When we talk about *identity* in the public school environment, we often find ourselves using metaphors about identity culled from business and industry, metaphors that in my view serve to cover up the relational nature of the process of schooling. A number of theoretical and practical considerations have led me to conclude that issues of the nature of the self of the teacher and student are in fact crucial to the educational process and that these issues are fundamentally relational. It is my contention that by ignoring the relational nature of schooling, we not only diminish learning, but at the same time we produce relational problems in schools, problems which occur between students and students, students and teachers, and with students, teachers, and administrators. Given this cultural context of schooling, it is not surprising that many children leave school feeling badly mangled by an impersonal and oddly conceived assembly line process, one which seems to seek to propel them out the school doors, bound for the appropriate local, national, or global market, or, alternatively, bound to take up residence in the pile of products which did not pass the scrutiny of quality control.

Of course relational issues within teaching have not gone unexamined by researchers. For example, Carol Gilligan has been a consistent proponent of an analysis of human interaction that sees problems of the self in relationship within a capitalist and patriarchal culture as central to both social injustice and psychological pain. She has called her analysis a *feminist ethic of care*.¹ My own interest here, in part, is to create what I believe to be the beginning of a satisfactory philosophical understanding of the relational paradigm. The central conceptual problem I have struggled with in the context of understanding identity as relational is the opposition that frequently occurs between relationship and self-development. This opposition leads to selflessness and self-sacrifice, the downside of women’s traditional caring behavior. Or, as Jean Baker Miller has put it, it can lead to “doing good and feeling bad.” What I am arguing is that if we examine this issue from an ontological perspective, it is relationship which is inevitable, while the forms relationship takes can vary, including forms such as sadism, caring, and selflessness.

Nevertheless, a form such as “doing good and feeling bad” could perhaps be dismissed as the result of “bad boundaries.” However, my analysis leads me to conclude that the concept of “boundaries” is itself among those we need to re-examine. What follows is an introductory examination of several key points I have concluded are fundamental to a feminist relational paradigm. I conclude with a discussion of the grounds upon which a teacher may inadvertently adopt a sadistic identity in the attempt to disrupt relational identity formation.

I will begin the discussion by exploring an everyday experience, one which many people, especially women in this culture, perhaps find all too familiar. The dynamic I describe here is illustrative of the underlying structures of identity and of
the way these structures play out in our relations with others. In consequence, this
dynamic also applies to the relational structure of teaching, and shows how our
cultural, ideologically inspired notions of the self and identity affect how we
understand the work a teacher does in the classroom.

Specifically, think of a time you were very hungry. If you are a man, and there
was food readily available, let us say for purposes of this discussion that you simply
ate something — whatever was at hand. You were hungry, so you ate. If you are a
wife or mother, let us say that you looked in the refrigerator and thought that there
were any number of things in it that you could not eat. You could not eat the
ingredients that would be used for dinner. You could not eat your child’s favorite
sandwich meat, because you should save it for her bag lunch tomorrow. Most of the
other things in the kitchen are desserts, or things that are high in fat, or perhaps very
expensive, so you are saving them as a treat, perhaps as a treat for the entire family.

As someone who identifies with the appellation “wife” or “mother,” and the
social roles they often entail, after all this contemplation of food, perhaps you
decided you should wait to eat dinner with your family. However, your husband,
who, for the sake of this argument, has already eaten a little snack, is not particularly
hungry. Or, he ate some of the dinner ingredients, so you are angry with him, and now
are not only starving, but also sullen.

This illustration is designed to show that women, particularly those who are in
socially defined roles connecting them to family, have a relational identity that can
make more complex something so fundamental and assumed to be “natural” as the
need to feed his or herself. In this sense, a woman might say, “Well, I cannot just eat
whatever I want to!” A psychotherapist working with this woman might ask, “What
do you want to eat?” The female response, at least within this relational setting, is
likely to be a puzzled, “I don’t know.”

In stark contrast, we have what I am calling for the sake of this illustration, a
generalized male response: He has already eaten and wonders what all the fuss is
about. Clearly, however, and I cannot be too emphatic about this, this phenomenon
is not gendered per se. It simply takes gendered form at this particular historical
moment, a moment in which any particular man or woman might not recognize his
or herself in this example. Regardless, it does, however, illustrate that it does in fact
matter to daily life how we experience our identity, and by extension, that it will
matter in the daily lives of teachers. The example above illustrates a source of both
potential dangers and positive possibilities in a relational identity. In what follows,
I argue that we are not simply separate individuals, doing whatever is appropriate
given external, internal, or “natural” cues. The entire meaning of “internal,”
“external,” and “natural” must come into question with regard to how we conceive
of personal identity. Even the male in the example above has an identity that I argue
is relational. It simply expresses itself in a highly individuated form because of how
and when it was constructed during his early development.

IDENTITY

Nancy Chodorow was among the first feminist writers to attempt to explain the
relational identity that has been observed in girls and women. In The Reproduction
of Mothering, Chodorow discussed the implications of the fact that women commonly are the primary caregivers of children. She noted that Sigmund Freud claimed girls have a longer preoedipal phase than boys do. This difference in length of the preoedipal phase is in fact generally still accepted within the field of psychoanalysis. That is, there is general agreement that both boys and girls in this culture have a long period of attachment in which their first “love object” is a woman (grandmother, mother, nanny, aunt, or day care worker, for example). Within this period of attachment, boys spend less time in the preoedipal phase, that is, their attachment becomes oedipal, “sexualized, focused on possession, which means focused on someone clearly different and opposite,” earlier in life than it does for girls.

The upshot of this difference is that in this culture, or in any culture where women are still the primary caregivers while at the same time the culture is largely patriarchal, girls tend to grow up to be women whose sense of identity is “larger,” in the sense that it will encompass more relationships, while boys will tend to be more disconnected. Again, this is to take “girl” and “boy” as powerful social constructs with little physiological meaning.

To explore this phenomenon of relational identity in more depth, I want to turn to an example which Jean-Paul Sartre uses to illustrate his analysis of being-for-itself in Being and Nothingness, one which has helped me to understand more clearly the issues of identity and role which I have raised here. This is the example of a waiter in a café. To begin, when an actor plays Hamlet, he is aware he is playing a role. This, too, is the case, Sartre insists, when, for instance, a waiter walks by our table in a café. Sartre writes:

His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes toward the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tight-rope-walker…. All his behavior seems to us a game (BN, 101-2).

Sartre’s point here is that society predictably expects the people who perform public duties to conduct themselves according to “ceremony,” as he puts it: “A grocer who dreams is offensive to the buyer” (BN, 101-2). This position, in which one attempts to assimilate oneself to one’s social role is one of “bad faith,” no matter how encouraged the bad faith may be by one’s public duties. Bad faith is an ever-present phenomenal possibility of the self. The woman who was hungry in the earlier example and who was struggling with whether, or what, to eat, is someone located within the relational field in a position of bad faith. What Sartre is examining through the concept of bad faith is the ground whereby we can never be the waiter in the way that a glass of water is a glass of water; our activity, our continual assumption of the role, is what brings the identity as waiter into being. The only fundamental component that follows us from act to act is our situated freedom to act as the waiter, or not.

Teachers, also, can be understood as behaving according to ceremonial rules. Not only do we in a sense, expect this of teachers, teachers themselves often expect
to behave according to ceremony. This, however, is not productive for learning on the part of students, nor is it productive for the teacher in terms of creating a satisfactory work life.

When our behavior is constructed around the ceremonial, we often do not know how to respond to that which occurs outside the ceremony. If one is a teacher taking attendance, what does it matter why a student is tardy? The ceremony prescribes that you make a mark in your attendance book or on your computer’s attendance program; this is what the “proper” teacher does. The meaning of the student’s behavior is also prescribed: for example, one of the prescribed meanings is that the student who is tardy lacks concern for his or her own education, another is that lateness means disrespect for the teacher; both of these are among the set meanings for a student’s tardiness. Involvement in the ceremony may effectively prevent the development of positive reciprocity in relationship, the development of which would present to the teacher the real possibility that today, with this student, it matters in a particular way that the student is late, and that it matters for reasons unique to the student. To teach effectively, I argue, one needs to allow oneself to have a relationship with the student. Ceremony interferes with experiencing relationships in positive reciprocity.

As indicated, an essential problem is the bad faith of ceremonial action, and how it differs from some other, more authentic form of action that I do advocate for teachers. Ceremony and duty together can encapsulate our freedom by giving us a set identity to inhabit, which effectively acts as a stop to our ability to resonate to others and to ourselves in relationship. When we cannot resonate to the situated other, we are disconnected. When we cannot resonate to the situated self, we are dissociated. Either state may serve to convince us that we cannot act in the interest of someone else’s freedom, or even in the interest of our own. Together, they produce the alienation for which the profession of teaching is so famous.

THE OTHER

What is the nature of the identity of the self that it can take so many forms, and can present itself as acting more or less in bad faith; more or less alienated; more or less dissociated and disconnected? In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir informs us that individual human identity is constructed in conjunction with other people. This relational identity makes it possible for women historically to assume the role of Other, although the social construction of the Other proceeds in addition to, and beside, the construction of woman as Other. Beauvoir asserts, The category of the Other is as primordial as consciousness itself. In the most primitive societies, in the most ancient mythologies, one finds the expression of a duality — that of the Self and the Other. This duality was not originally attached to the division of the sexes; it was not dependent upon any empirical facts. Otherness is a fundamental category of human thought....Thus it is that no group ever sets itself up as the One without at once setting up the Other over against itself.

Beauvoir quotes Lévi-Strauss in Les Structure Elementaires de la Parenté as locating the actual possibility of alterity in something so fundamental as the “passage from the state of Nature to the state of Culture” which is
marked by man’s ability to view biological relations as a series of contrasts; duality, alternation, opposition, and symmetry, whether under definite or vague forms, constitute not so much phenomena to be explained as fundamental and immediately given data of social reality.\(^8\)

However, even given the fundamental character of alterity in human existence, Beauvoir notes that “willy-nilly, individuals and groups are forced to realize the reciprocity of their relations.”\(^9\) This reciprocity arises, based in G.W. F. Hegel, as a fundamental structure of consciousness, which to posit itself must find itself opposed to another consciousness.\(^10\)

The dominant schools of thought in psychology usually define this structure of consciousness in different terms, though the phenomenon clearly has the same roots. This experience of reciprocity is reified and naturalized in terms of separation and individuation, to indicate this experience of one’s own existence, experienced in opposition to the consciousness and existence of the Other.

Paradoxically, though who we are is, in a sense, constructed in opposition to other people, it is also through other people that we experience who we are. In most Western thinking, dualities are seen as oppositional and unrelated. For instance, good and evil are an opposing pair, and in Western thought this opposition is fundamental and exclusive. However, in the work of philosophers who have most influenced my own thinking, dualisms are construed in a way that perhaps is seen, for lack of a better analogy, as Eastern.\(^11\) By this designation, I am simply calling attention to a way of looking at existence where opposing pairs are infinitely internally related while simultaneously appearing to be solely separate.

In the case of one’s individual identity, this means that consciousness is nothing without the situation in which it comes to be, while another aspect of this “nothing” is that it is always also separated from being-in-general. This is what inspired the title of Sartre’s most famous work, \textit{Being and Nothingness}, where, to paraphrase him, nothingness is the emptiness at the heart of being. By this, he means the ability we have to reflect on our lives, or even to perceive ourselves as having an identity, is predicated on the existence of a pre-reflective consciousness that is \textit{nothing}. As Sartre formulated it in \textit{Being and Nothingness}, “consciousness is a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself” \textit{(BN, 124)}. He refers to that which is not consciousness as “being-in-itself,” while the shorthand he employs for consciousness, as defined above, is “being-for-itself.” Because consciousness, in this formulation, is always other than what it is, we are able to speak of consciousness as being, fundamentally, a negation. Within this construct, it is only being-in-itself which exhibits plenitude as a characteristic, while consciousness, in itself, is nothing.

It is through combining this formulation from Sartre’s early work (that consciousness always has its being elsewhere), with his later, explicitly political work, that we arrive at an understanding of the individual as Sartre eventually conceived him or her: If consciousness does not have objects, feelings, and identity somehow in it, but is instead a negation which only has being in so far as it is consciousness of something, then individual identity will also carry this characteristic of consciousness.
Sartre constructs in detail an argument for the importance to the being of any individual human of a number of key elements. Basic is the “situation.” As Sartre puts it, “It follows that this in-itself, engulfed and nihilated in the absolute event which is the appearance of the foundation or upsurge of the for-itself, remains at the heart of the for-itself as its original contingency” (*BN*, 130).

As Sartre goes on to explain with regard to the concrete and contingent, we cannot choose our situation as the souls in Plato’s *Republic* choose their condition. Rather, there are contingent circumstances of our birth which make us “to be born a worker” or “to be born a bourgeois” (*BN*, 132). However, this situation is not static. It is situated with regard to a future that is always reached for, but never grasped *per se*, and with regard to a past which also lacks solidity. This lack of coincidence of the self with itself gives rise to the importance to human beings of what is possible; that is, to the importance of what appears to situated consciousness as “lack” or, in an alternative movement, “possibility.” It is possibility, lack, or, as he sometimes put it, desire and need, which for Sartre is at the root of what we experience as values.

While acknowledging experience as, in a sense, a possession of one’s own subjectivity, he cautions us that this same experience of what is mine, or my experience, “reveals to me a being which is *my* being without being-for-me” (*BN*, 301). This being is one that Sartre believes to be crucial to understanding the relationship of for-itself to in-itself. This aspect of human being can only exist as mine because of the presence of the Other (*BN*, 303).

The example Sartre uses to elucidate this is the experience of shame. Shame is not something inside me, but rather comes to me as something I am because *myself* is not something residing inside me; it is rather out there, in the world, where others make judgments, where these judgments on the part of the Other constituting *me*. Sartre writes: “I need the Other in order to realize fully all the structures of my being. The For-itself refers to the For-others” (*BN*, 303). He is here referring to the ontological structure of the system of relations we call “the individual.” It should already be clear through this analysis of the ontological structures of human being and of our world, that there is, ontologically at least, no way to ever be perfectly alone, just as there is no way to be perfectly separate, or “autonomous” in the usual modern and Western sense. In fact, it is only through the recognition offered us by the Other that we come to be “an individual.” As Sartre put it: “But if another consciousness must mediate between my consciousness for itself and itself, then the being-for-itself of my consciousness — and consequently its being in general — depends on the Other. As I appear to the Other, so I am” (*BN*, 320).

It is perhaps appropriate to note here that virtually all of Sartre’s examples of the situation of the person who is constituted through the presence of the Other are, in fact, negative. He begins with shame, proceeds to the desire for the death of the Other, and continues to a Look that is to be avoided during an attack, and so on. It is here also that Beauvoir’s work provides for a great deal of understanding not possible through studying Sartre’s writings alone. Her discussions of the dyads, triads, ensembles and collectives that constitute human relational existence allow for the *possibility*, at least, of positive reciprocity in relationship.¹² In defense of
Sartre, however, one must note that his discussion is based on life as it now exists in a world suffering from scarcity, and divided by capitalism into classes whose ends oppose each others. One can further note that Beauvoir, in *The Second Sex*, also detailed the negative impact of the constitution of self by the Other. The logic of this is that the general life of woman reveals itself negatively as life played out within patriarchal constraints.\(^{13}\)

To this point, we have been considering human existence in the abstract. However, Sartre’s next step, while still abstract, introduces a counterpoint to our everyday intuition of ourselves as embodied beings. For him, being-for-itself is *both* completely body and completely consciousness. As for-itself, the body can be said to be both a point of view (knowledge), and an instrument (action) which is distinct from all other instruments in a world that is constructed of instrumentalities. He describes the logic that leads him to assert that it is not what we commonly think of as “my body” which is in fact my body. One’s body, as it exists in the midst of the world, is always the body *for others*, and it is as a body for others that we see ourselves.

To use the language of subjective and objective is perhaps appropriate here: For me to have an objective existence as a being-in-the-midst of the world, my objectivity is constituted by people other than myself. The Other not only makes me an object for him or her, but it is through the reflexive internalization of this objectification that I can be an object for myself. That is, it is through my relations with the Other that I have an objective self. From the subjective side, this internalization may take the form of *rejecting* the object the Other offers us, as in “I am not a jealous fool!” However, as Sartre would have it, the negation of this objectification has the same ontological ground as its acceptance.

Sartre’s discussion of the ontological ground of concrete relations with others led him to reject the idea that relations between individuals are relations of externality (*BN*, 315). Looking for an alternative approach, he concluded that by proceeding from Edmund Husserl to Hegel, we realize immense progress. According to Sartre, Husserl’s attempt to elude solipsism has much in common Kant’s. Without going into the details of his theory, Sartre’s first refutation of Husserl was accomplished by arguing that there is no subject “in” consciousness. Sartre takes himself to task for this position, however, finding in the first part of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Mind* “the brilliant intuition… to make me depend on the Other in my being” (*BN*, 321). In brief, the solution Sartre accepts from Hegel is that first, the negation which constitutes the Other is direct, internal, and reciprocal: second, it calls each consciousness to account and pierces it to the deepest part of its being; the problem is posited on the level of inner being, of the universal and transcendental “I”; finally in my essential being I depend on the essential being of the Other, and instead of holding that my being-for-myself is opposed to my being-for-others, I find that being-for-others appears as a necessary condition for my being-for-myself….Yet in spite of the wide scope of this solution, in spite of the richness and profundity of the detailed insights with which the theory of the Master and the Slave is filled to overflowing, can we be satisfied with it? (*BN*, 321-22)

Sartre’s conclusion is that we cannot.\(^{14}\) His argument largely centers on the impossibility of subsequently relating individuals whose fundamental ontological
relation is separation. Overcoming this separation requires various logical sleights of hand, for instance requiring the existence of a God. This leads him to explore again the nature of concrete relations with others, and in this exploration he expands his notion of the fundamental interiority of relations between individuals.

Sartre finds this interiority in the experience of being seen by another, which he explains through the example of being caught by someone as one looks through a keyhole. On first examination, this relation is most likely one of exteriority. However, as Sartre argues convincingly, this is hardly the case. What we find instead is that if consciousness as for-itself is always only consciousness (of) something, then the experience of being seen by another is what brings the individual into situated existence.15

I can not truly define myself as being in a situation: first because I am not a positional consciousness of myself; second because I am my own nothingness. In this sense — and since I am what I am not and since I am not what I am — I cannot even define myself as truly being in the process of listening at doors. I escape this provisional definition of myself by means of all my transcendence. There as we have seen is the origin of bad faith. Thus not only am I unable to know myself, but my very being escapes — although I am that very escape from my being — and I am absolutely nothing. There is nothing there but a pure nothingness encircling a certain objective ensemble and throwing it into relief outlined upon the world, but this ensemble is a real system, a disposition of means in view of an end (BN, 348-49).

What happens to the possibilities of being and knowing when “all of a sudden I hear footsteps in the hall?” First, Sartre maintains that with the advent of the look of another person, the self can now exist in unreflective consciousness, where before it existed only as an object in reflective consciousness; and, according to Sartre, this fact means that “I have my foundation outside myself” (BN, 449). In this respect, the Other is foundational for the self. In other words, according to Sartre, the person we most commonly conceive of ourselves as being is a self that is founded on the existence of the Other. This selfhood, however, is existence as in-itself, which is why Sartre describes the look of the Other as bringing into being the situated self.

In each step that I have addressed in Sartre’s analysis, I have focused on the ontological dimension that relies on the existence of others and on the existence of what we call the “world.” Another dimension, one which can be construed as separate, individual, and autonomous, as it is so often in modern presentations of the self, whether it is found in its role underpinning psychology, philosophy, or even our daily discussions of our thoughts, feelings, and activities, is also a dimension which clearly exists in his work. In fact, this dimension of intense separateness and isolation is simply the dimension I am currently discussing when it has been turned back on itself by relations of oppression, by worked matter, and by the world of words made available to us in a situation where the oppression of one person by another is the dominant external structure for the expression of human possibilities.

The foundational nature of the relation of self and Other is also described throughout Being and Nothingness in negative terms, something Sartre reinforced famously in a speech from his play, No Exit, where his character asserts that “Hell is other people.”16 This is a perspective on the ontology of human relations that assumes that these relations will be lived out in conflict, with damage as the never-ending result. Not to put too fine a point on it, Sartre finds that fear, shame, and pride
are the fundamental experiences the Other confers on us. However, as he notes, we cannot know what these relations would be in a world that did not have exploitation and alienation as givens, nor can we know what forms human freedom might take (BN, 797).

THE TEACHER AS SADIST

What we have here, in effect, is a theory of how identity is itself constructed in internal relations with others. For a teacher in a classroom this means that who the teacher can claim to be is under constant construction by his or her students. The problem with this for many teachers is that they fear this inevitable reciprocity of identity creation. They want to create the identity of their students but avoid having their own identity re-created. In order to achieve this, the teacher becomes a sadist. Returning to the example of the teacher who takes attendance according to ceremonial rules, even in this seemingly harmless adherence to ceremony, the teacher is constructing his or her self as sadist by denying the Other, the student, as a center of freedom expressing itself as meaning making.

The sadist is a person who attempts to control who they appear to be by denying the reciprocity between one’s self and the other, because the other has the power to transform and shape who we are. The teacher as sadist attempts to protect his or her identity by stripping students of all free, intentional activity, thereby gaining control of the freedom of the students (BN, 518-20). Complete engrossment in an activity cannot be allowed, because such engrossment is the condition for grace as the expression of the students’ freedom in activity. By reducing students to lumps of flesh, the teacher can believe she has ensured the safety of her identity, while creating in her classroom the obscene: consciousness and freedom reduced to mere flesh. A student who struggles to create his or her self under these conditions cannot learn because the intentionality of the student is always in question. To put this another way, students who must question their very existence as free and conscious human beings find themselves drowning in flesh, reduced to their facticity as a position only, one which can be found on the teacher’s attendance sheet. One could say that the teacher has taught the student to be the very same “bump on a log” about which many veteran teachers complain.

The existential philosophical tradition, particularly as it is embodied in the work of both Beauvoir and Sartre, has, as I have begun to argue here, much to offer current feminist thinking about relational identity. It is also crucial to sharpening our understanding of why a discussion of identity as relational can be misconstrued as essentializing women’s traits. This occurs in so far as human interaction always runs the risk of bad faith, where bad faith is essentializing. I believe that reclaiming this work also can help us elucidate why relational identity may manifest itself as destructive, as well as generative. The teacher as sadist is a relational identity; I hope I have pointed to some of the crucial structures that underlie such a negative possibility, while indicating the ground for the positive.

Understanding identity as relational is a profound step away from a conception of it as the domain of an isolated ego. Bringing the existential philosophical tradition into our discussions of the work of authors such as Gilligan, Chodorow, and Miller
will continue to prove useful in the task of developing a truly feminist and non-essential notion of the self as relational.


3. Ibid., 97.


7. Ibid., xix-xx.

8. Ibid., xx.

9. Ibid.

10. This opposition is, for Beauvoir, fundamentally hostile. Her discussion can fairly be constructed as confining itself exclusively to societies in which there is scarcity, that is, to the only societies we have so far constructed. I do not think this hostility should be read as natural to consciousness. My own discussion of positive reciprocity makes the case for an alternative possibility.

11. That this approach could also be included among the many that are called postmodern would be accurate.

12. This does not imply that Beauvoir has a happy view of human relations; in most of her work we find rather the opposite. All I am pointing to here is that her work expresses more strongly the possibility of positive relations than does Sartre’s.

13. Of particular interest to educators is Sartre’s statement regarding the role of shame in education: “But this new being which appears for the other does not reside in the Other; I am responsible for it as is shown very well by the education system which consists in making children ashamed of what they are” (*BN*, 303).

14. Hegel’s discussion of consciousness takes place within the realm of knowledge, a fact that Marx, too, found unacceptable. I mention Marx’s response here because Sartre’s ontological formulation in *Being and Nothingness* is assumed as background in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1976-1991). *Critique of Dialectical Reason* is an attempt to ground the historical truth of Marx’s dialectical materialism in the praxis of individual agents and groups. This development which Sartre makes of Hegel’s argument is one he extends to his later work.

15. This experience of being, as it were, “under the gaze” of another should not be taken too literally. That is, the look of which Sartre describes the impact could be brought to bear by someone who is blind. Other commentators have read Sartre’s focus on the look as privileging of the visual over other bodily capacities. Close reading of the text is likely to undermine this conclusion.