Introduction: Philosophy of Education in a Pluralistic World
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It is my great pleasure, as editor of Philosophy of Education 2006, to invite you to enjoy the intellectual feast laid out in the pages that follow. You will find very satisfying fare similar to that provided in previous volumes of this collection: well-crafted, insightful essays on a variety of current and perennial topics in philosophy of education, written from different perspectives corresponding to different geographical, political, social, and intellectual locations. This year’s collection has a special international flavor. Thanks to the vision and initiative of Sharon Bailin, president of the Philosophy of Education Society in 2006, this year’s annual meeting was held in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, and featured papers presented in Spanish (published in translation here). I expect you will agree that inviting the submission of papers written in a language other than English is one important way of widening participation in the conversations that take place at PES meetings and in these pages.

As is customary, this volume begins with the presidential essay, distinguished invited essays, and featured essays, the selection of which is described in the preface that precedes this introduction. Thereafter, essays are printed in the same order in which they were presented at the annual meeting, and all of the above are accompanied by invited responses that are substantive papers in their own right. I will introduce the essays in a different order, one in which they are grouped according to common features or concerns. What follows is certainly not the only way the key points and recurring themes of the essays could be characterized, and I fear it is not even the best one, but I hope it will serve to help you locate philosophical fare ideally suited to satisfy your current intellectual appetite.

Cultivating Moral and Intellectual Virtues

A number of this year’s essays explain, illustrate, and defend new conceptions of important educational ideals in terms of the potential of these particular ways of thinking to improve education for personal and social development. Peter Giampietro takes up Heesoon Bai’s notion of autonomy as attunement to argue that it should be understood and cultivated as an intrinsically relational concept. Todd Rowen revisits Hannah Arendt’s account of wonder in light of Immanuel Kant’s characterization of the sublime, proposing that such “consuming states of apprehension” can facilitate the disruptions of established frameworks that are key to transformative learning. Trust is the focus of Suzanne Rice’s featured essay, in which she employs features of Annette Baier’s analysis of the concept to clarify the significance of trust relations between teachers and students as well as in education more generally. Dror Post examines the role of hope in education, introducing a distinction between Promethean and Epimethean varieties to characterize the place of hope in classrooms alongside other virtues such as wisdom and patience. Central to Ann Chinnery’s recommendations for moral education is the conception of compassion she constructs from the work of Emmanuel Levinas, in aid of building community in contexts of difference.
Virtue also receives due attention in the essays concerned with thinking. Yolanda Garcia Pavon and Pablo Flores del Rosario argue that an appreciation of what is “other” about the thinking of children yields a conception of philosophy as a “relational space” in which dialogue is central, and that this is the conception appropriate for classrooms. In their essays, Dale Turner and Christina Hendricks each address how critical thinking can be taught without appeal to standards or criteria taken as objective and universally valid, drawing our attention to the social contexts of agreement that are a condition of productive argument. Shelby Sheppard offers us reasons why philosophers of education should ensure that teachers and students appreciate how the study of controversy develops the intellectual and moral virtues — such as courage, confidence, honesty, and empathy — that characterize the educated person. In G.W.F. Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Tyson Lewis finds grounds for including in the teaching of dialectical thinking “the centrality of restraint, patience, and concentration as opposed to self-righteousness, stubbornness, and vanity.”

RESPECTING AND LEARNING FROM OTHERS

These arguments for the importance of personal qualities such as patience, discernment, trust, hope, empathy, and compassion are complemented by essays that foreground the social and relational dimensions of education. James Stillwaggon and Frank Margonis each focus upon the important topic of teacher-student relationships: Stillwaggon enlists Søren Kierkegaard and Jacques Lacan in support of the thesis that teachers must maintain some distance from students to preserve the relation as educative. Similarly, in search of a pedagogy that opens closed student-teacher relationships, Margonis seeks to balance Paulo Freire’s commitment to engage students in critical anti-oppressive education with Sharon Todd’s commitment to a Levinasian nonviolent pedagogy, in which teachers must relinquish the position of emancipator with its presumption of superior knowledge. The call to question assumptions about who holds superior knowledge is echoed in Charles Bingham’s essay, which urges us to rethink the role teacher authority plays in education for empowerment since, seen in the light of Jacques Derrida’s work, authority turns out to be more enigmatic than typically acknowledged by traditional, progressive, and even critical points of view. The question of how authority in teacher-student relationships is properly understood arises again in the essay by Charles Howell, which examines what responses to disobedience are appropriate given Christian perspectives on student responsibility. According to Howell, it is through talking about realistic approaches to classroom management that religious conservatives and secular educators could find common ground, the former’s belief in free will and the latter’s belief in social influence on individual behavior notwithstanding.

Considering the social and relational dimensions of education leads naturally to the questions: Can we learn from the lives of others? If so, then under what conditions? Bryan Warnick tackles this topic by showing how philosophers can help clarify elements of the process of imitative learning in which human exemplars are thought to play a central role. It stands to reason that, if we are to plan curricula on the assumption that children learn their moral lessons best from good role models,
then we should have a clear idea of the mechanisms or avenues through which that learning takes place. Sharon Bailin addresses the topic in her presidential essay by examining the philosophical significance of cross-cultural comparisons between different conceptual frameworks and corresponding ways of life. She describes how, through her research and travels, she has come to appreciate that the conceptions of creativity held by people living in other times and places differ from modern Western conceptions in ways that appear more contradictory than complementary. Analytically speaking, asks she, so what? Is there some epistemological benefit to be gained from studying beliefs and practices of other cultures? Bailin argues that, not only is it possible (contrary to what framework relativists might claim) for us to understand cultures with significantly different worldviews and social practices than our own, but there is also substantial epistemic merit in doing so, since revisiting our theories and frameworks in light of those new perspectives can result in better justified beliefs.

The topic of learning from the lives of others is broached in yet another way in Rebecca Katz’s essay, which undertakes to resolve the apparent paradox that the autonomous, self-governing individual so prized in liberalism is the product of a communal education involving enculturation. Katz enlists Nietzschean insights to critique current market-dominated educational systems that substitute such goals as pleasure, power, and fame for genuine self-development. Similarly concerned with a perceived educational overemphasis upon socioeconomic progress and uncritical cultural appropriation, Erika Kiss looks back to Plato’s *Protagoras* to recover a tripartite conception of liberal education that balances instrumental and aristocratic values with a Socratic love of virtue for its own sake.

**Identifying and Redressing Oppressive Power Relationships**

Ron Glass and Alexander Sidorkin also offer critical analyses of current educational policies and practices, in each case with systemic injustice as a central concern. Glass excoriates the “savage injustice” of a public education system that, through its various ranking and sorting mechanisms, limits the life opportunities of children in low-income, culturally and linguistically diverse (LI/CLD) families. Sidorkin marshals Philippe Aries flanked by Michel Foucault and Karl Marx to accuse public education of contributing to the systemic oppression of children by a capitalist class system that limits the rights of young people in order to consign them to unpaid labor in schools—the labor of accumulating the skills and knowledge needed for the economic system to produce profit for the privileged.

It is a short step from criticizing market-driven schooling to promoting educational initiatives aimed at producing more just educational, social, and political relationships. Kathy Hytten makes a case that we should help teachers use existing philosophical resources when teaching students to think critically and develop new resources for addressing injustice by paying more attention to the pedagogical potential of narrative, performance, and alternative forms of media. Barbara Stengel contributes to the cause a conception of responsibility as socially conceived and socially developed that, building upon the prior work of Barbara Houston, Dwight Boyd, Heesoon Bai, and Barbara Applebaum, yields important implications for how
we understand the educational function of blame. For their part, Helen Anderson, Robert Roemer, and Matthew Jackson offer analyses of the strengths and limitations of some of the competing conceptions of social justice education current in the literature. Anderson argues that, when read together rightly, the work of Jane Martin and of Cris Mayo combine to form a better framework for anti-oppressive education than either alone, since the latter’s focus on relatively privileged students complements the former’s concern with those who are younger and marginalized. Jackson looks at Henry Giroux’s critical pedagogy through a Levinasian lens to raise concerns about the potential for “ontological violence” when educators assume that the subjectivity of their students is comprehended within the scope of reason. In a bit of a twist, the essay by Roemer argues that, while Paulo Freire and Albert North Whitehead share similar ideas about what bad pedagogy looks like and about what kind of teaching will promote student freedom, Whitehead’s “pedagogy of the bored” has the advantage over Freire’s “pedagogy of the oppressed” of arriving at the same educational destination carrying less political baggage.

EDUCATION AND CULTURE: ASSESSING LEGAL INTERVENTIONS AND POLICY INITIATIVES

To the cause of promoting social justice Ken Howe contributes a careful review of empirical research relevant to assessing the chances that, given the political and cultural conditions current in the United States, educational policies favoring school choice will reduce economic inequality. His arguments are framed with Harry Brighouse’s “modest defense” of school choice in mind. Brighouse might not find an enthusiastic endorsement of school choice in Howe’s review, but he would find support for the position that philosophers should enter policy debates armed both with reliable empirical evidence and a realistic appraisal of what is politically feasible. In a similar vein, Anne Newman’s featured essay not only assesses the prospects for success of attempts to redress inequality in schooling through school finance litigation, but also evaluates arguments that rights-based claims alone will not suffice to achieve the equitable redistribution of resources on which social justice depends. In his featured essay, Mario Di Paolantonio critiques claims made by Mark Osiel and Carlos Nino for the educative role of public trials in new democracies, proposing instead that “radical democratic theory” offers a more accurate view than the deliberative model of the pedagogical potential of conflict in societies with democratic aspirations.

At the school level, Dianne Gereluk examines both the rationales provided for policies on dress (for example, school dress codes and uniform policies) and the reasoning offered in support of judgments on the legality of such policies. In that light, she raises concerns about the inequalities that can result when the principles invoked to ban religious, social, and political symbols are inconsistently interpreted and applied. Sharon Todd examines the recent debates over the right of Muslim girls and women to wear hijab to school to argue that conceiving societies as polycultural rather than multicultural would improve responses to cross-cultural conflict by more accurately reflecting both the gendered nature of cultural practices and the unstable, dynamic character of culture itself.
Silvia Grinberg’s essay introduces Georg Simmel’s notion of the “tragedy of culture” to reflect upon some unintended consequences of the processes of scientific rationalization that have afforded greater control over the environment at the cost of the disenchantment of the world. This is the dialectic of the Enlightenment: we gain rational autonomy at the price of existential meaning because evaluating competing ends is seen to fall outside the scope of reason.3 When education can only be justified on instrumental grounds, compulsory public school systems lose their legitimacy after they fail to yield the economic benefits they promised to deliver. Grinberg proposes that this very failure opens a space to question the hegemony of instrumental logic: “For those young people whose social, financial, and political lives have left them precluded, for those whose condition as workers and as citizens has been questioned, education could become a space for them to understand and to act against the strength of facts.”

Maria Teresa Yurén takes an equally long view of social and cultural change in her distinguished invited essay, in which she reconstructs six successive “epochal philosophies” guiding official educational projects in Mexico from 1821 to the present day. The conclusions she draws from her analysis reinforce concerns expressed in the essays introduced previously about the extent to which competitive political agendas and short-sighted economic imperatives govern public education’s priorities in both colonized and colonizing nations.

Attention to how the intersection of politics, culture, and education does and does not support the cause of justice is visible also in the distinguished invited essay by Joseph Carens, in which he raises the questions, “In what ways may we reasonably ask immigrants to adapt to us when they join our community? In what ways may immigrants reasonably ask us to adapt to them?” Carens argues that, from the point of view of liberal democratic political theory, justice requires the state to recognize and support the identities and cultures of immigrant groups as well as to respect their individual rights. In other words, justice requires of a liberal democracy a “public culture” in which immigrants are accepted as full members of society with their cultural identities intact — up to a point, at least. The general principle that he believes should guide the resolution of cultural conflict has, to my ears, a reassuring Canadian ring: “both parties…should strive for mutual accommodation as much as possible.” Aware, of course, that the devil is in the details, Carens explains and illustrates four distinct kinds of normative claims and concerns, requirements, expectations, encouragements, and aspirations, in order to specify more precisely what kinds of accommodations he thinks immigrants and the state can reasonably expect of each other.

Finding Education in Unexpected Places

Jessica Hochman and Christopher Moffett are both concerned, albeit in rather different ways, with the progressive educational potential of activities within urban landscapes. Hochman uses a study of how graffiti became a form of praxis for young New Yorkers in the 1970s and 1980s to consider whether—and, if so, under what conditions — youth-created media/performances constitute useful pedagogical “third spaces” (physical and dialectical) to discuss difference. Moffett contests the bias
against urban environments that he finds in much Environmental Education, which he suspects has inherited its dim view of cities and their dwellers from no less influential authors than Plato, René Descartes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Annie Dillard, Aldo Leopold, and Henry David Thoreau. Moffett offers us ideas for an experiential Urban Environmental Education inspired by the example and message of Jane Jacobs — “stop and look” — and the practice of the derive developed by Guy Debord to enable fresh perspectives on familiar city scenes.

**Moving from Empirical Research to Philosophy and Back Again**

Like Ken Howe, Leonard Waks and Karen Krasny use empirical research results to advance toward philosophical and educational objectives. Waks presents paradigm cases from Malcolm Gladwell’s survey of research on cognition to develop and defend both a new analysis and a new explanatory model of intuition, which in turn become the basis for his recommendations on the proper place of intuition in teaching and learning. Krasny turns to neuroscience and consciousness studies to support John Dewey’s belief that the sympathetic imagination plays a necessary role in the development of good moral character. If I read her rightly, she undertakes to show how appreciating the physiological basis of thinking (how consciousness is embodied) and the narrative construction of the autobiographic self helps explain why images and emotions arising from literary reading are so important to moral education.

Terri Wilson’s essay reconsiders the distinction between scientific and interpretive research in the context of recent high-stakes debates on two related issues: what counts as scientific research and what counts as good (that is, worthy to be funded) research or scholarship on education. Wilson reconstructs key aspects of Dewey’s understanding of inquiry to argue that, since the validity of all forms of inquiry is rooted in experience and depends upon the larger social contexts in which inquiry takes place, the scientific-interpretive distinction is less clear and less important than is generally assumed. This essay shows once again why it pays for empirical and interpretive researchers — however they are defined — to pay heed to the results of philosophical investigations as well as the reverse.

As you will recall, each essay mentioned here is accompanied by an invited response or two. Sometimes the authors are sympathetic to the way the issues are framed and the arguments are developed in the papers they review; sometimes they are not. In both cases, and in all the variations in between, the response essays serve to enlarge and enrich the many conversations joined in this collection: a philosophical feast indeed.

**Philosophy of Education in a Pluralistic World**

Previous editors of PES volumes, beginning with Nicholas Burbules in 1986, have commented upon the content and form of their year’s batch of essays in relation to key questions facing philosophy of education as a distinct field of scholarly endeavor. The questions they have raised include (in my words): Should we worry over the divergent ideas that currently exist within PES about what good philosophy of education looks like, or see that diversity as a sign of strength? Do academic philosophers of education need a clear and common identity for philosophy of
education to survive as a field? In what way or ways should we understand the relationship of philosophy of education to (a) philosophy as the “parent” discipline, (b) other disciplines and forms of inquiry, and (c) current policies and practices in public schooling? Should we try to convince teachers and administrators that our work is relevant to their needs; and, if so, how can we do so while still raising critical questions about the aims of public school systems and the means used to achieve them? Should we take firm positions on normative issues in education and, if so, on what grounds? Can we find a coherent epistemological middle ground between “anything goes” relativism, on the one hand, and “my way or the highway” absolutism, on the other?

My own thinking about the current state and possible future directions of philosophy of education also starts from a particular view of (a) the challenges that we face today as scholars, teachers, citizens, and sentient beings and (b) the objectives we might prioritize in our work in order to respond to those challenges. To my mind, our primary objectives under all those categories should include promoting greater cooperation and the nonviolent resolution of conflict. My rationale is simple: I believe that we need more agreement within and among communities, countries, and nation-states in order to deal adequately with such global problems as poverty and environmental destruction. If we continue to poison the water we drink, the air we breathe, and the soil in which we grow our food, then questions about the survival of philosophy of education will become, as it were, academic. We need nonviolent resolution of conflict because the persistence of opposing views on such fundamental issues as who should control use of the earth’s natural resources and to what ends increases the chances that disagreement will be resolved through force. Also, as current wars demonstrate, armed conflict not only obstructs the cooperation we require to respond adequately to human suffering and ecological degradation, it also contributes to those very conditions. The destruction of natural and social environments exacerbates the poverty that proves such a fertile ground for violence.

Elsewhere I have proposed that greater cooperation can be promoted by identifying and extending the common ground that exists between people representing rival points of view. I have also discussed at length how reaching some degree of agreement across radical differences might be possible, our different locations within past and present conditions of systemic oppression and other forms of domination notwithstanding. In line with that work, I wish to recommend here that we should consider how our particular ways of doing philosophy of education might contribute more effectively to systematic assessments of the strengths and limitations of competing worldviews and corresponding ways of life.

As I use the term, a worldview is a set of beliefs about the fundamental nature of things, including the origin, history, and structure of the cosmos; the kinds of objects that exist in the world; the kinds of relationships that hold among those objects; and the nature of humans and their place in the world order. Together with associated images and root metaphors, these sets of beliefs form a background to thought and action that we rarely reconsider unless an unexpected event or unusual
circumstance calls that background into question. The relationship between a worldview and a way of life is analogous to the relationship between the conceptual scheme of a particular paradigm of inquiry — behavioral as opposed to humanistic or transpersonal psychology, for example — and the attitudes, interests, norms, priorities, and practices of the corresponding community of inquiry. That relationship is not one of logical or causal necessity: the “fit” between worldviews and ways of life is not “tight.” Up to a point, different sets of beliefs about the world can be compatible with the same way of life, and the same set of beliefs can be compatible with different ways of life. This “looseness” of fit notwithstanding, I think it is reasonable to expect that our overall ways of life — our attitudes, interests, norms, priorities, and practices — will shape and be shaped by our fundamental beliefs about the world, and each will not be radically at odds with the rest.

I recommend that we seek to contribute more effectively to systematic assessments of competing worldviews and corresponding ways of life on the basis of the following beliefs. First, I imagine virtually everyone contributing to or reading this volume would agree that it makes a great deal of difference which images, metaphors, concepts, and explanatory frameworks mediate our experience and so shape how we perceive, feel, think, and act, both individually and collectively. If it is important to have better rather than worse conceptual frameworks to inform particular educational practices, policy initiatives, and research projects, then it is at least equally important to have better rather than worse sets of basic ontological, epistemological, and ethical assumptions to inform our overall ways of life.

Second, new developments in science have implications for our fundamental ontological, epistemological, and ethical assumptions that in turn bear upon important issues within philosophy of education. I have in mind the work by Brent Davis and Dennis Sumara on complexity thinking and its implications both for mechanistic worldviews and associated philosophies of educational research, and in particular the critique they offer of the epistemological assumptions underlying the 2001 act No Child Left Behind.6

Third, positions on specific topics within philosophy of education such as those taken in these essays are only fully intelligible and defensible as part of at least one worldview. For example, a position on liberal education based upon the belief that virtue is properly desired for its own sake is difficult to explain and defend if no plausible worldview can be articulated within which that conviction is intelligible and reasonable. Because the disagreements that profoundly divide us inside and outside national boundaries are often rooted in and related to the differences between competing worldviews, efforts to reach enough agreement for just, peaceful, and sustainable ways of life must go equally deep. I believe, in other words, that greater agreement on a worldview or set of reasonably compatible worldviews could contribute significantly to the resolution of many important disputes. Should agents of a state be empowered to use torture to extract information from people when the state expects that information to be important to its security? I submit that, if we thoroughly understood and believed in karma (or in the view summed up in the expression “As ye sow, so shall ye reap”), the answer to that question would be very clear.
Fourth, given the existence of worldviews that are in some cases incompatible, I do not believe the Rawlsian liberal strategy of prioritizing the right over the good is an adequate response to the challenge of pluralism. Maintaining and re-creating systems of public schooling involve too many beliefs about what is and is not real, what is and is not important, and what is and is not morally permissible to remain neutral between competing accounts of what it means to be a human being, and assuming a posture of neutrality risks reproducing the status quo. As I have argued previously, I think identifying an overlapping consensus in a particular context is an excellent beginning to, not a substitute for, dialectical assessments of competing sets of core beliefs.8

Fifth, the current state of world affairs leads me to believe that at least some of the core assumptions of our dominant worldview(s) are profoundly mistaken. This belief is consistent with the very many arguments advanced within PES and elsewhere that only a radical change of heart and mind effected through transformative education will enable us to respond adequately to the social, political, economic, environmental, moral, and/or spiritual crises that (depending upon our locations and perspectives) can be seen darkening the horizon and/or already unraveling the fabric of life.9 My hope is that systematic assessments of competing worldviews and ways of life will contribute to greater agreement on (a) what shifts in perceiving, feeling, thinking, and acting are most urgently required, (b) by whom, and (c) how they might be accomplished.

Sixth, the methods and results of all forms of inquiry — empirical, interpretive, conceptual, historical, literary, phenomenological, and more — would be relevant to the critical comparisons I imagine. I believe philosophy is the natural home for the multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary “scholarship of integration” that is required to assess, not just particular positions, but also the larger conceptual frameworks, root metaphors, metanarratives, and social contexts that they assume.10 In the past philosophy has included within its purview systematic attempts to show the advantages of one worldview and corresponding way(s) of life over its rivals, and I think philosophers of education are often well placed to contribute to such projects thanks to their front-row seats at the complex interplay of theory and practice.

Would we be required to do philosophy of education very differently in order to contribute more effectively to systematic assessments of competing worldviews and ways of life? As indicated before, I hope more philosophers of education would join efforts to engage in this type of “big picture” thinking. Otherwise, I expect no drastic departures from current practice would be required, since I think all the different kinds of inquiries and analyses we undertake have important roles to play in the broad critical comparisons I imagine as well as in the treatment of smaller-scale topics and concerns. Indeed, I anticipate that appreciating how different kinds of philosophical work can contribute in different ways to the development and/or critique of particular worldviews and ways of life will show how they and other forms of scholarship are (at least some times and in some ways) complementary.11 What I would expect in the short term if my recommendation was seen to have merit is that we would become more conscious about what set or sets of fundamental
beliefs are implicit or explicit in our philosophical scholarship, in part by more often taking advantage of opportunities to learn from the worldviews and overall ways of life of people from other times and places as well as from their more specific concepts and theories.¹²

I realize that the project of systematically assessing competing worldviews and ways of life might sound similar to “traditional” conceptions of philosophy of education that have fallen out of favor. As John Portelli tells the story, the limitations and failures of traditional conceptions prepared the ground for the emergence of analytic philosophy of education as the dominant paradigm within the field.¹³ Is my recommendation consistent with a postmodern suspicion of grand theorizing? How far should our distrust of metanarratives extend? How much background agreement and on what key issues is not only compatible with appreciating diversity, but also required to create and maintain social institutions within which diversity can flourish? All good questions — and just the kind that I think lead us directly to evaluating different sets of basic ontological, epistemological, and ethical assumptions. Moreover, the same sociological analyses of how ideologies maintain unequal power relationships that prompt suspicion of efforts to produce agreement also reveal the dangers of leaving dominant worldviews unchallenged.

My recommendation boils down, perhaps, to proposing that we should take heed of the proverb, “In constructing a philosophy as in building a ship, there is no point in going halfway.”

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The publication of Philosophy of Education 2006 is the result of the energy and expertise of many people. There would be no yearbook without an annual meeting, and there would be no annual meeting without an academic society, so my thanks go first to the officers and committee members who keep the PES ball rolling. Special mention is due to President Sharon Bailin and Executive Director Alexander “Sasha” Sidorkin for their large share of the initiative and hard work that brought PES to Puerto Vallarta.

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Fulfilling my responsibilities as program chair would not have been possible (or nearly as enjoyable) without the cheerful and very capable assistance of Pedro Cortina, whose fluency in Spanish bailed me out on more than one occasion. Gracias, Pedro! Thanks also to the Deans of Education at Simon Fraser University and UBC, Paul Shaker and Rob Tierney, who provided the funds to hire a graduate assistant.
After annual meetings end, much work remains to bring papers to publication. An important task this year was timely translation of Spanish papers into English, which was professionally accomplished by Gladys Gist. An equally important task was establishing the web-based OJS management system that enabled manuscripts to be submitted on-line. For their part in this my thanks go to Ryan Thomas and Nicholas Burbules at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The OJS software was developed under the direction of John Willinsky at UBC; I salute his efforts to reduce the financial and environmental costs of academic publishing.

Collecting, organizing, circulating, and copyediting the manuscripts was expertly accomplished by managing editor Tim McDonough and assistant editor Liz Jackson. We owe the publication of Philosophy of Education 2006 in large part to their efforts and to the final preparations for printing completed by Joyce Atkinson. I am very grateful for all their patient responses to my inquiries and for the many other ways in which they helped me with my part of the project. May editors of all future volumes be so fortunate!

1. In different ways, the essays described in this section bring to mind Bernard J.F. Lonergan’s argument that objectivity is properly understood to be a function of authentic subjectivity, a position introduced in his major work Insight: A Study in Human Understanding (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1958) and further developed in Method in Theology, 2nd ed. (London: Dartman, Longman, and Todd, 1973).


7. There are, of course, many interpretations of what karma is and how it works. For this context, I recommend the remarks by the Dalai Lama in The Universe in a Single Atom: The Convergence of Science and Spirituality (New York: Morgan Road Books, 2005), for example, 90–92 and 109–111.


11. For an overview of research underway to develop these ideas, see Daniel Vokey, “What Are We Doing When We Are Doing Philosophy of Education?” Paideusis 15, no. 1 (2006): 44–55; http://journals.sfu.ca/paideusis/.
12. By happy coincidence, while writing this introduction I received in my e-mail inbox a good example of such an opportunity: An invitation to participate in the symposium *African Education: Worldviews, Ways of Knowing and Pedagogy* that is scheduled to take place on November 24, 2006, at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC. Thanks to my location in the Pacific Northwest I am blessed by many opportunities to be introduced to indigenous worldviews and corresponding educational traditions, teachings that uncover assumptions unquestioned in my own work.