Introduction: Artists in Dialogue

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I have long thought of the essays published in *Philosophy of Education* as “artists’ sketches.” These are the preliminary, more focused but often less detailed, studies an artist does of figures, objects, or compositions before launching into a full-scale treatment of a subject. Not every sketch makes its way into a finished work, a work that is commissioned for display. But every sketch contributes to the artist’s capability to complete the work imagined.

Though preliminary in one sense, artists’ sketches can contain — and express — significant insight and even truth. And they are often of great value both for their power to explain or illumine the artist’s later work and for their individual impact as a piece of art. The classic examples of this are Leonardo da Vinci’s sketches, sketches done sometimes as a scientific study of the representation of the human person — anatomically and developmentally, sometimes as a disciplined practice in an attempt to get the folds of drapery or the angle of an arm just right, and sometimes in conscious preparation for a particular artistic work. Whether a study of Judas done in preparation for *The Last Supper* or a first compositional attempt for *The Adoration of the Magi*, Leonardo’s sketches provide a window on his understanding of his craft and artistic task and serve as a harbinger of his later efforts. Some sketches find their way into finished compositions almost “verbatim,” while others are rejected for a different solution to the artistic problem, but all are useful in shaping understanding.

So it is with this year’s *Philosophy of Education* 2007 essays. One cannot, in 4,500 words, offer an exhaustive analysis of even the simplest educational phenomenon, or the most accepted educational term, or the narrowest exegetical question, or the least contested educational policy, or the most rudimentary educational vision. And when those phenomena, terms, exegeses, policies, and visions are complex and contested, one can only hope either to unpack the issues, pointing the way for further inquiry, or to focus one’s own inquiry on a single specific question.

The authors whose work I introduce here offer both “problematizations” that unpack issues and careful considerations of focused questions. This work tells us something about how philosophers of education have spent their time this year, while affording us a glimpse of what kinds of more comprehensive works we may expect in the future. So what is on the minds of philosophers of education? “Body am I, and soul,” says Friedrich Nietzsche’s child. Few would say — with Nietzsche himself — “body I am entirely, and nothing else; and soul is only a word for something about the body.” Despite recent research findings in neurosciences, the philosophers of education whose work is published here maintain a sense that “soul” (or its secular analog, “self”) cannot be reduced to a physiochemical function. Nonetheless, as I survey this collection, I am struck by a near universal desire to attend to bodies and embodied experience as constitutive of soul and self, that is, to attend to body and soul.
That “body and soul” might serve as a theme for this collection occurred to me at the March, 2007, Philosophy of Education Society conference, at which these essays were first given voice. Alternate sessions focused on disabilities, spirituality, and girls’ sexuality. A new special interest group for spiritual and religious matters began to take shape. There was buzz in the hallways about bodies, souls, and the constitutive relations between them. As the essays were submitted for review and publication, I could see this theme emerging anew.

But I saw something else running throughout the set of essays you will read here, less a theme and more a common thread of concern. This is a concern with relation and the nature and limits of individual agency. Human actors are embodied, but they are also embedded in webs of relation with other persons — through discourse and culture as well as physical proximity and actual place. What then can we make of agency, of the power to act, to take responsibility, to be held liable?

I will also highlight a few essays — those focused narrowly on policies of public education — in a separate section within this introduction. But, as the careful reader will detect, even these demonstrate a consciousness of embodied experience and embedded webs of relation.

Before highlighting the essays that point you to both the theme of body and soul and the concern about relation and agency, let me acknowledge the limited nature of this particular view of the philosophy of education landscape. Any teacher being observed knows that a principal’s visit to the classroom cannot encompass that teacher’s performance or those students’ learning. And physicists tell us that one cannot observe any phenomenon without altering the phenomenon in some way. So this look at philosophy of education in 2007 must be taken with the humility that acknowledges that this is just one point on a curve intrusively observed.

**Body and Soul**

At this point on the curve, there seems to be an interest in bodies and souls taken together. President Susan Laird’s Presidential Address “Food for Coeducational Thought” and Kneller Lecturer Richard Shusterman’s “Self-Knowledge and Its Discontents” anchor that interest in this volume.

Laird skillfully argues that we should “reclaim foodways as objects of philosophical-educational study and for thus rethinking coeducation.” She acknowledges that hers is a “problem-posing essay,” one that ends with a series of rich and provocative questions that Laird explicitly offers as an agenda for future work. Laird’s focus on food and foodways as gendered practices stems from a concern about the hungers that plague souls as well as bodies. Her respondents Huey-li Li and Al Neiman extend that thinking outward to “glocal” perspectives and inward to issues of addiction.

Shusterman takes the Delphic maxim, “Know thyself,” seriously but asks, who or what is the self to be known? Shusterman rejects a soul/body dualism, briefly explores a full range of classic and contemporary interpretations of what it might mean to know one’s self, and comes down firmly in favor of a “somatic self-consciousness” rooted in body-based reflection as a way to achieve self-awareness.
but avoid melancholy and self-centeredness. Gert Biesta’s and Kal Alston’s responses each push Shusterman to understand the self, body and soul, in relation to others.

One of the great strengths of Philosophy of Education year after year is the essay-response format, and this year’s version is no exception. While each individual essay offers an interesting argument, it is the pairing of essay with response that illustrates the play of dominant themes, shared concerns, and points of dispute. This is so in the current collection as the Presidential and Kneller essays demonstrate, and I urge you to read essays and responses together to get full value for your time invested.

Laird, Shusterman, and their interlocutors set the “body and soul” theme, but they do not exhaust it. Cris Mayo, in her featured essay, “Disruptions of Desire: From Androgynes to Genderqueer,” begins with the body and argues that bodily desire is the energy that powers disruptions of often oppressive political arrangements and construction of “just, collective possibility.” In viewing desire constructively as “a founding move in ethics and social organization,” Mayo rejects a view of sexual desire as selfish and also rejects a view of desire as sublimated through contemplation and therefore instrumental to the soul’s wellbeing. Ann Diller’s response — that Mayo, following Judith Butler, focuses too much on desire’s power to alter future action and not enough on the curiosity and wonder experienced by the wholly present subject — urges Mayo, somewhat ironically, to pay more careful attention to embodied experience.

Joseph Meinhart (“Must ‘Real Men’ Have Sick Souls?”) and Jim Garrison speak directly to the question of “sick” and “healthy” souls as they use William James’s Varieties of Religious Experience as a tool to make sense out of the potentially miseducative aspects of masculinity. In “Teaching as Asceticism,” Darryl De Marzio takes up the apparently spiritual practice of asceticism as a way of transforming the self of the teacher into one enriched by being for others; Deborah Kerdeman responds by noting that being for others is a gendered experience and that asceticism, a constructive self-discipline, may be experienced differently by males and females. Jon Fennell begins “Character Education: The Priority of Philosophy to Procedure” with a quote from George Will’s Statecraft as Soulcraft and goes on to defend “a politics that takes its bearings from what ought to be.” Fennell sides with Will and Michael Sandel over Richard Rorty that philosophy must take precedence over procedure in character education. Daniel Vokey agrees with Fennell that “worthy passions” and “worthy aims” matter, but parts company to insist that procedure does matter, that to avoid indoctrination we need to know how we came to agreement over our worthy goals.

Interestingly, indoctrination gets several close looks in this volume. James Lang (“The Great Indoctrination Re-Construction Project”), taking a historical perspective, links indoctrination to the development of liberalism as a philosophy and argues that religious education need not be associated with indoctrination. Suzanne Rosenblith welcomes Lang’s reconsideration of the status of religious education with respect to indoctrination but cautions that any such reconsideration must be
linked to a view of rational action, of expanding agency. Barbara Peterson’s interest in indoctrination, analyzed in “Accountable for Indoctrination,” is prompted by her own sense of agency as a peace educator. In a self-reflexive move, Peterson wonders whether and when peace education slides into indoctrination and invokes I.A. Snook’s analysis of intention as useful in determining when indoctrination occurs. Brian Burtt counters with Tom Green’s consequentialist analysis, reminding us that “teaching is a story of an extended relationship rather than a brief encounter,” and that the consequences for autonomy must be evaluated over the life of that relationship.

Stephanie Mackler (“Educating for Meaning in an Era of Banality”) invokes Hannah Arendt’s notion of natality as an educational counter to the risk of meaningless in an era of banality, of “being at home” with meanings that go unexamined. She claims, “If banality is home, natality is exile,” and offers a “thermostatic” metaphor for balancing the banal and the natal in human living. Kathy Hytten accepts Mackler’s analysis that “adults who are seduced by banal clichés are easily prey to manipulation,” but wonders what Mackler’s use of the banal/natal thermostat — and the metaphors of “at home” and “in exile” — add to our understanding of education for critical thinking.

Concern for the physical and spiritual realities of place and space are commonplace in this collection of essays. Helen Anderson (“Learning (and Leaving) the Comforts of Home”) and Susan Douglas Franzosa explore place-based education and together articulate a “pedagogy of place under deconstruction,” linking Anderson’s notion of “homeplace” to radical pedagogy. Karim Dharamsi uses architectural design as a metaphor illustrating the interdependence of knowledge and norm as he explores “a divide in the epistemology of educational foundations.” Dharamsi suggests Robert Brandom’s inferentialism, a kind of epistemological contextualism, as a fruitful model. Randall Curren, in response, clarifies Brandom’s intent, questioning whether Brandom’s theory will do the work Dharamsi contends it will.

The authors of the essays mentioned above bring together interests in body and soul. They juxtapose embodied experience and the construction and recognition of meaning and meaningfulness. They see coming to be as rooted in realities that are always physical but never only physical. But they also see coming to be as coming to agency rooted in relation. This concern is crystal clear in many of the essays published here.

Agency and Relation

The agent of interest to the authors of Philosophy of Education 2007 is not the Enlightenment’s atomistic self acting in concert with an autonomous will. An understanding that persons are constituted in social relations framed by discourse and culture permeates the perspectives taken here. And when relations are understood as the unit of analysis — whether in theoretical physics or educational philosophy, it is the spaces between atoms and persons that are of interest. This is one of the reasons why I have chosen to highlight the dialogue between author and
respondent in this volume. What passes between two philosophers is, I think, more revealing of the quality of thinking than either essay standing alone.

Frank Margonis, in his featured essay, “A Relational Ethic of Solidarity?” sets the stage for the consideration of relationship and agency. Margonis stretches Paulo Freire’s theory of solidarity and co-intentional education using Emmanuel Levinas and Elizabeth Ellsworth to cover asymmetrical relationships. Denise Egéa-Kuehne supports Margonis’s choice to highlight Levinas and emphasizes the value of rooting solidarity in Levinas’s primordial responsibility for the other. Tyson Lewis also invokes Freire and compares Freire and Lukács on the subject of revolutionary organization in an effort to develop a revolutionary pedagogy. Mark Brenneman offers a “relational account” of Freire’s revolutionary leadership in response, melding Freire’s dialogical pedagogy with Emmanuel Mounier’s personalism.

Relational pedagogy and its implications for political agency is the focus of the interchange between Avi Mintz (“The Midwife as Matchmaker”) and Charles Bingham. Mintz makes the case that Socrates was an early proponent of relational pedagogy, based on his role as educational matchmaker. Bingham counters with the claim that pedagogical relations must be understood as political enactment. Martha Ritter (“The Significance of Finding a Witness in Liberatory Education”) articulates a case for “witness” as a particular kind of pedagogical relation. Paul Farber reinforces Ritter’s hint that witness is a relationship that intentionally empowers, one that enhances agency.

The concept of agency is Claudia Ruitenberg’s concern in “Discourse, Theatrical Performance, Agency,” as she mines Butler’s work on performativity for what it offers educational theorists. Lisa Weems supports Ruitenberg’s effort but warns us how devilishly difficult it is to inhabit the tension Butler seeks to articulate. Weems reminds us — a refrain sounded frequently in this volume — that it is “bodies that matter,” that performativity is effected by and effects the physical and affective dimensions of self and other.

Trevor Norris and Deron Boyles and Peter Giampietro and Michael Merry unpack the ways consumer society impacts schools to constrain agency. Norris (“Consuming Schooling”) tries to articulate the relationship between consumerism, schooling, and the possibility of valid knowledge. Boyles asks Norris what happens to agency if consumerism takes over. Giampietro (“Autonomy, Identity, and the Role of Narrative”) criticizes schools for giving in to “commodity fetishism” and thus circumscribing a student’s possibilities for becoming an “educated person.” He suggests an image of the “self as narrator” of his or her own life story as an antidote. Merry offers a critique of the view of autonomy that creeps into Giampietro’s analysis, while supporting his overall project.

Some of the essays in this collection focus on the conditions for constructive relations — within schools or in computer-mediated communication. Barbara Applebaum makes a strong case for accepting Lynn Weber’s rules for enabling nonoppressive interaction in the social justice classroom in “Engaging Student Disengagement.” She claims these rules promote respect while respecting difference.
Mordechai Gordon doubts whether Weber’s guidelines will work based on questions about the nature of the pedagogical relation that grounds education. Can rules for engagement be *preconditions* for teaching and learning social justice? Or are those apparent rules really the *goal*? Kalynne Pudner, in “MySpace Friends and the Kingdom of Ends,” raises similar questions about internet-based communication. Pudner wonders about the process of “e-socialization” that MySpace users experience and its impact on the possibility of practicing what Robert Kunzman calls “thick respect.” While Pudner advocates a Kantian response, James Dwight argues forcefully that a modernist ethic based on a modernist sense of identity simply will not work in a postmodern, hypertext world. Agency and relation are both altered beyond modernist recognition.

That agency and relation figure in essays focused on ethics and moral education should come as no surprise. Michael Katz and Megan Laverty offer a lovely exchange on “Competing Conceptions of Caring.” Katz compares the views of Milton Mayeroff, Nel Noddings, and Jaime Escalante as vehicles for enhancing teachers’ professional morality and argues in favor of Escalante’s version, both because it can be taught through the rich medium of film and because Escalante’s representation is rooted in the concrete work of teachers. Laverty concurs with Katz but for different reasons, emphasizing our “fundamental condition of being in dialogical relation” and care as an element in a “complex pedagogy of dialogue.”

Lynda Stone (“Should Blame Be Part of the Education of Character?”) and Dan Butin engage in a lively exchange problematizing blame as it figures in the project of character education. Using Michel Foucault as a foil, Stone notes that blame is missing in the discourse of character education yet present in the discursive practice that *is* character education. Butin questions Stone’s reliance on Foucauldian language and her characterization of character education as ubiquitous or even worthy of careful scrutiny, but follows her lead in pondering the links among risk, blame, and character.

Kevin Gary keeps the focus on questions of character in “Kierkegaard and Liberal Education as a Way of Life.” He maintains that agency is best understood as an awakening of ethical capabilities and that what passes for liberal education today neglects “education for moral commitment.” James Marshall supports Gary’s project but warns him to be careful of conflating liberalism as a political theory with liberal education.

Some of the essays in this collection that present themselves as narrowly-drawn philosophical or pedagogical puzzles about meaning and textual interpretation — obviously artist’s sketches in the sense articulated at the outset — also raise issues of agency and relation. Christine McCarthy’s exploration of “Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge,” via an interpretation of what she calls Deweyan realism, opens up to Heesoon Bai’s response that “relations of causality” are at the root of meaning in “dependent co-ordination.” David Diener’s traditional exegesis of *Republic V* in “An Argument Against Sight-Lovers,” maintaining the possibility of both knowledge and belief applicable with regard to the same object, opens the door to James
Stillwaggon’s contention that this view is incomplete without submission to the authority of knowledge. This move “links epistemology, politics, and education,” according to Stillwaggon. Naoko Saito’s rich exposition of what it means to “read philosophically,” layered through her rereading of Stanley Cavell’s rereading of Henry Thoreau’s Walden, invites Linda Shadiow to describe philosophical readings as “invitations into a liminal space where the writer and the reading, the teacher and the student, can labor together” in wonder over the text.

Two essays explore democratic living and democratic education in ways that highlight, not surprisingly, questions of relation and agency. Karen Sihra examines humility as a central democratic virtue, and argues that humility necessarily functions in democratic interaction whether one views democracy intersubjectively as relations of care, respect, and empathy — with Bai — or politically as an “agonistic pluralism” — with Chantal Mouffe. A.G. Rud sharpens Sihra’s delineation of “philosophical humility” as a key to democratic education and pushes her to state more explicitly that humility requires accepting the limits of our own knowledge while continuing the search for wisdom.

In “Democracy Without Ideology?” Greg Seals offers what he calls a “nonideological democratic theory of education” and explains, using Antonio Gramsci, the advantage of a nonideological social scientific theory over an ideological one. James Giarelli believes that Seals’s real agenda, obvious only in his last paragraph when he refers to winning “the war of position in which [democrats in education] are engaged,” involves a battle for educational hegemony. Giarelli positions himself on Seals’s side in the “war,” but urges Seals to reformulate his question to ask, what does it mean to do educational inquiry in the tradition of public democratic education?

Problems and policies of public democratic education — including the issue of educational inquiry — are the focus of the remaining essays in this volume.

**Problems and Policies of Public Education**

D.C. Phillips has been a consistent voice in the debate about what it means to do educational inquiry and it is the rare issue of *Philosophy of Education* that does not include Phillips or his interlocutors. This volume offers a critique of Phillips and his response. Emery Hyslop-Margison and M. Ayaz Naseem write in “Philosophy of Education and the Contested Nature of Empirical Research” that Phillips offers an “apology for the dominant research paradigm in education.” They base their claim on a close reading of an earlier Phillips essay, siding with Kieran Egan, Robin Barrow, and others that education is too complex an activity to be constrained within the claims of “generalizability, predictive capacity and construct validity [that] continue to haunt the legitimacy of empirical research in education.” Their real worry, revealed late in the essay, is “political passivity” on the part of academics handcuffed by a ideologically and morally suspect view of scientific inquiry. Phillips maintains that he has been misunderstood as an apologist for any form of science; his claim, he says, is that educational philosophers ought to have more than passing acquaintance with the practice they are theorizing.
Alexander Sidorkin, Francis Schrag, Ames Brown, and Robert Roemer consider policies related to educational funding and teacher education. Sidorkin’s featured essay asks “Is Schooling a Consumer Good?” and offers “A Case Against School Choice, But Not the One You Had in Mind.” Sidorkin takes the logic of the market to its furthest conclusion, arguing that schooling is not a consumer good but a market commodity. In a carefully drawn thought experiment, he demonstrates how we might change the incentive structure of schooling if we view learning as instrumental rather than as an end in itself, and how that changed incentive structure could result in greater equity in the face of socioeconomic diversity. Charles Howell recognizes Sidorkin’s courage in pursuing this experiment while questioning several aspects of his analysis.

Equity is also Schrag’s concern. He offers a straightforward scheme for “Postsecondary Schooling Education for All” in this democratic society, a recommendation that Heather Voke accepts with alacrity. Schrag carefully illuminates present practices of higher education funding to support his claim that offering “lifespan learning” to all is desirable both in the interest of “equal regard” for all citizens and with respect to the overall consequences of the policy.

In “What is Your Philosophical Disposition?” Brown questions the value of the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education’s (NCATE) Standard X, the standard that calls for dispositions of a certain kind in new teachers. He argues for philosophical habits of mind and “doing philosophy” over dispositions as character traits, urging that future teachers author their own philosophies of education as a means to that end. John Covaleskie agrees with Brown’s characterization of philosophy as an activity but shies away from the value of emerging teachers articulating a creed. Instead, Covaleskie suggests that philosophy is an analytical tool that can help teachers figure out what to do at any given point in instructional time.

Diversity and NCATE both figure in an interesting exchange between Roemer (“Unseen Teachers and the Limits of Diversity”) and Suzanne Rice about which differences make a difference in schooling. Using a Socratic argument, Roemer delineates the obvious but often overlooked point that diversity has limits. That is, “diversity” — an NCATE standard — exists to the extent that individual differences are perceived and identified, and perception and identification are functions of “context or the interest of the person noting the difference.” Rice applauds Roemer’s willingness to raise the issue, but questions where he draws the line and clearly worries that Roemer’s analysis fails to account for the ways in which school both accommodate and produce differences in students.

THE PROMISE OF CAREFUL DIALOGUE

Like most scholarly fields, philosophy of education has its ideological squabbles. Is wisdom to be found in classic texts or contemporary thought? Is a modernist worldview defensible in a postmodern world? Are classic liberalism and contemporary liberal politics, especially the politics of identity, compatible? Can a masculinist epistemology represent feminist experience? Does privilege — epistemic,
economic, cultural — blind logic? Is philosophy a love of wisdom or a practice of warranted assertibility? Can analytic philosophers and continental philosophers be friends? The answers, of course, vary depending on who is asking and under what circumstances. These are the essential, if admittedly ideological, questions that lurk always in the background as we explore the kinds of specific issues taken up in this volume.

I prefer to divide the practitioners of philosophy of education in two camps of a different sort: those who are careful and those who are not. Those who are careful make use of the philosopher’s tool (for example, argument analysis and construction based on defensible “logics,” linguistic analysis, phenomenological inquiry, narrative deconstruction, the “method of intelligence”) that fits the question asked — while taking pains to understand and value the perspective and thinking of those who do not agree, and to anticipate, respect, and answer the objections that will spring from their difference. The authors of the essays — and responses — published here are careful in this way. I trust you will find their exchanges — not just artists’ sketches but artistic dialogues — both valuable in themselves and promissory notes of interesting work to come.

4. This is, of course, John Dewey’s terminology. See, for example, John Dewey, How We Think, in John Dewey: The Middle Works, vol. 6, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976).
5. It is right that one opens this volume to a list of contributing and managing editors whose work is the backbone that supports this collection of philosophical essays. I consider it a coup to have secured the services of distinguished and generous scholars to aid in selecting and compiling Philosophy of Education 2007, and it was a blessing to work alongside them — virtually, that is — for the past year. Thanks to all the contributing editors for impressive professional discernment and welcome personal support. And thanks too for working with the kind of dispatch most editors only dream of!

In addition to yearbook essay review, Jeffrey Ayala Milligan and John Covaleskie took on added responsibilities for conference program development and I single them out here. Jeff coordinated the embedded evening conference, an effort envisioned by President Susan Laird, as well as all alternative conference sessions. John took an embryonic idea for “works in progress” sessions and made them a productive reality. James Stillwagon, not a contributing editor but a vital member of the Conference Program Committee, worked to keep Jeff and John — and me — on track. I very much appreciate the efforts of all three.

Joyce Atkinson and Liz Jackson bring different talents to their shared role as managing editors, but in each case their contributions were substantial. Joyce is the anchor. She is thoughtful, responsive, and inventive. She worked hard to let me do what I wanted to do. But most of all she was there whenever I needed her. What a gift! And I don’t know if editing and shaping a set of disparate essays and responses into a book is supposed to be fun, but I can say without hesitation that our four months of editing were quite enjoyable, largely because of Liz’s careful editing, wise observations, insightful suggestions, and generous sense of humor. Thank you to Joyce and to Liz.

No one has a more generous (if quirky!) sense of humor than PES Executive Director Sasha Sidorkin. I thank him for keeping me in the humor zone when things got a bit frustrating and I thank he
and Susan Birden for handling the production of the Jane Roland Martin Presidential Honors Project CD that supplements this Yearbook. Finally, I thank President Susan Laird for her confidence in inviting me to take on a task so challenging and so very rewarding.

IN MEMORIAM

2007 marks the death of long-time Philosophy of Education Society Fellow Thomas F. Green of Syracuse University. Those who have read his work know that Tom Green was a model of the category “careful” philosopher. This was perhaps most clear to me as he responded to Philosophy of Education Society colleagues on contested topics involving values, beliefs, and spirituality, always acknowledging others’ important insights while drawing the careful conceptual distinctions that would raise more questions. I — with those who knew him well — mark his passing.