Caring versus the Philosophers

Michael Slote

University of Maryland

I

I am sure that everyone who attended the 1999 Philosophy of Education Society meetings knows about the justice/caring debate. Carol Gilligan’s distinction between two ways of approaching morality and Nel Noddings’s subsequent systematic discussion of a “feminine” ethic of caring have had an enormous influence on psychological and educational theory over the past decade or so, but until more recently the impact on philosophy and on philosophical discussions of ethics has been much less. I remember my own original reaction or lack of it to the new ideas. I thought the idea that men and women think differently about moral issues was absolutely fascinating and very possibly correct, but I didn’t see how Gilligan’s and Noddings’s views could affect the ethical theorist’s efforts to come up with a comprehensive view of morality. If anything, it seemed that the duality of human moral thinking threatened us with a kind of relativism, one that left men and women talking past one another and gave them no basis for thinking critically and constructively together. That idea was certainly daunting, if not frightening, to the aims of ethical theory, so, as I just indicated, I preferred to leave the justice/caring issue to one side and do ethical theory as I always had.

I think very differently now, and so too, I believe, do a great number of other philosophers. Many ethicists now think that caring has an important role in the moral life, one not much noticed before Gilligan and Noddings wrote, and so, even those philosophers who pursue supposedly masculine thinking about justice and rights of autonomy often argue that such thinking needs to be supplemented or complemented by a consideration of the role and moral significance of caring and its attendant ideas of responsibility for and connection to other people. Still other philosophers have placed an even greater emphasis on the moral ideal of caring. Rather than say that independent ideals of caring and justice both have an important role to play in the moral life, these philosophers — and I count myself among them — have attempted to show that caring can be the basis for all of morality, so that whatever validity ideals of justice have can be subsumed under the notion of caring and grounded from within that notion.

But from the standpoint of the original caring ethicists, such an attempt to make caring do all the work of ethics may seem extreme and implausible. Both Noddings and Gilligan have wanted to limit the terrain of caring and to allow for a somewhat independent role for justice, rights, and autonomy, and from their perspective philosophical ethicists who try to make caring cover the whole of the moral life may seem to have got the bit between their teeth; or, to switch the metaphor, such philosophers seem to have gone from the frying pan of indifference to caring to the fire of a caring monomania. The original insight about the specific role and importance of caring may thus seem to have been lost in the philosopher’s eagerness to find a single neat theory of morality.
But even when philosophers give justice an independent weight alongside caring, their efforts to integrate these two factors within a total theory of ethics may seem, to those advocating the importance of caring, to distort the caring ethic. When the philosopher asks the caring ethicist how caring fits together with justice, her or his desire for a total or systematic view of morality stands revealed as such, and I have heard caring ethicists say that such a desire violates the very spirit of such an ethics. So I would like to begin by considering this issue and attempting to show that the questions philosophy asks and the aims it exhibits need not be regarded as incompatible with the ethic of caring. Thereafter, I would like to consider some distinctively philosophical arguments and questions that seem initially to threaten the caring ethic, but that turn out actually to help us toward a better understanding of the significance of caring.

II

One objection that caring ethicists sometimes have to philosophical ethics concerns issues of sensitivity and particularity. Caring as Noddings and others have described it involves being focused on, absorbed in, another person or other persons, and this, they have argued, involves a sensitive concern with the particularity of another person’s needs. By contrast, standard monolithic ethical codes and theories can seem to offer a single criterion for all moral decisions and, in doing so, to shunt aside subtle differences in the particularity of situations and persons. The Kantian Categorical Imperative, Bentham and Mill’s Principle of Utility, and the simple sets of prima facie rules offered by intuitionists like W. D. Ross have all been criticized in terms like these, and, interestingly enough, the Kantians, for example, have taken the criticism sufficiently to heart so that many of them now advocate a caring-like sensitivity to nuanced need and circumstance within the moral requirement, derived from the Categorical Imperative, to promote the happiness of other people. But, in addition, the Utilitarian can claim that seeking the greatest happiness of the greatest number precisely involves being sensitive to people’s differing needs and to the opportunities and obstacles inherent in differing social situations, and the intuitionist can argue — indeed they have argued — that any finite set of rules needs to be supplemented or enhanced by a nuanced sense or intuition of the situationally varying relative weights of those rules. So to a first approximation, familiar moral theories need not be or need not at any rate remain the blunt instruments that a caring ethic would have to reject out of hand.

And the same point can be made about attempts to extend the idea of caring so that it covers all of morality. Noddings has said that caring is essentially about relations with people with whom one is or will be personally involved. How one should act toward people one doesn’t know, distant people who are, say, sick or starving, is or has been for her a question outside the purview of caring, but in recent years Virginia Held and I have advocated the idea that there are two different kinds of caring.¹ There is intense personal caring toward people one knows, but there also can be a general humanitarian caring or concern about people one only knows about (as part of a group), and a morally decent person, we have argued, will combine in some fashion these two kinds of caring or concern (together with self-concern, but let us leave that aside, to simplify matters).
Now philosophers who advocate a combination of personal with humanitarian caring will want to say how those different modes of caring are combined in a single moral view and/or in a single moral individual. But the criticism that such combined caring is somehow too blunt an instrument to give us a realistic picture of the moral life seems largely beside the point. If there is nothing blunt or insensitive in the original caring ethicists’ idea that morality contains elements of both caring and justice, it will be blunt or insensitive to say that morality consists in two kinds of caring only if there is something insensitive or insufficiently nuanced in the idea that *humanitarian caring can do the work that justice does in more traditional approaches to morality.* Well, perhaps there is. But I have elsewhere argued that the caring ethicist can cover the essential ideas of justice through the idea of humanitarian concern for others, and I do not want to repeat those arguments here, because I think the fundamental objection to what philosophy is doing here relates to a different issue, the issue of integration or system-building. ²

Whether the moral life involves justice and caring or simply two kinds of caring, I think the caring ethicist will object to the idea of combining two such elements within a single theory or view. Good, moral, just, and caring people do not operate with or use some total theory in which considerations of justice and of caring are mentioned and somehow integrated. Rather, they go about their lives, sometimes dealing with issues of justice, sometimes being involved in caring relationships — alternatively, sometimes acting from humanitarian concerns and sometimes acting out of concern for the perceived needs of people they know. And there is no more integration than *that.*

For the philosopher to suggest otherwise is really, it seems, to distort the moral life and indeed, furthermore, to do so in the name of a factitious unity or integration that actually *gets in the way* of morality. For consider someone who operates constantly with some overarching theory or principle that tells him or her how much weight to put, and when to put weight, on concern for those he or she knows and loves and how much weight to put, and when to put weight, on general humanitarian goals. Such preoccupation with a principle, it can be argued, will actually interfere with one’s concern for other people. To borrow a famous example from Bernard Williams, the husband who uses a moral principle to determine whether it is all right or obligatory to save his drowning wife, when forced to choose between saving his wife and saving a stranger, can be seen as having an insufficient or distorted love for his wife. (Such a husband is said by Williams to have “one thought too many.”) In her original book on *Caring,* Noddings made a similar point, and the eighteenth-century moral sentimentalist Francis Hutcheson also argued that someone with a genuine benevolent concern for the well-being of others would be concerned directly with people’s well-being rather than being concerned with whether he or she was acting rightly or admirably according to some principle or rule. (The similarity between Hutcheson and Noddings should not be surprising, given that caring and benevolence are both sentiments, and that, Noddings is, therefore, at least within limits, a kind of modern-day moral sentimentalist.)

In a recent essay in a Festschrift for Virginia Held, Noddings has substantially qualified her insistence that the moral life not be mediated by rules and rule
following, but I think her original impulse in *Caring* was in fact more correct. If we really are concerned with the well-being of others, we are focused on them and their well-being, not on questions about our own moral status and that of our actions relative to certain moral rules or standards, but this is a complex and controversial notion, and I will not try to defend it further here. For the moment, let me just use it to see whether the criticism of philosophical ethical theorizing mentioned above can really undermine the kind of systematic approach philosophers love and want the caring ethicist to emulate.

According to a morality of caring (or benevolence, à la Hutcheson), a good person is not attentive to and guided by moral rules, principles, or standards, but has a direct or unmediated concern for (other) people’s well-being. But that does not mean there cannot be such a thing as a valid morality of caring; it only means that that morality can be used to judge the moral quality of people’s actions without our having to insist that those who are judged should themselves have to think in explicitly moral terms. When a person seeks the well-being, say, of his children, and does so without being concerned about the moral character of his own actions relative to certain rules, a caring ethic can say that that person acts morally well and even praiseworthily, but it may also insist that if the person had been concerned with moral standards and with whether his actions were conformable to them, he and his actions would be *less* morally worthy.

The caring ethic thus represents a standard or criterion of right or admirable action and motivation that the moral individual is not supposed to apply to herself. To that extent, such an ethic insists on a kind of split (Michael Stocker calls it a schizophrenia, but that seems a bit tendentious) between what guides good people and how we evaluate that goodness. The people themselves, according to the ethic of caring, are not to guide themselves by the principle that it is right to act caringly, wrong not to; rather, they are to be directly concerned with people’s well-being. But that principle can still represent a valid moral standard against which their conduct and motivation can be measured by those who would wish to do so.

So the caring ethic can tell us when behavior and attitudes are praiseworthy or bad, but it also tells us that the morally best attitude does not involve a concern with being moral as such or conforming to the ethic of virtue. And perhaps a near analogue in our ordinary thought and action can be found in the morality of self-defense, for we think one can be justified in killing when that is necessary to saving one’s own life, but we would consider it weird and in any event unnecessary if the person who defended himself, say, against someone coming at him with a meat cleaver, had to clear his self-defense with his conscience before acting. What is precisely permissible, when someone is coming at one with a meat cleaver, is that one act to save one’s own life *without worrying whether one is acting rightly or whether one is in general morally permitted to act in self-defense*. There may be no time for such thoughts, but the self-defense will still be justified, and so the principle that self-defense is permissible is not one we expect to guide those whose actions are deemed permissible according to that very principle.

I think an overall morality of caring has this same feature, and that it is an attractive feature. Though there are a host of objections to such a view that I have
not had and will not have time to consider, let’s see how it bears on the issue of integrated philosophical accounts of morality. An account that spoke of some sort of balance between caring and justice or between two kinds of caring would indeed be flawed if it had to function as an action guide for moral agents. For the guide would get in the way of genuine caring, interposing a fairly complex principle between the moral agent and those he or she cares about. But according to what I have just been suggesting, an integrated or systematic account of morality need not function as an action-guide, but may simply represent a general criterion or standard for the external or post-hoc judging of actions and motives. Those who elaborate a non-simplistic theory of when actions are right, wrong, or praiseworthy need not be supposing that good people should or can guide themselves or govern their lives by such a theory, and so this objection to philosophical integration or systematicness may not have much force.

But can we really coherently suppose that two kinds of caring, say, can be balanced within an individual without the individual making use of a principle that recommends or requires such balance? If the theory says that the best person balances concern for those he or she knows well (considered as a group or class) with humanitarian concern for (the class of) people generally, does the best person not have to pay attention to that very principle, that very standard, in order to insure that s/he actually does balance those concerns? I think not.

Consider someone who loves her own two children equally. There may be a balance between the concern she feels for the one child and that which she feels for the other, but that does not mean that she has to guide her behavior toward them via the consideration that she ought to be equally concerned with each of them. The concerns may simply be (roughly) equal, and in that case her interest, attention, and efforts regarding the two children will naturally flow in a balanced or non-lopsided way in their direction. And something similar can be said about the overarching structure of an ethic of caring.

For an ethic of caring to cover all of morality, it needs to accommodate the concern we feel for those we know and love, but also the humanitarian concern that a good person will feel toward people generally. And in a morally good individual there will be some sort of balance between these concerns. More, much more, needs to be said about what such balance, which is not supposed to be exact equality, amounts to, and I have written elsewhere at considerable length about this issue. But for present purposes, it may be enough to point out that a unified morality of caring that advocates a balance between two kinds of caring need not assume that individuals who exemplify such a balance will do so out of a conscientious concern to do what they ought to do according to an ethic of caring. A moral theory of caring may say, rather, that the moral individual will feel concern for (the class of) those near and dear to her and feel concern for (the class of) human beings generally and that neither of these concerns will dwarf the other. It will hold that a person’s actions are wrong if they do not exemplify such a balance and right if they do, but that does not mean that a caring individual will deliberately try to act (or feel) in a balanced fashion or act that way out of a sense of obligation or duty. The correct moral-philosophical view of caring, whatever it turns out to be, need not seek to impose
itself on caring individuals and need not, therefore, interfere with the particularity and sensitivity of concern for others that mark what is most attractive, and indeed compelling, about the ideal of caring.

Of course, advocating an ideal of balanced caring raises important issues of moral education. How does one get, persuade, educate people to care about others in the way specified as ideal by the theory? But this is also obviously a problem for the simpler or smaller ethic of caring that focuses mainly on our relations with people we know or are intimate with. Caring for others is not something one can inculcate simply by telling or even persuading people that they ought to care, so attention needs to be paid to the processes whereby people come to care about people they know, and, relative to the morally more systematic view of caring I have sketched or alluded to here, more, much more, clearly needs to be said about the ways people can develop balanced or non-lopsided concern as between those they are intimate with and humanity as such or generally. But there is no time to say that more here. Rather, I would like to discuss some other ways in which philosophy and its concerns may seem to clash with the ethic of caring.

III

As I mentioned earlier, some advocates of caring hold that caring does not cover the whole of morality and believe that beyond the sphere of our most intimate relationships, and most especially in the area of politics, independent ideals of justice define what is morally appropriate. But I want now to mention some reasons for thinking that considerations of caring may not even cover our relations with intimates in a morally adequate way. Caring relationships rest on an attitude or motive of caring on the part of at least some, but not necessarily all, individual participants (a newborn baby does not care about her mother in the way her mother cares about her), but what does a felt attitude of caring imply for actions taken on behalf of those we care about? If we deeply, genuinely care, then we shall not just wish certain people well, we shall also try to help them when they need our help and we will be moved by a general practical concern to promote their happiness. But what about situations in which we have to choose between people we care about? In the hypothetical case (and philosophers love hypothetical examples) where I have to choose between rescuing one person I love or care about and rescuing six other people I love or care about, most people and even most philosophers would agree that I do best to rescue the six.

However, in another kind of hypothetical case, we would hesitate or refuse to do what saves the most lives. For if we would have to kill one person we love or care about to save six lives, say, few if any of us would seriously consider doing so. There is a difference between letting one person die when that is necessary to saving six others, and actually killing someone as a means to saving six others, and this difference defines the moral position philosophers call deontology. Deontology is the view, roughly, that it is morally wrong to destroy or harm innocent people as a means of preventing some greater number of people from suffering death or harm. In effect, deontology distinguishes commissions from omissions and claims that the end does not always justify the means. Most of us accept deontology in a deep way:
we think it wrong to take one innocent life as a means of saving more than one life and would be reluctant and more than reluctant to do so.

But the philosophical justification of deontology is another matter, and the question of justification here threatens the ethic of caring in a most serious way. If one loves or cares about the members of one’s family, one presumably wants what is best for them, but in that case how can such caring preclude, say, killing one family member when that is the only way one can save the lives of the rest of the family? If, as individuals, we would refuse to kill in such a case, surely it is some intuitive deontological rule or principle that is influencing us, for how could the sheer emotion or feeling of love by itself preclude our doing what seems best overall for our family? And in that case, caring by itself doesn’t encapsulate all the moral distinctions we need to make in talking about how we as individuals should act toward those we care about. Even on the individual and private level, the morality of caring apparently needs to be supplemented by other considerations, and if that is so, then the significance of caring is considerably less, I think, than its defenders have imagined.

But I believe that caring is actually in a better position than these philosophical criticisms suggest. Caring arguably has its own resources for disallowing killing as a means to saving (a greater number of) lives: rather than have to borrow from independently grounded moral rules or principles, a refusal to kill can develop from within caring as a motive. If one really cares about or loves people, then that feeling in and of itself can, I believe, generate a hesitation and refusal to kill someone one loves or cares about, even when that is a necessary means to prevent the death of more people one loves or cares about. And one way to get clearer on this is to examine a motive or attitude diametrically opposed to love and caring, namely hatred.

Imagine an uncle who for some reason hates his three nephews. All three want to go to medical school, and (given that their parents are dead and other relatives unavailable) all three are living with a friendly neighbor, but hoping to get the money for medical school from their uncle. The uncle has reason to believe that the neighbor is willing to help the boys through medical school, but will not save money to that end if he believes the uncle is willing to do so. So the uncle figures that if he helps the oldest of the boys, the neighbor will spend his extra money elsewhere and will not have anything to spare for the other two when, at spaced intervals, they are ready for medical school. If, then, the uncle does not help the first nephew, the other two will be helped, but if he does help him, he can prevent the other two from being helped. Still, there is something galling to him about this second option; the idea of doing something that will make his first nephew grateful to him simply sticks in his craw, and so it is hatred that leads him to deny the first nephew help and thus do something that on the whole is less bad for those he hates.

But if a negative emotion can understandably lead someone to produce results that are overall less bad, then why should positive feelings like caring or love lead someone to not do what produces results that are on the whole less good? And the point of bringing in a negative emotion like hatred is that someone who acts from
hatred is far less open to the suspicion that she is basing her actions on independent moral considerations than is someone who acts from love. When someone who loves another refuses to kill that person as a means to saving the lives of a number of others she loves, it can be philosophically suspected that that refusal is less a matter of love itself and more a matter of the fact that someone who loves will also wish to fulfill her independently given (deontological) moral obligations toward those she loves. (This very view can be found in John Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice.*) But there is presumably no such thing as the morality or deontology of hatred or antipathy, so when the uncle acts as I am assuming he does, what he does comes from and is understandable in terms of his motives or feelings alone. However, once we see that negative emotions can yield a refusal to bring about overall worst results, what good reason do we have to deny the opposite possibility to positive attitudes like love and caring? We have no reason not to say, then, that an attitude of caring can in and of itself generate a refusal to kill someone one cares about even as a means to saving a plurality of others one cares about. (What I am saying applies not only to the concern we have for those near and dear to us, but to humanitarian caring as well, but the arguments must be left to another occasion.) Caring need not borrow from an independent deontology, but can provide its own kind of basis for intuitive deontological thought and action.

IV

Thus we see that the ethic of caring is in a position to defend its own adequacy and importance against certain philosophical criticisms, but I would like now, and by way of a rather lengthy conclusion, to discuss another philosophical worry that can be directed at what defenders of caring have said about the nature of their own view. In particular, I have in mind the contention, to be found in Noddings’s work and that of many others, that such an ethic bases a certain kind of moral value in the value of certain relationships. According to this view, if it is from a moral standpoint better to care than not to care about (certain) people, that fact reflects and is grounded in the value of caring relationships, and those who make this claim draw attention to the relative neglect of such relationships in previous “masculine” moral philosophy.

Certainly, relationships of love and (both civic and personal) friendship have been relatively neglected during the course of modern moral philosophy, and the value of such relationships is not in dispute. But I think there are philosophical reasons for denying these relationships the foundational role that most caring ethicists have ascribed to them, though these considerations do not so much undermine caring and its importance as indicate that the foundations of caring morality should be seen in a different light.

What caring ethicists like Noddings have claimed is that caring about particular individuals is morally obligatory and admirable because it is necessary to important human goods that are realizable only in close relationships. But if parental caring, for example, is obligatory and admirable *because* it is essential to the good(s) of family life, why is a child not just as obligated to take things from her parents and accounted admirable for doing so? More starkly, if the beauty and value of the bond
between mother and infant is the basis for our high regard for maternal concern or caring, why is the infant’s openness to and need for her mother’s love not just as praiseworthy? And it seems implausible to say such a thing. Rather, there is a difference in admirability or moral value here, and that is because there seems to be some sort of fundamental difference in moral admirability between caring and being cared for.

Similarly, the devotion of a tutor to a retarded child can seem very admirable, even if it might be better if their relationship were not needed. Again, the admirability of such caring seems not to be grounded in the desirability of the relationship, but rather to be a function of the kind of attitude caring (for or about a person) is.

In a nutshell, then, I am saying that it makes more sense to base an ethic of caring on the intrinsic moral value or admirability of a caring attitude or motive than on the desirability or value (for participants or in general) of caring relationships. The latter, more familiar mode of explanation ends up being unable to distinguish caring from being cared for in a principled way, and this typically philosophical consideration should lead us, I think, to regard the morality of caring as more immediately based in the value of caring motivation. Indeed, the very phrases “ethic of caring” and “morality of caring” suggest the primacy of motivation within such a view, but caring ethicists have in fact ignored this possibility or resisted it when it has been presented to them. And one can understand some of the reasons why. To deny that the morality of caring takes off from the value of certain relationships might seem to put the value of such relationships in question and risk returning to a kind of moral philosophy where that value is underrated. And Noddings in particular also seems to hold that if we put primary value on a certain attitude, we have no explanation of the moral failure involved when someone cares for another person but that person never receives the benefit of knowing that s/he is cared for. Let us consider these reasons in reverse order.

The idea that there is a moral failure when the benefits of caring are not received or acknowledged by the person cared for is somewhat ambiguous. It might just mean that the moral goals of caring are somewhat frustrated if the person cared for does not know s/he is cared for or that if the cared-for person receives benefits and refuses or fails to acknowledge them, then that person is to some extent morally criticizable. With these assumptions I find it easy to agree. However, Noddings also appears to think that the moral virtue or admirability of the caring individual at least partly depends on whether the cared-for individual knows about or acknowledges the benefits received (or that the caring person is attempting to provide), and this is something I find somewhat objectionable. For it treats the moral value of caring as dependent on the accidental or unpredictable consequences of such caring, as dependent, to use Kant’s phrase, on “step-motherly nature.”

It seems more attractive, instead, to hold that when someone has done everything possible and reasonable on behalf of another person, the partial failure of his or her efforts does not detract from the admirability and praiseworthiness of those efforts or actions. A caring person does her homework when she tries to help another person, she responds to the full particularity of the other, and she is absorbed in her
effort to help that other. But if through uncontrollable and unpredictable circumstances those efforts to help fail or go unacknowledged, it seems intuitive to suppose that her efforts are just as morally good and praiseworthy as if she had been entirely successful. This Noddings has denied (and some fellow caring ethicists have already criticized that denial on grounds similar to those I am advancing here). But if we place our most fundamental value on caring as an attitude or motive of individuals, then we can avoid this undesirable consequence and say that unsuccessful or unacknowledged efforts to help or care for another can be as admirable as successful and acknowledged efforts because of the admirable motive that underlies and actuates them.

This involves treating the ethic of caring as a kind of virtue ethics, as based in a certain personal virtue. But that virtue is one that reaches out toward the other and in a psychological sense — or by way of intentionality — involves connection with other people (of a kind one typically does not find in so-called masculine moral philosophies). It is just that the connection forged or sought is not the source of moral value and that the personal attitude that reaches out to the other and seeks to create connection is. Understood as a pure virtue ethic, the ethic of caring is still very much on the side of connection with others, rather than founding morality on our separateness from and autonomous rights as against others, in the manner of the “masculine” moral philosophy of Kant and the contractarians. But the position I am defending has the advantage over previous understandings of the foundations of caring that it at least allows us to answer the philosophical criticism mentioned above and coherently hold that caring is morally better and more praiseworthy than being cared for.

However, there is also the worry that by locating moral value primarily in an attitude or motive rather than a relationship, we risk underestimating the value of loving and caring relationships. Here we need a distinction. What has an explanation and is not primary within the field of explanation is not necessarily for that reason less important within human life. Facts about biology help to explain the significance of marriage (rather than vice versa), but marriage may play a more significant and important role in our lives than the facts of biology do. And by the same token, the fact that relationships that involve caring involve something we admire may help to explain why such relationships are so desirable, but that does not mean that the relationships are somehow less important than the motives or attitudes that help to make their value possible. All this needs to be worked out, and in other work I have myself been trying to do just that. But I would urge you to consider the possibility that friendship and love and other relationships involving caring are indeed enormously valuable; but that, for the philosophical reasons mentioned earlier, the ethic of caring cannot or should not attempt to ground itself in such value.

However, if instead we ground it in the moral value of a certain kind of motive, as I have suggested, we should nonetheless remain clear that the dictates of that motive, what it will prompt us to do, depends very much on the interpersonal and social context in which that motive occurs. What friends we have and what interests and projects and expectations they have all help to determine the possibilities and
(therefore) the tasks of caring. The caring individual must be responsive and responsible to the particularities, nuances, and complexities of a larger interpersonal and social context, but as we have just seen, that need not mean that the context, rather than caring itself, is the primary explanatory moral value within a plausible and promising ethic of caring.


5. See for example, Debra Shogan, Care and Moral Motivation (Toronto: OISE Press, 1989), 57.

6. This point is well made by Marilyn Friedman in “Feminism, Autonomy, and Emotion,” in Haber and Halton, Norms and Values.