“Yes…But is it a Naturalism?”

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There are occasions in the life of every philosopher of education when it is appropriate to stand back and reflect upon the nature of one’s philosophical activities and mode(s) of reasoning. Some philosophers, however, address certain educational problems and issues which directly implicate the general questions about the nature of one’s philosophical activities and the proper mode(s) of reasoning. The work of Harvey Siegel involves educational problems and issues which have such general implications, for in his work the question about reason becomes the central problem. As Siegel has stated, the “fostering of rationality and critical thinking is the central aim, and the overriding ideal, of education” (RR, 2). So, what Siegel takes rationality to be is important.

Our primary purpose is to explicate and critique the kind of philosophical perspective that Siegel has put forward in his recent works. A secondary purpose is to consider what philosophy of education might legitimately be conceived to be. In the first section, we briefly explicate Siegel’s general educational position. There we briefly note that Siegel’s explication and defense of his educational position depends upon what Siegel calls “fallibilism.” Next, we explicate the basic features of “naturalism.” “Naturalism,” as we understand it, is a very important approach which rather recently has shown itself to be a comparatively plausible philosophy. Roughly and briefly, a “naturalism” holds that there is no First Philosophy. In the light of the widespread influence of certain postmodern views which deny that there is a viable philosophy of education, our indirect purpose is to provide some reasons for thinking that philosophy is alive and well. Third, we return to consider whether Siegel’s position is a kind of naturalism and we argue that there are good reasons for concluding that his position is not really a viable naturalism.

Siegel’s General Educational Position

Rationality Redeemed? continues to develop and defend the ideas he had set out in his Educating Reason. Siegel has roughly organized the new work into two parts. The first part tries to develop and defend the following: that “rationality, and what I call…its ‘educational cognate,’ critical thinking, constitute a fundamental educational ideal,” that the “fostering of rationality and critical thinking is the central aim, and the overriding ideal, of education,” and that an “education aimed at fostering critical thinking is morally obligatory” (RR, 1, 4, 2, and 63, emphasis ours). The second part of the book, “Dialogue,” considers various critiques to his position which have been put forward by contemporary contextualists, feminists, multiculturalists, and postmodernists. According to Siegel, such critics “either radically reconceive [Siegel’s] ideal or reject it outright”; they “manifest radically different approaches to philosophy and philosophy of education” (RR, 4 and 8).
Siegel attempts “to embrace what is right” in such critiques and “to demonstrate some of the ways these critiques do not succeed” (RR, 8).

Throughout his work Siegel employs a broad conception of “critical thinker.” A critical thinker must not only have the skills and abilities which facilitate or make possible the appropriate assessment of reasons, but a critical thinker must also have certain dispositions, habits of mind, and character traits as well (RR, 2). As Siegel likes to say, a critical thinker is one who is “appropriately moved by [good] reasons.” For Siegel, the relationship between “critical thinking” and “rational thinking” is very close, for he takes rationality to be the having of good reasons. In many ways, then, Siegel’s “critical thinker” is closely related to a rational, free, and responsible agent.2

Siegel rightly sees that rationality continues to come under serious attack from many sides. Siegel holds that it is a legitimate philosophical task just to defend the claim about rationality as the fundamental educational aim. It is (also) a legitimate philosophical task to worry about whether the ideal is “utopian,” about whether and how it can be realized. In this respect, the second task compliments the first task. Here we briefly argue that the basic view needs a (minor) modification to take into account the role of “trust” and “authority.” C.A. Hooker has argued that less than ten percent of today’s physicists can understand the basic equations of modern physics.3 Hooker and Hilary Putnam argue, therefore, that there is a division of labor within most forms of (collective) inquiry. Within each intellectual tradition, there is (legitimate) trust and respect for the (legitimate) intellectual authority of others.4 It turns out, then, that much of what we come to believe (and come to know) does not result from our having “direct evidence” but from our trusting (legitimate) authorities. The appropriate education here, then, will involve a “balance” between trust in the reliable authorities and “independent” reason.5 (The Neiman and Siegel essay often stresses some of the institutional (collective) aspects of rationality, but Siegel’s recent book rarely does.)6

Siegel attempts, therefore, to explicate and defend rationality as a fundamental, educational ideal. To do this, Siegel spends a lot of time explicating and defending what he calls “fallibilism”: even if a claim is justified, there is a chance it is false and in need of revision.

Siegel has continually claimed that rationality just is having good reasons. In contrast, we agree with Max Black’s analyses that the claim is really a semi-stipulative definition which needs a second-order legitimation.7 (We shall return to explicate this term.) Black and Nicholas Rescher appear to hold that rationality is the pursuit of appropriate ends by intelligent means.8 One’s characterization of rationality has important implications for how one answers the skeptics.

NATURALISM AND LEGITIMATION (AS SECOND-ORDER INQUIRY)

The most important aspect of Siegel’s book is his firm, intuitive grasp of the fundamental philosophical issue at stake. It seems that Siegel does not really help by calling his view the “old-time enlightenment metanarrative,” and by saying that the partial (objective) success of his various critics actually depends upon the very “Enlightenment” conceptions and ideals that the critics challenge (RR, 8). Siegel
does not restrict himself to the enlightenment ideals; indeed, he says that “this ideal” is the most widely advocated in the history of philosophy of education, from Plato to Dewey and beyond (RR, 189 and 216). It is important to note that enlightenment thinkers are hardly “fallibilists!”

It helps to get clear about “objectivity” (or second-order legitimation) by comparing Siegel’s views with Hirst’s well-known views. Hirst’s justification of “liberal education” rests in large part on the claim that “[j]ustification is possible only if what is being justified is both intelligible under publicly rooted concepts and assessable according to accepted criteria.” So, judging according to public standards is a necessary condition of (objective) justification. Siegel holds that, even if it is necessary, it is clearly not enough. “Justifying” a candidate by showing it “fits with current practice” (or “accords with practice”) cannot be sufficient for it to be justified.

J.L. Mackie is well known for denying that there is any “objectivity” in moral discourse. Mackie never denied objectivity in the sciences. Richard Rorty has denied that science is objective! Rorty does not reject the teachings of modern science; he does accept the (first-order) reasons and criteria of the current practice. But when asked for a justification of science, he says that there is none. For Rorty, all one can say is “this is what we do.” “Objectivity” is, somehow, connected with legitimation (justification). Rorty argues that we should drop “objectivity” and settle for “solidarity” in science (and for “ethnocentrism” in ethics). Siegel is (rightly) opposed to Rorty (as we will show) (RR, 174-75).

Siegel is also (rightly) opposed to W.V.O. Quine’s “epistemology naturalized,” an approach that tries to reduce considerations of (objective) justification to the first-order findings of psychology (RR, 204). Perhaps Siegel takes Quine (ca 1969) to define what a “naturalistic” approach to philosophy is. But Hooker, Putnam, and Joseph Margolis all have called themselves “naturalists” indeed, “pragmatists” and all of them reject Quine’s “naturalism.” Furthermore, all of them reject Rorty’s arguments! We believe that the naturalism of Hooker, Putnam, and Margolis (following the lead of Nelson Goodman and Morton White in the late 1940s and J.J.C. Smart and Quine in the 1950s) provides a plausible view in which both ontological and epistemological objectivity can be defended.

In summary, it is reasonable to hold that philosophy addresses three questions: (1) What do we take to be the nature of the real world, and why? (2) What do we take to be the extent of our ability to have knowledge of the real world, and why? and (3) Having answered those questions, how should we live our lives, and why? Consider question one. Let us say that, broadly speaking, questions of fact, questions about the way the world is or appears to us to be, in terms of ordinary inspection, activity, scientific inquiry, and the like, are first-order questions (questions for first-order discourse). In contrast, questions about what, in the most critical sense, we take it we should mean, as in speaking of reality and knowledge, will be second-order questions (questions for second-order discourse.) First-order questions are questions about the way the world is, while second-order questions are questions about the right use of the concepts of reality and knowledge decided in the most responsible
way we can manage. Thus, the concern of second-order philosophical questions is *legitimation*: the reasoned or critical justification of an account of what reality or knowledge “are” or “should” be taken to be, under the condition of admitting a suitable run of first-order instances of actual (apparent) knowledge.¹⁶ (Siegel seems to accept this characterization.)¹⁷)

Given this distinction between first-order and second-order discourse, one can see that Kant’s transcendental approach is but one way to carry on second-order discourse. Foundationalism is another way. The “naturalistic” approach of Hooker, Margolis, and Putnam (and we think Catherine Elgin, Israel Scheffler, Goodman, Quine, and Smart) is yet another way to carry on second-order discourse.¹⁸ And for the naturalist, first-order inquiries without second-order inquiries cannot but be incomplete and blind; second-order inquiries without first-order inquiries cannot but be empty. The Western philosophical project has traditionally relied on a viable distinction between first-order and second-order discourse. As Rorty says, and Hooker, Margolis, Putnam, and Siegel agree, if the distinction were not viable, then philosophy really would be dead.

Naturalists hold that there is no first philosophy. A first philosophy holds that philosophy must start from (or discern or approximate to) necessary principles or constraints. For example, Aristotle held that it must be the case that nature has a fixed structure and human beings have a fixed nature (or essence); Aristotle held that to deny it is to contradict oneself. But Aristotle’s argument is invalid. In a formal system it is a necessary falsehood that a thing be F and be not F. But in an actual inquiry, it is not necessarily false, for one can always choose to reinterpret the terms. Thus, real numbers can be “irrational,” parallel lines can meet, a thing can be both a particle and a wave, and so on. (Such “changes” helped motivate Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction.)¹⁹

Siegel holds an “absolute” conception of truth: (1) The true cannot be defined “relative to” any epistemic properties and (2) For any proposition P, P is either true or false. But the second aspect is not unconditionally necessary; it is not an a priori truth that for any proposition P, P is either true or false (RR, 23). Multi-valued logics are not logically incoherent. Several philosophers (for example, Elgin, Margolis, Putnam, and Quine) have argued that, depending upon the nature of the domain of systematic inquiry, a multi-valued logic may well be defensible. A multi-valued logic would distinguish the false from the (more) “plausible,” but would it leave open whether there is an uniquely “plausible” theory in the domain. One could find two theories which are “incongruent” but equally “plausible”; one need not reject one of them. If science can distinguish the false from the (more) plausible but leave open whether there is a “uniquely” plausible theory, then we should not expect more in other domains (for example, morality).²⁰ Now Rorty himself “advocates” giving up “bivalence.”²¹ Here it is clear that Rorty is being arbitrary, for he will just say he switched! But considering whether it would be appropriate to change from using a bivalent logic to multi-valued logic is a second-order discourse for which our “best” (second-order) reasons (for and against) can be given.²²
Recall that Siegel is fallibilist. Indeed, “we are all fallibilists now, and have been since Peirce” (RR, 164). If so, we are not all full-bodied Peirceans! For Quine has shown that Peirce’s attempt to define “true” (and the “real”) in terms of the long-run outcome of the community of inquirers fails: it is neither an a priori nor an empirical truth that the long-run inquiry must converge to a unique theory.23

Peirce was one of the first to grasp the significance of probability in modern science.24 Siegel makes use of and stresses the important epistemic role for probability. But the concept of “probability” is not universal in the sense that all rational inquirers have it. It was invented about three hundred years ago and has undergone significant changes before it achieved the epistemic roles it has today. Even today, the concept has important problems. Siegel seems to hold that a criterion is universal because it is binding on all rational inquirers (RR, 20, 34, and 216). But how can Siegel know that the concept of “probability” is universal? How can he show that the concept we use today will be the same one that all our rational descendants will be using? Even if a similar concept were in use, perhaps the differences would be so great that one would say it is really a different concept! As Popper has warned us, one cannot predict the direction of knowledge “growth.”

The “naturalists” claim that there is no first philosophy is an inductive conjecture; it is a rational, risky bet. Given that there is no a priori need for certain foundations, and given that all attempts to discern certain foundations have failed so far, we bet that none will be found in the future. The claim that there is no first philosophy does not have the status of a necessary truth; it is not self-reflexively self-defeating.25 The Neiman and Siegel essay appears to accept these conclusions. Indeed, they praise Scheffler for recognizing that objectivity does not require “fixity of any sort” and that there “need not be any necessary understandings of permanent criteria.”26 The naturalist would add that, if one may start without having necessary truths, knowledge also has to be reconceived so that it yields provisional solutions rather than necessary truths.27 Siegel does concede that it is impossible to achieve a “God’s-eye point of view” (RR, 150, 175, and 215).

A naturalist would add that inquiry is also unlikely to achieve a Godlike necessary framework for all inquiry. Here the naturalist joins forces with such postmodernists as Rorty and Lyotard. For example, what Lyotard calls a “metanarrative” includes such things as “the necessary march of the proletariat” (Marx) and “the necessary unfolding and cunning of reason” (Hegel). The naturalist and the postmodern argue that these views (which involve such unconditional necessities) are epistemically inaccessible!

Rorty has repeatedly argued that philosophy has shown that Kant’s project (to find universal-and-necessary truths or constraints) has been a failure.28 For Rorty, philosophy has led us to see the contingency of various concepts, rules and principles. But Rorty and Mackie go on to argue that only a Kantian account of “objectivity” and legitimation will do! Given that the Kantian account fails, the postmodern claims that the philosophical project of legitimation fails. We argue that postmodernism is mistaken, for it has (arbitrarily) overlooked the “naturalistic” approach to legitimation.
The view that there is no first philosophy (or Siegel’s fallibilism) cannot just be a negative criticism. One must develop a positive theory of inquiry which coordinates epistemology, a theory of truth, and ontology.

Siegel does not go nearly far enough. He holds that “claims which arerationally justified are claims which we have reason to regard as true”; Siegel says this is a conceptual truth (RR, 22). But work of Bas C. van Fraassen shows that this is not a conceptual truth. Scientists can have good reasons for accepting a theory (because it explains the phenomena) and yet not taking the theory to be true.

The major problem, perhaps, is that Siegel never successfully links rationality (or epistemology) to any ontological position. The Neiman and Siegel essay does argue that maximizing the (epistemic) “credibility” (or coherence) of the entire system is not enough; they hold that objective utterances need also to have referential import. Neiman and Siegel appear to follow the work of Scheffler who held that there are two “initially credible” beliefs: In a mature field of inquiry, 1) the terms typically refer to what they purport to refer and 2) the expressions of the laws of nature are approximately true. When Scheffler is read this way, then he clearly had anticipated the well-known Putnam-Boyd view. But Putnam rightly came to regard such claims as a question-begging defense of realism. If a realism is to be defended, it will have to be in a more “indirect,” holistic manner. The first step starts from one of our deepest salient beliefs that the technologies related to modern (physical) science are causally powerful and effective. One then reasonably infers from this that modern science is somehow in touch with reality.

Linking rationality and a “minimal realism” will also help provide a viable answer to certain kinds of skeptics who ask, “Why should I be rational?” by showing how one’s ends can, as best we can judge, be achieved. Here one’s characterization of rationality plays a key role.

Siegel’s discussion of how to answer the skeptic, however, contains an important finding. If one is going to engage the skeptic in rational argument, one will have to appeal to the skeptic’s reason. One will have to assume that the skeptic has the capacity to reason. Now it might seem questionable to establish the jurisdiction of reason by appeal to the judgment of reason itself, but Siegel draws on the work of Rescher to argue (correctly) that it is not questionable at all. Siegel writes that rationality is “self-justifying” (RR, 81). This is either a misleading or an inadequate way of expressing the point for a naturalist. Rescher himself expressed the point in several, rather different ways: “the overall justification of rationality must be reflexive and self-referential”; rationality is “self-reliant.” What Rescher was trying to express is this: The justification of rationality is not a linear process that ultimately rests on something outside rationality itself. In this sense, the justification of rationality is, and “must” be, autonomous; it can be subject to no external authority.

Rescher’s claim that reason is “self-reliant” leads to the following. Suppose we hold that (scientific) reason arises and lives within an intellectual tradition and that initiation into the tradition both limits and yet enables the powers of reason. Then we can understand how the intellectual tradition could be in a position to justify its
activities to its members without appealing to anything external to, or outside of, the intellectual tradition. The capacity for legitimation arises and lives within the ongoing intellectual tradition. In other words, philosophy (and epistemology) is not external to, or outside of, the intellectual tradition. For the naturalist, first-order inquiries without second-order inquiries cannot but be incomplete and blind, and second-order inquiries without first-order inquiries cannot but be empty.

**Is Siegel a Naturalist?**

Perhaps Siegel thinks that legitimation involves a choice between a Quinean “naturalist” and a Kantian “transcendentalist.” If so, then this is a serious mistake, for “naturalism” needs to be considered. Siegel’s frequent remarks about “transcendental methods” and *a priori* methods suggest that Siegel really is some kind of Kantian (and hence a non-naturalist). Siegel as a Kantian would also explain why Siegel often seeks help from the strong neo-Kantians (Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas).³⁶

Siegel does have a solid grasp of the fundamental question: How can epistemology answer the second-order *legitimative* question? Yet when Siegel talks about epistemology, he says that epistemology is a single, overarching, general view that “sanctions” (“underwrites,” “underlines”) the more specific principles and reasons in each of the intellectual traditions it oversees (*RR*, 6, 32, 33, 34, and 117). These remarks suggest that there is an *external* authority which oversees each of the specific traditions. Recall that Siegel concedes that there is no “God’s Eye View.” Yet he does not quite come out and agree with the naturalist that inquiry is also unlikely to achieve Godlike *necessary constraints* (or frameworks). Again, Siegel’s references to the Kantians Apel and Habermas hardly reassure the naturalist here!

Siegel holds that he can provide four reasons to justify critical thinking as the fundamental educational ideal, one of which is respect for students as (potential?) persons. He holds that the “fundamental justification” is this moral reason (*RR*, 4). For Siegel, the key notion is the *Kantian* notion of *equal respect* for persons (*RR*, 93-94). Siegel’s discussion of specifics within the moral domain rely, it seems, upon a Kantian approach. From this it seems to follow that the single, general, overarching epistemology is itself Kantian (and therefore not a “naturalism”).³⁷

In the “naturalistic” spirit, however, we are entitled to reject reliance on the *modalities*, whether logical, natural, or linguistic, as fundamentally unclear. Necessity in all its guises is thus abjured and the notion of analyticity as well. Accordingly, the quest for certainty based upon meaning is wholly abandoned.³⁸

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1. See, for example, Harvey Siegel, *Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking, Education* (London: Routledge, 1988). We will focus primarily on Siegel’s *Rationality Redeemed? Further Dialogues on an Educational Ideal* (London: Routledge, 1997). This book will be cited as *RR* in the text for all subsequent references. We have also relied upon Harvey Siegel’s “Justification by Balance,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 52, no. 1 (1992): 27-46; and on Alven Neiman and Harvey Siegel, “Objectivity and Rationality in Epistemology and Education: Scheffler’s Middle Road,” *Synthese* 94, no. 1 (1993): 55-83. (The “middle road” is between mere coherence and certainty by tethers to “initial credibilities.”)
10. Siegel “Justification by Balance,” 42-43.
14. Siegel would also be opposed to David Armstrong, *Belief, Truth, and Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). Armstrong’s “naturalism” holds that knowledge requires the absolute reliability of the knower: If there is an empirical possibility of error, then it can not be knowledge. This is incompatible with fallibilism.
17 Siegel “Justification by Balance,” 44.
19. See also Scheffler, *Inquiries*, 289.
22. Again, Siegel (“Justification by Balance,” 44) seems to accept this general point.
25. If Siegel’s version of “fallibilism” were understood in this way, then there would be no need for Siegel’s ad hoc and arbitrary “defense” (*Rationality Redeemed?*, 122).
33. See Hooker, Lycan, Margolis, and Rescher.
34. Black, “Why Should I Be Rational?” Cognitive rationality is justifiable only in the “practical” order of reason.
36. Siegel, *Rationality Redeemed?* chap. 8 never denies that philosophy is in any way *a priori*. And the “Epilogue” (185-88) seemingly adopts the Kantian approach (See 219). Siegel suggests (216) that the “universality” requirement has been successfully defended by Apel and Habermas. Apel is a Kantian who thinks one can discern the (needed) necessary constraints (“universality”) by isolating the presuppositions of *actual* social communication. Habermas is a neo-Kantian who believes that we can get closer and closer to the (needed) necessities by ongoing (fallible) inquiry. See, for example, Karl-Otto Apel, “The *Apriori* of the Communicative Community and the Foundations of Ethics: The Problem of a Rational Foundation of Ethics in a Scientific Age,” in *Towards A Transformation of Philosophy*, trans. Gyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980) and Jurgen Habermas, “Discourse Ethics” in *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990).
38. This paragraph is from Scheffler, *Inquiries*, xi. We have substituted “naturalistic” for Scheffler’s word “nominalistic,” but the message is the same!