorance.”1 “Agnotology” — the study of ignorance — provides a new theoretical lens with which to reframe traditional questions about “how we know” asking instead, “Why don’t we know what we don’t know? What keeps ignorance alive, or allows it to be used as a political instrument?”

Epistemologists of ignorance from a range of disciplines have made the convincing case that ignorance is no mere lack of knowledge as is commonly assumed, but is rather actively sought after, consciously produced, strategically deployed, ferociously consumed, and carefully maintained.2 They argue that like knowledge, ignorance is a social construction, and it has become a substantive epistemic practice. Recognizing ignorance as a structural problem, we must, they urge, carefully attend to the ways in which “ignorance can drive inquiry, by commission or omission,” in ways that play into “cherished, if misguided, putative knowledge.”3

In an effort to grapple with the myriad ways in which ignorance(s) have been mobilized by the powerful against the powerless and by ourselves against ourselves, I contextualize forms of strategic ignorance that operate on cultural and subjective levels and undergird other types of ignorance, all of which, I will argue, depend essentially on a form of closure: the denial and disavowal of difference. In particular, I look at how knowledge about sex and sexuality has been constructed and transferred through ignorance: the mobilization of strategic unknowns. Offering a
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Central to this process is the rethinking of foundational assumptions about subjectivity and responsibility that have hitherto relied on fantasies of mastery, illusions of autonomy, rationality, invulnerability, and freedom itself. As many social justice educators have pointed out, the very conceptual tools and theoretical lenses we use to illuminate the ways in which we are all complicit (though in different ways and to different degrees) in practices of domination and oppression (and with which we are not aligned and consciously resist) are insufficiently complex and contribute to the reproduction of hierarchical social relationships, even in the very spaces that are dedicated to their transformation, despite our best intentions. (How do we participate in our own domination, and how has it come to be that we identify with interests not our own?)

Within the context of social justice education, these questions are particularly salient, as the knowledge encountered is particularly difficult; examining power dynamics involved in shaping identities, complicity, and responsibility can be “world shattering.” Educators often lament the lack of engagement from students who are ignorant and intransigent; students often lament the ignorance of their teachers who seem oblivious to their realities and the ways in which mainstream curricula and overall school climate is irrelevant, offensive, and even dangerous for them. Are the kinds of ignorances structuring each position the same, similar, equally culpable?

When we factor in the strategic unknowns, the non-selected or non-cultivated, censored, erased, classified, forbidden, and dangerous forms of knowledge, we can then examine all those different forms of structural ignorance that have been harnessed for political ends. In the following sections, I explore historical and contemporary deployments of strategic unknowns and sequestered knowledge. I then examine how ignorance circulates, has been fostered and transferred, such that questions of culpability and complicity become quite complicated indeed. I argue that interdisciplinary approaches to philosophy of education can help us in this task and can point us to the necessity to look for responsibility not in our knowledge but precisely in our ignorance. We must seek it out in those places where we are certain of knowledge, and one key way to do this is through the engagement with difference and careful critical analysis of practices that stimulate anxieties about difference. This interdisciplinary philosophy yields a process rich with pedagogical possibility.

STRATEGIC UNKNOWNS AND SEQUESTERED KNOWLEDGES

The first form of ignorance I examine is generated when knowledge is encountered as threatening or dangerous. I detail some of the ways in which
particular forms of knowledge have carefully not been cultivated, meticulously sequestered, and explicitly forbidden. By examining ignorance as a defense, the activity of its process becomes clear. We can see non-knowledge is consciously constructed, used to leverage authority, close down community, and exonerate the culpable in a range of different legal and cultural arenas. This ignorance is a series of carefully constructed forms of not knowing that are used to protect power. They are deployed, either consciously or not, because those in privileged positions do not want us to know or do not themselves want to know.

From Galileo’s disavowal of heliocentrism to contemporary pressures to avoid particular areas of scientific research, this form of ignorance, has driven philosophical and scientific inquiry in directions that are not those most clearly indicated. Here, questions of culpability and complicity are clear. Ignorance is generated and disseminated through a logic of “we rule you, if we can fool you.” Ignorances of this kind are vicious, ethically reprehensible and epistemically dangerous not just because they disguise interests, are mobilized to value profit over people, but also because they produce other forms of ignorance on various levels that are then all the more complicated to recognize and diagnose.

Disciplinarity itself is structured by a kind of domain-exclusivity that shifts some knowledges out of consideration, and, in this sense, disciplinarity creates categorical ignorances. Relatedly, by incorporating gaps, the mobilization of strategic unknowns in this category pertains to how the formation of literary, philosophical, and scientific canons (our overall perceptual, conceptual, and linguistic apparatus) have been polluted by sexist and racist colonial projects of expansion and domination. Drawing our attention to the willful production of one particular form of knowledge that was carefully and decidedly not chosen for production, Londa Schiebinger demonstrates how gender relations in Europe and in its West Indian colonies guided Europeans as they selected particular plants and technologies for transport back to Europe and actively ignored others. The peacock flower was deployed in the struggle against slavery throughout the eighteenth century by slave women in the West Indies who used it to abort offspring who would otherwise have been born into slavery. Perhaps not surprisingly, this was one plant that failed to make it back to the motherland for knowledge production.

“Abortifacients” represent a body of knowledge and set of techniques that did not make it over to Europe from the New World. Knowledge ignored in the eighteenth century was by the nineteenth century largely forgotten and now translates, we might say, into widespread structural ignorance. The sharing of the knowledge about the existence of abortifacients may have been useful for the flourishing of more diverse and reciprocal social and sexual relations as well as for new understandings of community and sexuality. Perhaps the reduction of sexuality to reproduction could have been avoided. This actively produced ignorance has certainly played into the continued leveraging of authority over women, bodies, and pleasures.

Indeed, women’s bodies and pleasures “provide a fertile lens for understanding the workings of “power/knowledge-ignorance” in which we can “trace who desires
what knowledge,” and what ignorances are subsequently produced. Providing us with another example of how knowledge once found can be lost, Nancy Tuana shows the politics of unknowing at work in common and scientific knowledge of female sexuality and how knowledge about female orgasm was lost in the production of knowledge around sex and reproduction. She traces the construction, representation, and rifts in the construction of sexual knowledge, demonstrating how as knowledge and representation of the penis was growing, knowledge of the clitoris, though earlier pursued, was not. Previously scientifically constructed knowledge of the clitoris and female orgasm got lost in the reduction of sexuality to reproduction and shows that what we attend to and what we ignore are often interwoven with hidden values and political interests in complex ways.

These practices mobilize ignorance as strategies to protect power and profit and to exonerate guilty parties from wrongdoing. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, one of the first epistemologists of ignorance, illustrated the way ignorance was mobilized during the high period of institutionalized discrimination against AIDS patients. In 1986, the U.S. Justice Department ruled that employers could fire individuals with AIDS as long as they could claim to be ignorant of the known medical fact that AIDS did not pose a health danger in the workplace. Ignorance of the absence of risk was solid grounds for dismissing staff. These examples illustrate institutionalized denial of difference and desire and highlight the link between science, knowledge, and transparency; what is apparent is what can be known scientifically, what can be known scientifically is shaped by socially derived questions and selective avoidances, which have affected not only the way we have organized and disciplined expressions of sexuality, but also the ways in which we represent and transfer knowledge-ignorance, particularly with regard to how we understand education, the pursuit of knowledge, and school policy, to which I now turn.

Taken together with other kinds of restrictions on educational projects, including the circuitous defense of intelligent design by purporting to protect teacher freedom of speech in science classrooms, it is evident that schools are structural sites of ignorance. Mobilizing strategic and structural forms of ignorance in the attempt to disavow desire in education in Missouri, HB 2051, the so-called “Don’t Say Gay Bill,” as an example of how ignorance is structured in education. The blatancy of current attempts to pass bills in Tennessee, Missouri, and Utah that forbid the discussion of sexuality-related subjects and explicitly prohibit the use of the term “gay” raises new challenges to creating critical educational communities in school settings. Struck down in Tennessee and Utah, Missouri’s HB 2051 remains stuck in the House. The text of the bill is short, but the intent is wide-ranging: Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, no instruction, material, or extracurricular activity sponsored by a public school that discusses sexual orientation other than in scientific instruction concerning human reproduction shall be provided in any public school. The most of obvious effect of these bills is to frame school policy as forbidding knowledge and enforcing ignorance. Such bills eliminate crucial discussions of the historical and contemporary realities, struggles, and contributions of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender communities in schools, and under such
Strategic deployments of ignorance become key in the struggle to gain support for such legislation. The “Don’t Say Gay Bill,” I would argue, is a mechanism of defense, a form culturally imposed unknowing designed to maintain closed and insular communities of ignorance. The foreclosure of critical communities becomes an essential tactic as does the circulation of arguments that deflect rather than engage the actual issues. Representative Dwight Scharnhorst, a co-sponsor of the so-called “Don’t Say Gay Bill,” argued that sexual orientation issues should be taught by parents, clergy, and physicians and warned that teaching about LGBT issues would lead to other inappropriate discussions: “There is no need to talk about Billy wanting to marry a goat” he said. Butler County’s Republican Party co-chair Hardy Billington, who is running for reelection to the Poplar Bluff school board, published a newspaper ad supporting the proposed bill in which he calls homosexual behavior a self-destructive health risk as dangerous as smoking, which people need to be steered away from: “homosexuals need our tough love,” he says. In his defense of the bill, Missouri State Representative Steve Cookson, the actual sponsor of HB 2051, suggests that we need to be weary of “the homosexual agenda,” and that gay-straight alliances (GSA) have ulterior motives that should not be supported by taxpayer dollars. “Since they can’t reproduce, they must recruit people into that lifestyle.”

GSAs recruit people into anti-homophobia and ethical community and offer a space for critical conversations, critique of motivated representation, and the manipulation of people’s sense of justice and fairness. Local strategies to mobilize ignorance and resistance to the acceptance, recognition, and normalization of sex and gender difference, include the circulation of false facts, creatively concocted representations of the “homosexual agenda,” the cultivation of fear and disgust, and the idea that special interest groups are usurping the precious resources of the many to support the few, circulations of the idea that homosexuality is a morally depraved health risk that threatens the thriving of “normal” moral community. These circuitous logics of ignorance are so obviously blatantly false, it is surprising that they manage to get circulated in the first place.

The antigay community clearly feels threatened by the changing legitimacy of knowledge about LGBT communities. The fear that gays are trying to “recruit” people because they cannot reproduce is, perhaps, a projection of their own fear of their inability to reproduce their own closed community and protect their unjustifiable privileges. These examples show that ignorance is a productive force in itself, not just a “precursor or an impediment to more knowledge,” but is better thought as “the twin and not the opposite of knowledge.” Ignorance and knowledge are dynamically linked, mutually constituting forces operationalized in the service of both power and resistance. Different mobilizations of strategic unknowns and the sequestering of particular forms of knowledge have enabled both dominant and subordinate groups to deny awareness of things it is not in their interest to acknowledge; academic practices of disciplinarity and discipline-specific discourses
have enabled the continued exclusion of those knowledges other than dominant Western epistemic and intellectual traditions. Disciplined knowledge fails to recognize epistemes grounded on different conceptions of the world and ways of knowing, and thus, othered others cannot be recognized as such, they cannot speak and cannot be heard. That is, “when they speak from the framework of their own epistemic conventions,” they are not acknowledged or understood by the academy.

**DISCIPLINARITY**

Attending to the production, dissemination, and consumption of these strategic unknowns can help to challenge these forms of ignorance and shed light on their epistemic and ethical implications. They lead into ignorances that are established not by refraining from investigating certain questions or by directly withholding knowledge from certain groups of people, but through social practices and habits where questions of culpability and complicity become less clear. These practices are not only repudiations of openness but are also ways of remaining ignorant of how our own fantasies of mastery and invulnerability are socially constructed ways of seeing and not seeing.

Erinn Gilson has demonstrated how “the denial of vulnerability can be understood to be motivated by the desire — conscious or not — to maintain a certain kind of subjectivity privileged in capitalist socioeconomic systems,” namely, that of the “prototypical, arrogantly self-sufficient, independent, invulnerable master subject.” Invulnerability is a central feature of “masterful subjectivity” because it solidifies a sense of control, indeed, an illusion of control. The realization of full mastery, complete control, and utter indestructibility is, of course, an impossibility, but we have yet to conceive of the ethical individual as relational, dependent on others, or vulnerable.

Invulnerability, Gilson points out, is a stance that enables us to ignore those aspects of existence that are threatening or uncomfortable or unbearable, our perpetual vulnerability. As invulnerable, she explains, we cannot be affected by what might disrupt our way of seeing and being in the world. Showing us how structured ignorances from domains of disciplined knowledge are transferred into unquestioned social practices, Gilson shows how invulnerability is not interrogated, contextualized, or contested because it has become an unacknowledged social norm. Upon this fundamental ignorance, we layer other modes of ignorance. We do not often acknowledge that what we know and do not know and how we came to know (or not to know it) has a history, has been constituted by that history, and lays the groundwork for the proliferation of multiple forms of ignorance.

In much the same way I have come to see disciplinarity, Gilson argues that invulnerability closes us off to forms of meaning and value that ought to be interrogated. At the level of the individual, it represents closure to particular understandings of the nature of social relations as well as to particular features of the self. Gilson helps us reckon with our dependence on others, the way we cannot escape being shaped through our relationships to our environment and those we encounter within it. She argues, in seeking invulnerability, we actively ignore the
ways in which we become who we are through our openness to and dependence on
others. Importantly, however, ignorance is not only mobilized as a strategy of power
and domination, but also as a strategy of resistance, which I will explore in the last
section. Before I examine emancipatory aspects ignorance, I want to discuss how the
ignorances detailed above are circulated; when we begin to see how layered the
legacy of our inherited epistemologies of ignorance is, questions of complicity and
culpability become ever more complex.

**Transferred Ignorance and Culpability**

In her attempt to distinguish different kinds of ignorance and different degrees
of blameworthiness that accompany them, Katia Maria Vogt explores how blame-
worthy ignorance was characterized in the Socratic dialogues.20 We are admonished
to “know thyself,” but Socrates clearly demonstrates that this involves admitting
ignorance, knowing the limits of one’s knowledge. Socrates is the most wise, we
might say, precisely because he admitted his ignorance. So clearly, ignorance is not
all bad. The most vicious form of blameworthy ignorance Vogt finds in the dialogues
is when, ignorant of the limits of our own knowledge, ability, or expertise, we impart
“knowledge” or false information to others. This she terms “transferred igno-
rance.”21

Transferred ignorance, according to Vogt, involves a transition from an exag-
gerated self-image to an inflated assessment of one’s ability to judge matters other
than oneself; it is the misrecognition and “misrepresentation of one’s epistemic
standing.”22 Vogt tell us that when we put forward what we claim to know, we often
formulate ideas that figure in our thoughts because we picked them up from others,
but eventually come to treat them as our own original thoughts. While we indulge
in this kind of “overly optimistic self-image,” she says, we often do not even
understand what it is we are actually saying, and we impart “knowledge” we do not
in fact posses. The most common and most dangerous instances of transferred
ignorance occur when someone in a position of expertise moves from their “own
competence (or social status) toward more objective and universal knowledge
claims” that are then disseminated and consumed and transferred again. We
encounter an interesting example of such ignorance at the end of the *Apology*
when Socrates points out that “fear of death is a matter of misrepresenting one’s own
epistemic standing: in fearing death, one deems oneself wise.”23 In fearing death, we
assume we know what it is, when in fact we do not.

In transferring ignorance, we feel empowered by illusory and self-aggrandizing
views of ourselves and slip with ease into making overly confident knowledge
claims, which are not recognized as such. Vogt argues that we are culpable for the
transfer of such ignorance because we are thinking of ourselves as authorities on
matters we know little about; we view ourselves (and our closed communities) as
epistemically superior, as more knowledgeable than we actually are, which carries
with it a feeling of false superiority and a sense of having power over others. Faulty
inferences such as these, it seems to me, have been transferred from overly confident
individuals and closed communities into domains of knowledge and then back
again, making it difficult to decipher whether we are looking at mere shadows on the walls of the caves (or not).

Now with regard to historical and contemporary practices of knowledge production, education in general, and social justice education in particular, I think the idea of transferred ignorance is particularly useful and important. I think it helps to explain how we have come to inherit insufficiently complex conceptual tools, epistemologies of ignorance, and what we might call, borrowing some from Charles Mills, a skewed racialized (hetero)sexist moral psychology that allows us to act in racist, sexist, and homophobic ways while thinking of ourselves as acting morally, a globalized “cognitive dysfunction” that disavows the multiplicity of desire and denigrates difference, operating socially and psychically as the “natural” (and largely uncontested) order of things.

We find ourselves in an ever increasingly proliferating fact-free public discourse where ignorance masquerades as knowledge on issues varying from economic policies to scientific research, and so I suggest that Vogt’s notion of transferred ignorance, can and should be applied to structures, domains of knowledge, the disciplines, as well as individuals. Disciplinary projects of knowledge production operate with similar self-aggrandizing claims to knowledge and the misrecognition of them as such. Rather than acknowledging the limits of the particular methodologies adopted by different fields and collaborating with others, the drawing of the boundaries between disciplines and opposing “legitimate knowledge” to ignorance has resulted in an ever-increasing transfer of ignorance on multiple levels. The more ignorance is transferred, then, the more difficult questions of complicity and culpability seem to become.

Epistemic Vulnerability and Interdisciplinarity

In my attempt to contextualize non-cultivated, lost, and forbidden forms of sexual knowledge, we see the ways in which ignorance colludes and competes with knowledge in “mobilizing the flows of energy, desire, goods, meanings, persons.” Just as desire to encounter the unknown, acknowledge misrecognition, and explore new relationships in different community is the way out of the cave, admitting epistemic vulnerability offers a potential route out of our firmly established and punitive domains of knowledge that transfer ignorance and keep us in the dark. When the prisoner encounters the light outside of the cave, a painful adjustment in his perceptual proclivities proves necessary. Perhaps in his encounter with the community outside, the shadows cast upon the wall of the cave became less daunting; the opacity of their form in the dark was perhaps revealed in noting the projections that played key roles in shaping them.

The emergence of interdisciplinary analysis of agnotology has uncovered some of the structuring fantasies of disciplinary domains of knowledge and ignorance. We see traces of disavowed desires for mastery and control and an unacknowledged fear of difference in the insufficiently complex perceptual conceptual analytic tools we use to critically evaluate them. A pedagogy of epistemic vulnerability may prove to be particularly important not just for the creation of new conceptual tools and
theoretical lenses, new ways of seeing and being in the world, but also for educational theory and practice concerned with social justice.

By engaging outside communities, through the encounter with other knowers and ways of knowing, we might come to see that restrictive exclusive disciplines generate only sequestered knowledges and self-imposed ignorance. If destructive structural forms of ignorance grow out of insulated communities that disavow difference (and expressions of desire and sexuality outside the bounds of human reproduction), we might renounce fantasies of mastery, superiority, and domination by fetishizing connection, reciprocity, and solidarity. The denial of physical, psychic, political, and epistemic vulnerability is not without consequence and we might more successfully defend against them by allowing ourselves to be touched, moved, and transformed through the encounter with difference, with others.

A pedagogy of epistemic vulnerability would work to foster critical communities that can help us to tap into forms of knowledge and ignorance that push against disciplined ignorance and sequestered knowledges. Ignorance would function as the desire to know more rather than as a desire to not-know or make known. Because philosophy of education is an inherently interdisciplinary discipline it can help us in this task and can point us to the necessity to look for responsibility not in our capacities for autonomous and rational decision-making but precisely in our ignorance. A pedagogy of epistemic vulnerability would seek ignorance out precisely in those places where we are certain of knowledge through collective careful critical analysis of practices that stimulate anxieties about difference.

In recognizing the limits of our knowledge, the impossibility of invulnerability, and the contradictory roles ignorance and knowledge play in forces of domination and emancipation, we can open ourselves up to exciting new forms of pleasure in creating social relations of reciprocity and solidarity. Stimulating curiosity about difference rather than fear and admitting the erotic as a force that structures the encounter with difference, a force constitutive of both knowledge and ignorance (as well as the defenses mobilized against them), seems to me to be a good place to begin.

6. Ibid.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.


18. Gilson, “Vulnerability, Ignorance, and Oppression,” 308.


21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.
