Hi! My name is Barbara Applebaum and I am white, heterosexual, middle-class, able-bodied, Jewish and a feminine woman. So what? Who cares?

In his 1997 Philosophy of Education Society presidential address, Dwight Boyd challenged the members of this organization to ask “What kind of mistake might I be making if I try to ‘do’ philosophy of education as if my social location does not matter?” Boyd offers the provocative thesis that the objective stance traditionally coveted in educational discourse, in general, and philosophy of education, in particular, is a moral mistake because our “mobs” are always with us. Regardless of our intentions, our mobs are unavoidably doing something “to me, for me, through me, as me.” Although Boyd speaks for himself, his argument is clearly targeted to all those like him, those in similar social locations.

Since then, the “locating oneself” thesis (LOT) has been informally discussed over drinks at this conference and in a flurry of e-mails between our annual meetings (and sometimes even formally applauded in other presidential addresses and essays). Because of the challenging nature of the claim, many of these discussions have focused around issues of justification rather than elucidation. Yet, I believe that elucidating what “locating oneself” means is crucial because the notion is subject to a variety of interpretations, some of which are so mistakenly simplistic as to make it easy not to take LOT seriously.

In the first part of this essay, I outline Boyd’s argument and the conceptual basis upon which it rests. Then I present a dilemma that, I claim, arises because of this conceptual framework. In my attempt to resolve the dilemma, I highlight two aspects of what it means, in practice, “to make our social location matter.” The first aspect involves a personal recognition, a kind of acknowledgement that one’s consciousness has been raised. The second aspect is more public and consists of a performative act of resistance. This interpretation of LOT, I argue, has the advantage of illuminating the fact that moral agency regarding dominant group members is conceivable. Finally, in the second part of this essay, I argue that moral agency itself cannot escape LOT and must be critically understood from the lens of our social location. Acknowledging this calls for a radical alteration in our understanding of moral agency and has profound implications for how one does morally responsible intellectual work.

**Locating Oneself**

Applying his own argument to himself, Boyd acknowledges that he speaks “as a white, middle-class, heterosexual, still relatively able, ex-Protestant, morally concerned, academic man…and how long I should go on with these descriptors is part of my problem.” This problem, which he refers to as the “comma, comma, comma…problem,” not only accentuates the fact that people are multiply located
with identity markers that are fluid and context dependent, but also that some of these identity markers “matter” in ways that others do not. In order to explain what this means, Boyd appeals to two concepts, Iris Young’s notion of “social group” and Thomas Wartenberg’s notion of “alignment.”

According to Young, social groups are not aggregates or arbitrary collections of people. Neither are they associations in which the individual chooses to belong. Rather, social groups are experienced by individuals as something they have been “thrown” into and, therefore, something that existed prior to their own coming into being. Moreover, individuals are partly constituted by their social group affiliations in the sense that our personal identities, who we think we are, “even our mode of reasoning, evaluating, and expressing feeling” are formed by the history and culture of our social group affiliations.

Social groups, however, are not real substances. Rather, they are socially constructed expressions of a very particular type of social relation. Two aspects of this construction require emphasis. First, a social group exists only in relation to at least one other social group. In other words, the meaning and existence of one social group is always dependent upon the meaning and existence of another group (and vice versa). In addition, not only are social groups symbiotically related but also the relationship is always one of hierarchy; one group is dominant while the other is subordinate. More specifically, one group is considered the “norm,” and thus, the other group is defined as “other” and “deviant.” Furthermore, under cultural imperialism, these norms, as the source of oppression, become naturalized, mystified, and invisible.

In terms of explaining social injustice, Young’s ideas about the inevitability of our social group locations help to “locate the source of the harm.” Boyd, however, is not only interested in locating the source of the harm but also his part in it. Boyd turns to Thomas Wartenberg’s notion of an “alignment” in order to explain how he, “as a white, middle-class, heterosexual, still relatively able, ex-Protestant, morally concerned, academic man,” unintentionally plays a role in sustaining such social injustice. In his discussion of “situated social power,” Wartenberg argues that “peripheral social agents” contribute to the power of the “social field.” They do so by means of an “alignment” both in the sense of coordination (as in the “alignment” of all four tires on a car) and also in the sense of orientation (as in the “alignment” of nations with the superpowers). In so far as we are members of social groups, we are part of an alliance whose balance is maintained by everyone’s collaboration. Furthermore, in so far as we are members of dominant social groups, our categories of meaning, that is, our attitudes, behaviors and values, have an affinity with the dominant norms of the system. In other words, the core of who we are maintains and is maintained by the relational alignment between and among social groups. Regardless of their intentions, “peripheral social agents” are always aligned to support social power.

With these concepts Boyd can then contend that “his ‘whiteness-as-more-fully-human’ produces, and is produced by, my alignment around images of others as ‘black-as-less-fully-human’ and it is this alignment that is the active ‘agent’.” By unavoidably existing as white, as masculine, as heterosexual… he unintentionally
performs something that sustains the oppression of others. Thus, if he does not acknowledge his social location when he does philosophy of education, Boyd is both contributing to and legitimating oppression.

The Dilemma of the Inevitability Thesis

The picture that Boyd draws for us armed with the notions of “social groups” and “alignment” is, however, problematic. Although this description illumines how dominant group members contribute, unintentionally, to the harms of social injustice, it stops short of assisting dominant group members in understanding what they can actually do to assist in the dismantling of social injustice. In fact, Boyd’s argument poses a sort of dilemma for dominant group members who are morally concerned about social injustice. On the one hand, Boyd implies that dominant group members can do something about injustice, that is, locate themselves when they are doing philosophy of education. On the other hand, Boyd maintains that dominant group members are unavoidably part of a mob that sustains injustice, so how can their “locating themselves” have any effect on oppressive systems? I refer to this as the dilemma of the inevitability thesis.

Two practical problems follow from this dilemma. First, if there is this unavoidable element involved in the role that dominant group members play in the oppressive system, why should dominant group members try to do anything at all? At best, Boyd’s argument, then, may lead to a type of immobilization on the part of dominant group members. At worst, Boyd’s argument may inadvertently provide justification for a craven complacency on the part of dominant group members when taking risks and being uncomfortable is what is called for. In fact, explanations that put too much emphasis on “inevitability” may actually function to support the status quo. Second, unless this dilemma is resolved, we cannot understand what “locating oneself” means and why it actually matters when doing philosophy of education.

Part of the dilemma can be attributed to Young’s ambiguously deterministic understanding of individual social group embeddedness. Young contends that individuals are “partly” constituted by their group affiliations. A lot hangs on what she means by “partly.” Yet, she remains silent in this regard (at least Boyd does not discuss such an explanation in his presidential address). Young acknowledges the ability to change one’s social group affiliations, yet she makes no mention of how a dominant group member can contribute to changing the system that breeds injustice. Ann Ferguson argues, I believe correctly, that “any theory that purports to explain the ways these systems work and the ways oppressive social inequalities are maintained must not be so framed as to imply that those who benefit from them are not free to change them.”

In addition, while Boyd’s reference to the “alignment” helps to explain the role of dominant group members in sustaining unjust systems, it also implies a sort of passivity on the part of dominant group members that can be dangerously misleading. “(M)y ‘whiteness-as-more-fully-human’ produces, and is produced by, my alignment around images of others as ‘black-as less-fully-human,’ and it is this alignment that is the active ‘agent’.” This interpretation of the alignment may be dangerously misleading for two reasons.
First, the strong focus on the alignment may distract our attention away from the ways in which dominant norms and practices get deeply sedimented into our psyches “in a process that is newly reinforced each day.” Although such deeply held assumptions and beliefs may not be held consciously, this does not mean that dominant group members, by respecting and listening to the voices of those marginalized, should not work to bring these subtle assumptions and beliefs to consciousness. A classroom experience that I describe in the final section demonstrates this point. Second, Boyd’s strong emphasis on causal culpability, as the essential element of moral responsibility, reasserts dominant group members as the primary agents to be concerned with, reinscribing the dominance that Boyd seeks to expose. Consequently, the marginalized are re-inscribed as non-agents and the possibility of a reciprocal recognition of full subjectivity is lost.

Boyd’s reference to Butler’s work on the performative nature of gender could be engaged to avoid these problems; yet such a notion of performativity is left under-developed. Moreover, Boyd’s use of “performative” to describe both the non-objectivating, “how I orient myself with others” stance that he wants to argue is necessary in educational discourse and the performative nature of race and gender can confuse his audience. Emphasizing a particular application of the notion of performativity, I contend, can help us to avoid the aforementioned problems.

Young’s understanding of the relationship between social groups and individuals makes it difficult to see the sense of performativity that I am trying to articulate. Because Young wants to argue that groups are prior to individuals, she emphasizes the experience of “throwness,” that experience of feeling that we are ascribed to groups that are already in existence. Young is correct in her claim that “our identities are defined in relation to how others identify us, and they do so in terms of groups which are always already associated with specific attributes, stereotypes, and norms.” However, with this emphasis on how others identify us, she implies a sense of inevitability and she blurs an important distinction between our personal identities, who we think we are, and our ascribed identities, who others think we are. Although one’s ascribed identity influences one’s personal identity, to distinguish the two is to underscore that while there is a sense of agency regarding our personal identity, we can choose who we think we are, ascribed identity seems to be unavoidable. Yet, does ascribed identity preclude all sense of agency?

Ascribed identity may seem inescapable because it is assumed to depend on physical attributions. Race, racism, and race privilege, for example, are commonly understood as “written on my skin.” Yet, such essentialist interpretations of ascribed identity conceal that ascribed identity depends on more than just physical attributes. As the countless reports of the “bashing” of men who “appear to be gay” testify, our physical markers, while a necessary condition, are not a sufficient condition of ascribed identity. Something else seems to be at work.

Candace West and Don Zimmerman, speaking in terms of gender, emphasize the significance of configurations of behavior that need to be seen by others as normative, culturally approved gender behavior. West and Zimmerman describe how our behavior is always accountable and they underscore that gender is
something we “do.” Similarly, Marilyn Frye maintains that people enact performances as part of being recognized as a member of a particular social group. \(^{19}\) People may be born into a social group or ascribed into one by means of their physical attributes but whether they sustain such affiliations depends on whether they are perceived to enact the performances such group members are socialized to carry out. Frye distinguishes between a physical attribute, such as being male or being white-skinned, and the expected performances, attitudes and behaviors that are largely a result of social training to be masculine or whitely, respectively. Alison Bailey refers to these expected performances as “performative scripts” \(^{20}\) that, in terms of whiteness, are learned at a very early age and are reinforced by a system of privileges. \(^{21}\) Christine Sleeter captures an important aspect of these performative scripts in her discussion of the white racial solidarity and the “bonding effect” that is created by communicative processes (often subtle and seemingly harmless) that white people are expected to enact. \(^{22}\)

Applying the notion of performative scripts to Boyd’s defense of LOT illuminates how it is that, for dominant group members, these performative scripts actually support a system that keeps other people down. Moreover, because performative scripts are also tied to norms, beliefs and other categories of meaning, such scripts affect how we understand ourselves, how we understand others, and in Young’s words, “even our mode of reasoning, evaluating, and expressing feeling.” This performative understanding of social location, however, also suggests a sense of moral agency because performances can be subverted, can be resisted. \(^{23}\) While the “alignment” seems inevitable because it is so well orchestrated, one can resist collaboration and contribute to the disruption of the system of oppression. LOT, I will argue, is a demonstration of such a commitment.

Locating oneself, thus understood, does not imply that we are inevitably locked within a particular perspective. White feminists can be anti-racist, men can be feminists, and heterosexuals can be “straight but not narrow.” A performative understanding of social location explicates not only how dominant group members unintentionally both sustain and are sustained by the “alignment” but also that they can do something about it.

“WHAT? YOU MEAN I HAVE TO TELL EVERYONE THAT I’M WHITE?”

Or WHAT “LOCATING ONESelf” PRACTICALLY ENTAILS

With these pieces in place, we can now ask what does it mean to “locate oneself”? Is it sufficient to merely to recite a list of self-descriptions, as I did in the opening of this essay, so that our audience knows who we uniquely are? Is it sufficient to merely acknowledge our cultural embeddedness? Is “locating oneself” just another aspect of identity politics?

If we keep in mind that Boyd is concerned both with naming the source of the harm and also his part in it, it becomes clear that “locating oneself” is not mere self-identification. Given its strong relationship to the notion of social groups, “locating oneself” could not be equated with or satisfied by mere self-“I”dentification. It is not some kind of politically correct mantra or introductory prelude to presenting an essay or doing research. Indeed, the “comma, comma, comma problem” that Boyd
alludes to is restricted to our social group affiliations. That I have blue eyes and really like caramel crunch is not the type of identity marker that Boyd is concerned with.

Locating oneself is also not to be confused with just an admission of our cultural embeddedness or just an acknowledgement of cultural imperialism. More than just a recognition of the impossibility of a “view from nowhere,” to locate oneself is to acknowledge the subtle roles that well-intentioned, morally concerned dominant group members play in sustaining cultural domination and oppression.

Thus, LOT is primarily addressed to individuals with some sense of dominant group membership. Although our social group affiliations are multiple, fluid and context dependent, having some sort of dominant group affiliations always has some impact on our life chances in Western society. As Linda Alcoff notes in terms of race, our race is an ontological fact in the sense that it effects the jobs available to us, where we can live, who we can be friends with and love, how the police will react to us and even how our students react towards us. Dominant group members can only appreciate the systemic injustice that marginalized group members experience when the invisible privileges that dominant group members receive are exposed. Recognizing the systemic nature of those privileges requires that dominant group members locate themselves. Therefore, it is dominant group members — those who benefit from oppressive systems — rather than marginalized group members, who are targeted by LOT or the call to locate oneself. Accordingly, “locating oneself” is very different from identity politics. Publicly pronouncing that one is gay or lesbian is not the same as locating oneself as heterosexual for many reasons, among which is that the former is a way of negotiating power for subordinated group members, while the latter is a way of acknowledging having too much power and privilege. Although Boyd does not explicitly say this, the call to “locate oneself” when doing philosophy of education is directed primarily to those persons with some sort of dominant group affiliation.

To locate oneself (although not like a confession in the sense of being guilty and wanting absolution) has the confessional element of acknowledging that something has gone and is going wrong. It is “to make visible what is rendered invisible when viewed as the normative state of existence.” Moreover, it is a consciousness of the role played inadvertently by dominant group members in sustaining oppression, regardless of their individual good intentions. “Locating oneself” is not satisfied by merely a public proclamation of one’s dominant group identity markers, but, rather, is the product of a profound, personal transformation in one’s consciousness of oneself, of others and one’s relationship in the social world of which one is part.

Yet, while “locating oneself” involves a personal and inward recognition of the source of the harm and my role in it, it is also a performative act of resistance having illocutionary force. Communicatively, it does something. When doing intellectual work, locating oneself makes a statement about one’s stand towards the exclusionary effects of the norm of objectivity. This is not to imply that locating oneself necessarily requires one to maintain some version of relativism or deny transcultural ideals; Boyd, in fact, speaks in terms of a “moral mistake.” Locating oneself does not necessarily imply that one is inevitably bound to a particular perspective in the
sense of a “strong perspectivist view.” Rather, because locating oneself acknowledges a predisposition towards epistemological biases and marginalizing tendencies, the call to locate oneself requires that inquiries regarding transcultural ideals, for example, are to be examined from a position in which we locate ourselves first. Similarly, locating oneself does not imply that the value of rationality be denied, but rather, makes us more circumspect regarding our use of and reliance upon rationality.

Locating oneself is to take a stand when we are doing intellectual work, not about our individual fallibility, but about a possible epistemic blindness resulting from our social group location. It is to acknowledge that when we engage in philosophy of education such blindness contributes to the exclusion of others by influencing the questions we prefer to pursue, what we consider evidence worthy to be heard and (even) what we consider to be good reasons. Thus, as a moral and an epistemic issue, locating oneself draws our attention to the significance of collaborative inclusion that will be further discussed in what follows.

Troubles with Moral Agency

Emphasizing the moral agency of dominant group members, however, can be dangerous. As my friend and colleague, Amee Adkins has asked me on numerous occasions, “Why do you want to talk about the moral agency of dominant group members? Have not dominant group members done enough already?” Moral agency in regards to dominant group members is problematic when, on the one hand, it is assumed necessary for moral accountability, and, when, on the other hand, it cannot be understood independently from our social location and the privilege system that our social locations sustain. Moral agency is subject to controversy because dominant group members’ “ability to do something” has traditionally been connected to their “ability to control and be in control.” To avoid this predicament, dominant group members must be willing to entertain a notion of moral agency that is radically different from the one they are used to.

I do not have a theoretical framework to offer that maps out such a notion of moral agency, but I am contending that such a project deserves our attention. I would like to recommend some signposts that might guide a project aimed at redefining dominant group moral agency in ways that challenge rather than reinforce systemic oppression.

First, engaging in such a project requires, you guessed it, that dominant group members first locate themselves. Second, this project must be undertaken in collaboration with those in different social locations. Because the experiences, ideals, beliefs and values of the dominant group are taken as the unstated norm, the resulting bias may conceal factors that need to be considered. Inclusion, particularly in the sense of collaboration with those who are oppressed, is crucial for determining what dominant groups are morally responsible for and what they must do. As Barbara Houston’s warns, “Do not take responsibility unaccompanied by those who can show you your part in the harm.” The epistemic privilege of the oppressed requires recognition both because dominant group members’ asymmetrical social position may cause “blind spots” in their understanding of what is actually going on
and because this decenters the position of dominant group members and keeps the conversation from always being focused on them. As Alison Bailey puts it concerning white people, “Detours from white privilege do not remove me from the system of privilege, they relocate me within it by reasserting my needs at the center of analysis.” Dominant group members must take care not to keep the conversation focused on them alone; a conversation in which my being-as-dominant reinforces your non-being-as subordinate.

The importance of collaboration and decentering the conversation is illustrated in the following classroom scenario. This summer I taught a course on cultural and racial diversity in education to a group of graduate students from a variety of cultural backgrounds and racial locations. After what I took to be a really in-depth discussion of the epistemic privilege of the oppressed, two well-intentioned white women turned to the only black woman in the class and asked, “As a black woman, what do you think about …? As a black woman, what would you say about …?” By making her feel noticed and marked “as black,” the two women unintentionally marginalized their classmate as was evident in her response, “Do I ask you, as white women, what do you think about…?” Seizing upon this “educative moment” for the white students in my class, we proceeded to discuss who has control of when race should or should not count. And I recalled Barbara Houston’s reference to Pat Parker who tells her white friend: “The first thing you do is forget that I am Black… Second, you must never forget that I am Black.”

A redefinition of dominant group moral agency, as illustrated by the aforementioned scenario, also must be vigilant about dominant group members’ good intentions and about their desire to be “morally good.” Systemic racism is perpetuated regardless of the individual intentions of good, liberal minded people. Liberal moral intentions may even blind dominant group members from recognizing systemic racism.

“Not In Our Town,” a video that I have shown to my students, discusses how 10,000 citizens of Billings, Montana mobilized themselves against hate crimes by hanging reproductions of Chanukah menorahs in their windows at some risk to their own lives and property. After viewing this video, my predominantly white, undergraduate students are often moved to tears over the heroism displayed by the citizens of Billings. Acknowledging the importance of coalition, I then steer the discussion to a more critical viewing of this video. My students slowly began to realize that although the actions of these people deserve applause, their “pat on the back anti-racism” was focused on only overtly hateful and prejudice acts. Consequently, their good intentions obscured the need to do anything about the subtle systemic racism (quite evident even in the video) that was rampant in their town.

In her discussion of whiteness studies, Audrey Thompson contends, being a “good white” person, has long been a way of getting “credit” and has been “a part of the moral make-up of benevolent whiteness.” All this is to keep dominant group members in the center of and in control of the conversation. What good intentions are and what they get dominant group members must be critically assessed and decentered. As Maria Lugones so insightfully articulates as she addresses white feminists,
Your sense of responsibility and decision making are tied to being able to say exactly who it is that did what, and that person must be one and have a will in good working order. And you are very keen on seeing yourself as a decision maker, a responsible being: It gives you substance.34

If we take the call to locate oneself seriously, moral agency may be radically different from what dominant group members are used to. Although “agency” implies a “doing,” a “taking action,” moral agency for dominant group members may manifest itself more in a “not doing” or a “not deciding on their own what to do.” Nor can moral agency be defined only as a function of intentions. Dominant group members who locate themselves must be skeptical of their good intentions and not let them get into the way of genuinely listening to others. This need not immobilize dominant group members. As Boyd, quoting Phelan, states, dominant group members need to expect and accept that there will always be misunderstanding.35 How dominant group members respond to and deal with this misunderstanding is part of what it means to locate oneself when redefining moral agency.

CONCLUSION

Without a recognition of oppressive structures and the overall patterns of advantage and disadvantages, individual slights or conflicts can seem harmless. But without a recognition of individual variation and agency, the structures take on a life of their own and come to seem inevitable and insurmountable.36

In this essay, I have attempted to interpret Boyd’s “locating oneself thesis” as a proactive claim against dominance that amounts to more than just self-criticism by emphasizing the ways in which LOT can recognize both oppressive structures and dominant group agency.37 If the aim is to eradicate systems of dominance that currently oppress different groups of people in our society, not only must dominant group complicity be acknowledged, but what dominant group members can do to facilitate the achievement of this aim must be explored.38 By overlooking this latter project, I maintain, theorists may be unwittingly perpetuating that very system of dominance that they seek to tear down.

2. Ibid., 13
7. Ibid., 45.

10. Ibid., 88-89.


23. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, 147.


32. Not In Our Town, California Working Group, POB 10326, Oakland, CA 94510.


38. For an interesting discussion on different notions of agency in feminist thought see Fiona Webster, “The Politics of Sex and Gender: Benhabib and Butler Debate Subjectivity,” *Hypatia* 15, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 1-20.